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Abstract
A large-scale model of the global economy is used to investigate the
structural determinants of the Great Moderation and the transition to
the Great Recession (1986-2010). Beside the global economy perspec-
tive, the model presents the novel feature of a broad range of included
nancial variables and risk factors measures. The results point to the
relevance of various mechanisms related to the global monetary policy
stance (Great Deviation), nancial institutionsrisk taking behavior
(Great Leveraging) and global imbalances (savings glut), in shaping
aggregate uctuations. The paper 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on early warning indicators, assessing the information content of risk
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1 Introduction
Since the mid-1980s, a generalized dampening in macroeconomic uctuations
in the US and major industrialized countries has been observed. This Great
Moderationphenomenon (Stock andWatson, 2003, 2005) persisted for more
than two decades despite various episodes of economic, nancial and political
distress, until the eruption of the subprime nancial crisis in 2007, the oil
price shock in 2008, and the ensuing global Great Recession.1 The causes of
the Great Moderation have been debated in depth in the literature and sev-
eral hypotheses have been put forward. One prominent view attributes the
greater macroeconomic stability to good luckin the form of smaller shocks
hitting the economy since the early 1980s (Stock and Watson, 2003; Ahmed,
Levin and Wilson, 2004; Arias, Hansen and Ohanian, 2007; Kim, Morley and
Piger, 2008; Canova, 2009). Other contributions focus on the role of better
monetary policy following the second oil price shock in reducing aggregate
volatility (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 2000), shifting the economy away from
indeterminacy and leading to an environment of price stability (Lubik and
Schorfeide, 2004; Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2011). Finally, several sources
of structural change potentially responsible for declining output volatility
have been pointed out in the literature, such as improved inventory manage-
ment through the intensive adoption of information technology (McConnell
and Pérez-Quiros, 2000; Davis and Kahn, 2008), the expansion of the tertiary
sector and the concurrent contraction of energy-related and heavy industry
sectors (Carvalho and Gabaix, 2013; Ngouana, 2013), the decline in aggregate
consumption and investment volatility due to the dominance of permanent
technological shocks (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Galì and Gambetti, 2009),
and lower sensitivity of aggregate expenditure to current income and interest
rates due to nancial innovation (Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel, 2006).
More recently, the remarkable widening in macroeconomic uctuations
due to the onset of the Great Recession raised the issue of the end of the
Great Moderation. While some contributions argue in favor of a shift to a
new regime of higher macroeconomic uncertainty following the nancial cri-
sis (Barnett and Chauvet, 2008; Cannarella et al., 2010; Bean, 2010; Taylor,
2011; Keating and Valcarcel, 2012; Ng and Tambalotti, 2012; Ng and Wright,
2013), other evidence suggests that the Great Moderation might not be over.
Stock andWatson (2012) and Gadea, Gomez-Loscos and Pérez-Quiros (2014)
do not detect any structural change in the volatility and in other features of
the US business cycle in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Chen (2011)
1Among earlier events of distress since the mid-1980s are the 1987 US stock market
crash, the US Savings & Loans crisis (1986-1989), the East-Asia nancial crisis (1997-1998)
and the burst of the US dot-com bubble (2000).
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points to a reversion toward a low volatility regime in the G7 countries al-
ready occurring about the end of 2009 or the beginning of 2010. International
evidence of an only temporary change in the GDP growth rate is also de-
tected by Charles, Darné and Ferrara (2014). Larger oil price and nancial
disturbances (bad luck) would then be at the root of the rise in macroeco-
nomic uncertainty caused by the nancial crisis, driving the transition from
the Great Moderation to the Great Recession (Clark, 2009). Also the most
recent data, though not yet thoroughly researched, seem to suggest a return
to a reduced volatility macroeconomic regime (Furman, 2014; Davies, 2014;
The Economist, 2014).
In the light of the above evidence, this paper takes the perspective that the
Great Moderation and Great Recession share an important global dimension
and are tightly interrelated phenomena, with the purpose of getting a clear
understanding of their main underlying driving forces and the features of the
transition from a period of relatively subdued uctuations to an episode of
remarkably higher macroeconomic volatility.
To this aim, we employ an econometric approach with two novel fea-
tures with respect to the existing empirical literature. First, rather than
carrying out a country-by-country analysis, as in most previous studies, we
adopt a global-economy framework. In particular, a large-scale, factor vec-
tor autoregressive econometric model, exploiting macro-nancial information
for 50 OECD and emerging economies, is used to investigate global energy,
goods, labor, monetary and nancial asset market conditions. In addition to
providing a global perspective, the large-scale framework also grants the ben-
ets of more accurate estimation of structural disturbances, overcoming the
potential drawbacks of model misspecication and inconsistent estimation
of shocks a¤ecting small-scale VAR models (Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin,
2008). Second, we include in the model a large set of nancial variables,
allowing for identication of a broad range of structural disturbances related
to nancial markets, and a comprehensive array of risk factor indicators,
meant to capture investorsexpectations and sentiments about the state of
the business cycle.
Our ndings point to several structural supply-side, demand-side and -
nancial shocks as the main driving forces of macro-nancial uctuations over
the Great Moderation period and in the process leading to the nancial crisis
and the Great Recession, related to various mechanisms already documented
in the literature. For example, the early 2000s might have witnessed the set-
ting in of a new international monetary regime based on a Great Deviation
(Taylor, 2010, 2013; Hofmann and Bogdanova, 2012), as the monetary pol-
icy stance turned (over-)accommodative in many industrialized and emerging
countries, following the sequence of interest rate cuts implemented by the US
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Fed to contrast the recessionary e¤ects of the dot-com bubble and the ensu-
ing jobless recovery and deationary expectations. The narrative tells that,
originated in the US, the Great Deviation spilled over internationally through
the attempt of foreign central banks to resist unwanted uctuations in ex-
change rates and capital ows, by keeping interest rates low in the face of the
US Feds expansionary policy. Moreover, the destabilizing e¤ects of buoyant
liquidity were amplied by excessive risk taking of nancial intermediaries,
giving rise to the Great Leveragingphenomenon (Taylor, 2012), boosted by
nancial deregulation and innovation (Taylor, 2010; Kahn, 2010; Bernanke,
2010; Dagher and Fu, 2011) and misled risk perceptions (Lettau, Ludvig-
son and Wachter, 2008). An alternative explanation, the savings glut
hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005), points to foreign factors, rather than the Feds
monetary policy, as the main forces driving downward US real interest rates
and deteriorating the US current account decit. In fact, nancial crises in
emerging countries during the 1990s, especially in East Asia, led their central
banks to build up foreign exchange reserves to shelter from capital outows
by conveying national savings to international capital markets and pursuing
export-led growth. As the Great Deviation hypothesis, also the savings glut
view highlights the fact that the transition to the Great Recession occurred in
an environment of too low real interest rates, originating a sequence of asset
price misalignments involving initially bonds, stocks and house prices, and
then oil and non-energy commodity prices (Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas,
2008a; Caballero and Fahri, 2014). As the bust phase of the nancial cycle
set in, deteriorating balance sheets forced nancial institutions into delever-
aging and re sales of assets (the Great Panic; Bean, 2010), triggering a
contraction in domestic and external demand through a credit crunch and
worsening expectations about future credit supply and higher precautionary
savings due to mounting uncertainty about the resilience of the international
nancial system (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Bean, 2010; Bagliano and Morana,
2012; Morana, 2013a).
Our results provide insights on the relevance of those mechanisms for the
global economy in the period leading to the Great Recession. To preview
some of our ndings, global macro-nancial dynamics over the 1986-2010
period are due to a composite set of stuctural disturbances coming from
all (supply-side, demand-side and nancial) sources. Some of those shocks
displayed increased volatility well before the onset of the Great Recession,
which is then better interpreted as the nal outcome of an ongoing process,
in accord with the account provided by Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas
(2008b). The savings glut, Great Deviation and Great Leveraging hypotheses
are then complementary explanations of the transition dynamics leading to
the Great Recession.
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Whether early warning signals of deteriorating macro-nancial conditions
could have been detected while imbalances were growing is an issue also
strictly related to the interconnection of the Great Moderation and Great
Recession phenomena. The study innovates in this perspective as well, by
assessing the predictability of the recent contraction. In particular, the infor-
mation content of structural risk factor innovations for the prediction of the
timing and depth of the recession is evaluated. While the literature on early
warning indicator systems has been growing rapidly following the nancial
crisis (see ECB, 2014 for a survey), we are unaware of previous use of risk fac-
tor innovations with this purpose. We nd that dynamic models augmented
with lagged risk factor innovations could have predicted the timing of the
cyclical downturn and recovery more accurately than standard forecasting
models. The latter ndings further support the evidence provided in Morana
(2014b) and are promising concerning the inclusion of risk factor structural
innovations in early warning systems of indicators of macro-nancial risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the econo-
metric methodology is outlined, and details on specication, estimation and
identication of the structural shocks are provided. Sections 3 and 4 present
and discuss the empirical results concerning the structural sources of macro-
nancial uctuations over the Great Moderation and the transition to the
Great Recession. The predictive power of risk factor innovations for the tim-
ing and depth of the Great Recession is investigated in Section 5, and the
main conclusions are drawn in Section 6. The Appendix provides additional
information on data, estimation methods, and the identication of structural
disturbances.
2 Econometric methodology
The econometric model is composed of two blocks of equations. The former,
the global-economy model, describes the dynamics of a broad range of macro-
economic, nancial, and oil market global factors. The second block, the
local-economies model, captures the dynamics of the main macroeconomic
and nancial variables for a large set of developed and emerging economies,
and is used to estimate the unobserved global macro-nancial factors.
2.1 The econometric model
The global-economy model contains unobserved (F1;t) and observed (F2;t)
global macro-nancial factors and oil market demand and supply side vari-










economies model refers to Q macro-nancial variables for M countries, col-
lected in a N  1 vector Zt (with N = M  Q). The joint dynamics of the
global and local macro-nancial blocks are then modelled by means of the
following stationary reduced form dynamic factor model
(I P(L))(Ft   ) = t (1)
(I C(L)) ((Zt   )  (Ft   )) = vt (2)
where (Ft ); (Zt )  I(0),  and  are vectors of intercept components
of dimension N  1 and R  1 respectively, with R  N , and the contem-
poraneous e¤ects of the global factors in Ft on each countrys variables in









Global factor dynamics are described by the stationary nite-order poly-
nomial matrix P(L)  P1L + P2L2 + ::: + PpLp, where Pj (j = 1; :::p) is
a square matrix of coe¢ cients of order R, whereas dynamics in the local-
economies variables are captured by C(L)  C1L+C2L2+ :::+CcLc, where
Cj (j = 0; ::c) is a square block (own-country) diagonal matrix of coe¢ -
cients of order N . Finally, t i.i.d.(0;) is a R  1 vector of reduced
form global shocks driving the Ft factors, and vt i.i.d.(0;v) is the N  1





all i; j; t; s.
The chosen specication of (1) and (2) embeds important assumptions
on the structure of global and local linkages: (i) global shocks (t) a¤ect
both the global and local economies through P(L) and the factor loading
matrix , respectively; (ii) country-specic disturbances (vt) do not a¤ect
the global economy, limiting their impact only to the country of origin, due
to the assumed block (own-country) diagonal structure for C(L).
Consistent and asymptotically normal estimation of the model in (1) and
(2) is implemented by means of the procedures proposed in Morana (2012,
2014a), yielding accurate estimators also in small samples (see the Monte
Carlo evidence reported therein). Such procedures involve the iterative es-
timation of the unobserved factors and the local-economies model, followed
by the estimation of the global-economy model conditional on the estimated
unobserved factors (see the Appendix for a detailed account of the estimation
method).
Given the specication of (1) and (2), the disturbances of the global-
economy model in t have the nature of reduced-form innovations. In order
to investigate the role of underlying structural shocks in shaping global factor
dynamics it is then necessary to adopt an identication scheme. To this aim,
we impose a set of exclusion restrictions on the contemporaneous (within
6
quarter) responses of the factors to the structural disturbances, resulting in
a precise ordering(discussed below) for the elements of Ft. The structural
vector moving average representation for the global model (1) can then be
written as
(Ft   ) = HF (L)K 1t (3)
where HF (L) = [I P(L)] 1, and t = Kt is the vector of the R structural
shocks driving the common factors in Ft, with K being a R  R invertible
matrix. By assumption, the structural factor shocks are orthogonal and have
unit variance, so that E [t
0
t] = KK
0 = IR. To achieve exact identi-
cation of the structural disturbances, additional R(R   1)=2 restrictions
are needed. Since t = K
 1t, imposing exclusion restrictions on the con-
temporaneous impact matrix amounts to imposing zero restrictions on the
elements of K 1, for which a lower-triangular structure is assumed. Oper-
ationally, K 1 (with the restrictions necessary for exact identication im-
posed) is estimated by the Choleski decomposition of the factor innovation
variance-covariance matrix , i.e., K^ 1 = chol(^). Forecast error vari-
ance and historical decompositions are then derived using standard formulas.
Following the thick modelling strategy of Granger and Jeon (2004), median
estimates of the parameters of interest, impulse responses, forecast error vari-
ance and historical decompositions, as well as their condence intervals, are
obtained by means of simulation.
2.2 Specication of the global model
In the current application, the global-economy model (1) counts 33 endoge-








over the period 1986:1
through 2010:3.2 F1;t contains 12 unobserved global factors estimated by
means of the local-economies block (2) using a own-country diagonal dy-
namic structure of the rst order, as suggested by the BIC information crite-
rion. The local block counts over 800 equations and contains macroeconomic
and nancial data for 50 countries. Each unobserved global macro-nancial
factor is estimated as the rst Principal Component (PC) extracted from a
subset of cross-country, homogeneous variables in the local-economies model.
In particular, global macroeconomic and nancial conditions are captured by
a real activity growth factor (Y ) extracted from real GDP, private consump-
tion and investment growth series; an employment growth factor (E) from
the civilian employment growth series; an unemployment rate change factor
(U) from changes in the unemployment rate series; a real wage growth factor
(W ) from the real wage growth variables; a scal policy stance factor (G),
2A more detailed description of the dataset is provided in the Appendix.
7
capturing excess public consumption growth, from changes in the ratio of
public expenditures to GDP; a global US$ exchange rate return index (X)
obtained from the bilateral exchange rates returns against the US$; a core
ination (nominal) factor (N) extracted from changes in the series for in-
ation, nominal money growth rates, short and long-term interest rates; a
global excess liquidity growth index (L) from changes in the M3 (or M2) to
GDP ratio and the private loans to GDP ratio series; a real stock market
return factor (F ) from the real stock market price index return series; a real
housing return factor (H) from the real housing price index return series; a
real short term rate factor (SR) obtained from changes in real short-term
interest rates; and a term spread factor (TS) extracted from changes in the
term spread series.3
F2;t contains 11 observed factors, added to capture several sources of
nancial disturbances and fundamental imbalances with potential interna-
tional spillover e¤ects. Nine factors are US variables, namely: changes of
the nancial fragility index (FRA) used by Bagliano and Morana (2012)
and summarizing overall credit conditions, with reference to the corporate,
interbank and mortgage markets; the Fama and French (1993) size and
value factors (SMB, HML); the Carhart (1997) momentum factor (MOM);
the stock market liquidity factor (PSL) proposed by Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003); the leverage factor (LEV ) constructed by Adrian, Etula and Muir
(2014); a risk aversion index (FV ) obtained from a measure of stock return
volatility; changes in the ratio of US scal decit to GDP (Fd) and in the
ratio of US trade decit to GDP (Td). The remaining two observed factors
are the returns on the real gold price (GD) and on the IMF non-energy com-
modities price index (M). Finally, Ot contains 10 observed variables (listed
with details in the Appendix) concerning global oil market demand and sup-
ply conditions, included in order to capture potential e¤ects of oil market
developments on global macroeconomic and nancial quantities.
Estimation of the global-economy model (1) is then performed by the PC-
VAR method described in the Appendix and involves the rst 12 principal
components of Ft, jointly accounting for 80% of total variance, and three
lags, as suggested by Monte Carlo results (Morana, 2012) and specication
tests. Hence, 36 parameters are estimated for each of the 33 equations in the
model.4
3Detailed results on PC analysis and unit root tests are not included for reasons of
space, but are available from the authors upon request.
4Given the sample size available, the estimation of an unrestricted VAR(3) model would
have been unfeasible, counting 99 parameters for each equation.
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2.3 Identication of structural disturbances
Structural shocks are identied by means of a Choleski decomposition of the
factor innovation variance-covariance matrix. The chosen recursive struc-
ture of the global factors in Ft is motivated by plausible assumptions on
their relative speed of adjustment to shocks and supported by pairwise weak
exogeneity tests.
Since oil supply conditions are relatively exogenous to the state of the
business and nancial cycle, being heavily constrained by geophysical factors,
oil supply-side variables are placed rst in the ordering. A set of relatively
slow-moving macroeconomic variables, including both global and US-specic
factors, is placed next, and therefore allowed to react contemporaneously to
oil market supply-side conditions. The chosen ordering goes from the global
employment, unemployment, real activity, and scal policy factors (i.e., E,
U , Y and G) to the US government budget and trade decit to GDP ratios
(Fd and Td), and nally to the global core ination and real wage factors
(N and W ). It is then assumed that, over the business cycle, real activity
is determined by labor market conditions through a short-run production
function, with output growth feeding back on employment and unemploy-
ment with a (one-quarter) delay, capturing sluggish adjustment of the labor
market. Then, the global scal policy stance factor contemporaneously ad-
justs to business cycle conditions, having a (one-quarter) delayed impact on
real activity. Moreover, the inclusion of US scal and trade decit to GDP
ratios accounts for two potential sources of global imbalances; both variables
are assumed to respond contemporaneously to global cyclical conditions. Fi-
nally, ination and real wages are allowed to react within the quarter to labor
market and global business cycle developments. Oil consumption (C) follows
next in the ordering, based on the assumption that ow oil demand is heavily
inuenced by contemporaneous global macroeconomic conditions.
A set of mainly nancial, relatively fast-moving, variables, comprising
global and US-specic factors, is placed next, with the following ordering:
excess liquidity, real short-term rate, term spread, real housing prices, and
exchange rate global factors (L, SR, TS, H and X); these series are fol-
lowed by a sub-set of US nancial variables, namely stock market volatility
(FV ), size and value Fama-French factors (SMB and HML), and momen-
tum, stocksliquidity, and leverage factors (MOM , PSL, and LEV ); nally,
the remaining variables concerning the oil market, capturing oil price volatil-
ity and speculative oil demand, are followed by the non-energy commodities
price index, the global real stock return factor, the real return on gold (M ,
F and GD), and the US nancial fragility index (FRA). Within this set of
variables, the selected ordering implies that the liquidity stance (L), set by
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central banks according to the state of the business cycle, contemporaneously
determines the real short-term interest rate, and a¤ects asset prices and sev-
eral dimensions of nancial risk (captured by the size, value, momentum,
stocksliquidity and leverage factors, and stock market volatility), the latter
responding to global macroeconomic, liquidity, real estate and exchange rate
market conditions and being also a proxy for market expectations about fu-
ture fundamentals. Asset prices respond on impact to macroeconomic and
monetary policy conditions; in particular, global stock market returns are al-
lowed to react to all contemporaneous information on macro-nancial and oil
market developments, and to revisions in expectations on future investment
opportunities captured by movements in nancial risk measures.
Implementation of the recursive identication strategy yields, for each
equation in the global-economy model, a series of orthogonalized innovations
purged from correlation with all variables placed before in the ordering and
interpreted as underlying structural economic disturbances. As a general
caveat, it should be recalled that the interpretation of the results of the fore-
cast error variance and historical decompositions presented in the following
section in terms of structural economic and nancial shocks may be sensitive
to the chosen ordering of the variables. Since the structural model implied
by the recursive identication scheme is exactly identied, the assumed con-
temporaneous restrictions cannot be tested. However, the reliability of the
identifying assumptions is suggested by the results of a joint weak exogeneity
test, which, though not providing validation of the set of restrictions at the
system level, strongly supports the implied pairwise recursive structure.5
For ease of interpretation and exposition, the structural innovations de-
livered by our identication strategy are grouped into two broad sets of dis-
turbances, supply-side and demand-side and nancial, each including
several categories of shocks, around which the discussion of the empirical
results in the following sections is organized. Section 3 of the Appendix re-
ports summary tables of the identied disturbances for each category, and
the Supplementary Appendix provides a more complete account of their eco-
nomic interpretation, grounded on impulse response results up to a 10-year
horizon.
5The joint weak exogeneity test is based on the Bonferroni bounds principle, and is
computed using the 528 possible bivariate tests implied by the recursive structure involving
the 33 variables in the global-economy model. The test does not reject, even at the 20%
signicance level, the weak exogeneity null hypothesis (the value of the test is 0.005 to be
compared with a 20% critical value equal to 0.0004).
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2.3.1 Supply-side shocks
The main identied sources of supply-side shocks are oil and (non-energy)
commodities markets, the labor market, and productivity dynamics. From
the oil market variables, two composite shocks are identied: the rst is an oil
supply (OS) disturbance, capturing current and/or future shifts in the ow oil
supply coming from unanticipated changes in oil reserves, the oil production
mix, and inventoriesmanagement. A positive OS shock drives the spot
oil price downward, causing a negative correlation between oil supply and
the real oil price. Additional sources of shocks originated in the oil market,
mainly due to oil consumption preference shifts and futures price movements,
are aggregated in a otheroil market (OO) disturbance.
From the labor market, a labor supply (LS) shock, moving employment
and the real wage in opposite directions, and a labor demand (LD) distur-
bance, leading to changes in output and the real wage in the same direction
and in the unemployment rate of opposite sign, are identied. The former
can also be understood in terms of a shock to factor shares, as in Lettau and
Ludvigson (2014), inducing a negative correlation between real wages and
stock prices. Furthermore, a core ination (CI) shock is identied: being
by construction unrelated to innovations in employment and output, it bears
the interpretation of a shock to unit labor costs capturing shifts in the short-
run Phillips curve, with permanent e¤ects on the price level but no long-run
output response.
An additional source of supply-side disturbances is identied as a produc-
tivity (PR) shock: a positive PR realization leads to a permanent increase
in output and the real wage, and a decline in real stock prices. The counter-
cyclical impact on stock prices is consistent with both creative destruction
(Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Sto¤man, 2012) and pricing kernel (Canova
and De Nicolò, 1995) e¤ects. Finally, a non-energy commodities price (PM)
shock captures unexpected changes in commodities prices uncorrelated with
global macroeconomic and nancial factors, a positive PM having mild and
transitory recessionary e¤ects on global output.
2.3.2 Demand-side and nancial shocks
The identied disturbances coming from the demand side of the economy
concern an aggregate demand (AD) shock to the goods market, with pre-
dictable hump-shaped e¤ects on real activity and only a moderate impact
on the price level, and various innovations to global and US saving rates. In
the latter category, a negative global saving rate (GFI) shock, signalled by
a permanent increase in the common component of the public consumption
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to GDP ratio, leads to a long-run contraction of real activity and a decline
in stock prices. Similar e¤ects are observed following a negative US-specic
saving rate (GDI) disturbance, with a long-lasting increase in the US scal
decit to GDP ratio and only a short-run contraction in real activity. Fi-
nally, a non-US saving rate (GTI) shock is identied as the innovation to the
US trade decit to GDP ratio uncorrelated with global output movements
and with changes in the US scal policy stance, which should capture dis-
turbances related to the saving glutphenomenon associated with capital
inows from emerging countries into the US.
Several categories of structural nancial shocks are also identied. First,
innovations to the global monetary policy stance are captured by excess liq-
uidity (EL) shocks, i.e., changes in monetary aggregates and bank loans
growth uncorrelated with current and past movements in macroecomic con-
ditions. A positive EL realization has a negative impact on short-term in-
terest rates and triggers dynamic adjustments of real activity and nancial
variables broadly consistent with a boom-bust cycle: moderate expansionary
e¤ects in the short-run are followed by an output contraction and declining
leverage and asset prices over longer horizons. Innovations in the real short-
term interest rate (TL) and in the term structure slope (TS) are meant to
capture unexpected changes in the level and slope of the term structure of
interest rates that might be due to changes in expectations on future mon-
etary policy and macroeconomic conditions. Unanticipated changes in the
US$ exchange rate uncorrelated with current and past global macroeconomic
developments are interpreted as US terms of trade (TT ) shocks. Changes
in stock and house prices unrelated to global macro-nancial and oil market
conditions are interpreted as demand-driven and attributed to innovations
in investorspreferences, triggering portfolio reallocation across asset classes
and potentially impacting, through wealth and Tobins qe¤ects, on real
activity as well: a stocks preference (PF ) and a housing preference (PH)
shocks are then identied.
Various determinants of changes in investorsexpectations and risk at-
titudes on US nancial markets are revealed by innovations to a large set
of variables reecting US nancial conditions. The corresponding identied
structural disturbances are all orthogonal by construction to information
contained in past and current changes in global macroeconomic factors, oil
supply, the global monetary policy stance and global interest rate and ex-
change rate movements. In particular, positive shocks to the size (SZ) and
value (V L) Fama-French factors are interpreted as signalling greater prof-
itability of small and value stocks due to improved expected macroeconomic
conditions and investment opportunities and are followed by positive and
persistent responses of real activity. An innovation in stock return volatility
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identies a shock to the degree of uncertainty (RAV ) surrounding future eco-
nomic fundamentals and discount rates. An upsurge in uncertainty beyond
the level justied by macroeconomic and monetary policy conditions may
signal worsening expectations of future economic scenarios and is followed
by a short-run contraction in real activity and a somewhat looser mone-
tary policy stance. Finally, the orthogonalized innovation to a measure of
nancial intermediariesleverage allows the identication of a leverage (LV )
shock, capturing excessive risk-taking potentially leading to nancial insta-
bility and credit crunches. The observed downturn in real activity and global
liquidity conditions in the aftermath of a positive leverage shock, together
with a generalized decline in asset prices, broadly support this interpretation.
3 Forecast error variance decomposition
Our empirical analysis starts with the forecast error variance decomposition
(FEV D) of several variables in the global-economy model, yielding an aver-
age account of the sources of uctuations over the whole sample investigated,
and providing insights on the structural features of the Great Moderation pe-
riod. Results are presented in Tables 1-3 for various (categories of) structural
shocks and time horizons. In particular, the broad set of supply-sidedis-
turbances includes the contributions of oil market shocks (OIL, being the
sum of oil supply and other oil market disturbances), labor market shocks
(LM , including disturbances to labor supply and demand, and to unit la-
bor costs), productivity shocks (PR) and disturbances to the non-energy
commodities price (PM). Demand-side and nancialshocks are split into
the contributions of goodsaggregate demand (AD) and saving rate shocks
(SAV , being the sum of global and US-specic disturbances), US terms of
trade shocks (TT ), shocks related to the global monetary policy stance and
interest rates (MP , including innovations in global liquidity, real short-term
rates and the term structure slope), portfolio allocation shocks (PA, aggre-
gating preference shocks for stocks, housing and gold), and innovations to
risk factors (RF ), a composite category of nancial disturbances including
mainly shocks to the size and value factors, uncertainty and leverage shocks.
In the Tables and the discussion below, we refer to selected time horizons:
very short-term (from impact up to 2 quarters), short-term (between 1 and 2
years), medium-term (from 3 to 5 years) and long-term horizon (10 years).6
6A full account of the results is reported in Section A2 of the Supplementary Appendix.
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3.1 Output, employment, and ination uctuations
Table 1 (Panels A and B) shows that uctuations in global real activity
and employment are driven by both supply-side and demand-side/nancial
disturbances but with a di¤erent pattern across horizons. The latter broad
category of shocks accounts for 75% of global output variance in the very
short run, decreasing to 55% at the ten-year horizon. On the other hand,
employment uctuations are mostly driven by supply-side disturbances over
short horizons (74% of the two-quarter variance) with demand and nan-
cial shocks increasing their share up to 48% in the long run. Going deeper,
on the demand side, goodsaggregate demand shocks (AD) account for a
large fraction of output variance only in the short run (from 58% at the
two-quarter horizon down to 9% after three years), whereas saving rate dis-
turbances (SAV ) gain some importance over the medium term and account
for 15% of output variability at the ten-year horizon. Revisions in investors
expectations on US nancial markets, captured by risk factor shocks (RF ),
also become a relevant source of output variability over the medium term,
reaching 15% at a three-year horizon. Less signicant roles are played by
structural disturbances coming from monetary policy and global interest rate
innovations (MP ). On the supply side, shocks originated in the oil market
(OIL) and disturbances to productivity (PR) gradually increase their im-
portance as the horizon lengthens, each accounting for around 20% of output
variability in the long run. Over shorter horizons, labor supply shocks (LS)
give a sizeable contribution to real activity uctuations, reaching 20% at the
one-year horizon before declining to 5% in the long run. Labor supply dis-
turbances are also dominant for global employment uctuations, being the
most important source of variability at all horizons, though declining from
57% in the very short run to 26% at the ten-year horizon. Moving from
shorter to longer horizons, the contributions of other structural disturbances
to employment variance increase, reaching in the long run 24% for oil market
shocks, 20% for disturbances to risk factors, and 13% for global saving rate
innovations.
This initial set of results from the global-economy model suggests two
considerations. First, at a business-cycle horizon (3 to 5 years) the broad
picture of the main driving forces of output and employment uctuations is
composite and consistent. For both variables, a sizeable share of variabil-
ity is accounted for by shocks to labor supply, global saving rates and risk
factors (around 45% for real activity and more than 60% for employment).
An additional non-negligible role is played by disturbances originated in the
oil market and, only in the case of output, by productivity shocks, whereas
innovations to the monetary policy stance do not appear to be an important
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source of variability. Second, the rich array of variables included in the model
to capture changes in investorsexpectations and risk attitudes on US nan-
cial markets allows identication of structural risk factor (RF ) disturbances
that yield a signicant contribution to output and employment uctuations
(between 15 and 20% at a business-cycle horizon), a nding consistent with
recently proposed news-driven business cycle theories (Beaudry and Portier,
2014). In fact, RF shocks (being orthogonal by construction to current and
past changes in global macroeconomic factors, as well as oil supply and global
monetary policy and interest rate changes) can signal revisions in expecta-
tions of future economic fundamentals and, a¤ecting rmsinvestment and
householdslabor supply, might be an autonomous source of business cycle
uctuations.7
Panel C of Table 1 shows results for global core ination. Supply-side
shocks account for the bulk of ination variability in the very short run (75%
at the two-quarter horizon), and gradually lose importance over longer hori-
zons in the face of demand-side and nancial disturbances, reaching 48% in
the long run. In particular, unit labor cost shocks (CI) are responsible for
a large fraction of ination variability, going from 46% (at the two-quarter
horizon) down to less than 20% (ten-year), followed by labor demand distur-
bances (around 15% across all horizons). Relevant contributions to ination
variability are given by shocks to global saving rates (particularly non-US,
GTI) and to risk factors, each category acounting up to 15-20% of the vari-
ance in the long run. Overall, at the business-cycle horizon, more than 70%
of ination uctuations may be attributed to labor market, saving rate and
risk factor disturbances, whereas innovations to global monetary policy play
a minor role at all horizons. Finally, as displayed in Panel D, non-US saving
rate shocks (GTI) are also the main driving force of uctuations in the US
trade decit to GDP ratio, their contribution being 60% in the very short
term and more than 50% even in the long run, a nding consistent with the
saving glutexplanation of the US current account imbalance dynamics.
7Moreover, the noticeable contribution, within the category of risk factor disturbances,
of innovations to the Fama-French size factor (SZ) is also consistent with the view that
small rms do contribute to business cycle uctuations, as well as with the relevance of
nancial acceleratormechanisms. Small, poorly collaterized rms have limited access
to external capital markets and pay a higher external nance premium. Then, a positive
shock to borrowers creditworthiness turns into a lower external nance premium and to
higher investment, triggering a nancial accelerator e¤ect.
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3.2 Liquidity, leverage and asset price uctuations
Table 2 presents variance decomposition results for two variables related to
the global monetary policy stance, namely global excess liquidity and real
short-term interest rate changes (capturing developments in monetary and
bank loans aggregates, and in the level of the term structure of interest rates,
respectively), and a (US) nancial sector leverage measure.
Panel A shows that uctuations in global liquidity are mainly demand-
determined in the short and medium run, with demand-side and nancial
shocks accounting for around 70% of variability at the one-year horizon,
declining to 40% in the long term, whereas supply-side, particularly oil mar-
ket, disturbances gain importance over longer horizons. A relatively large
share of uctuations in liquidity is attributable to shocks to economic fun-
damentals, mainly goods aggregate demand (AD) and global saving rate
(SAV ) disturbances, jointly accounting for 44% of the two-quarter and 22%
of the two-year variance. This is broadly consistent with the countercyclical
use of monetary policy in OECD (Sutherland, 2010) and in some emerging
countries (McGettigan et al., 2013). However, changes in global liquidity un-
correlated with current and past movements in macroeconomic conditions,
interpretable as innovations to the stance of global monetary policy (EL),
give a sizeable contribution to liquidity uctuations, amounting to 20-25% up
to a three-year horizon, a nding consistent with the great deviationview
of monetary policy conduct over a large part of our sample period (Taylor
2010, 2013).
Evidence of uctuations unrelated to structural shocks to macroeconomic
fundamentals is also provided by the variance decomposition of the real global
short-term interest rate in Panel B. In particular, shocks to the term struc-
ture level (TL) account for 30-40% of the short-rate variability at all horizons.
Less important, though signicant, contributions are provided by goodsag-
gregate demand and global saving rate disturbances, and, from the supply
side, by productivity shocks.
Panel C shows the main sources of uctuations in US nancial intermedi-
ariesleverage. A remarkable share of variability, ranging from 70% on impact
to 42% from a two-year horizon onwards, is attributable to risk factor shocks.
Within this category, relevant contributions are provided by shocks to the
degree of uncertainty about future economic fundamentals (RAV ) and, most
importantly, by (own) leverage disturbances (LV ). Being uncorrelated with
global macroeconomic, monetary policy and interest rate conditions as well
as other US risk factors, the latter shocks capture nancial intermediaries
excessive risk-taking behavior potentially leading to nancial instability, co-
herently with the great leveragingtheory (Taylor, 2012).
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As shown in Table 3, a sizeable role for structural disturbances unrelated
to macroeconomic fundamentals is also a common feature of uctuations
in several asset prices. A fraction of variability in the US$ exchange rate
ranging from 50% on impact to 30% from a one-year horizon onwards is
attributable to a US terms of trade shock (TT ) uncorrelated with current and
past developments in real activity and other global macroeconomic conditions
(Panel A). Disturbances originated in the oil market account for around
25% of the exchange rate variability over horizons longer than one year,
whereas shocks to global saving rates and the monetary policy stance play
a negligible role. Fluctuations in real stock prices (Panel B) are mainly
driven by purely nancial disturbances, with portfolio allocation (PA) and
risk factor shocks jointly accounting for 50% of the variance at the two-
quarter and 40% at the three-year horizons. A similar pattern characterizes
real house price uctuations (Panel C), with portfolio allocation (mainly
due to housing preference, PH) and risk factor shocks explaining 45% of
the two-quarter and 30% of the three-year variance. Among fundamental
determinants, oil market disturbances play a major role in both stock and
house price uctuations, accounting for an increasing share of the variance
across horizons, reaching 33% and 41% respectively in the long run. Finally,
Panel D shows that uctuations in real non-energy commodities prices are
determined notably by shocks to goodsaggregate demand in the short run,
with more than 20% of the variance accounted for at a two-quarter horizon,
and by risk factor disturbances in the medium to long run, reaching 22% at
the three-year horizon.
4 Evolving macro-nancial dynamics since the
mid-1980s
While forecast error variance decompositions yield an average account of the
sources of global uctuations over the whole time span investigated, the tran-
sition from the Great Moderation to the Great Recession is better assessed
by looking at historical decompositions, that allow to disentangle the con-
tributions of the various structural disturbances to the dynamics of global
macro-nancial variables on a quarter by quarter basis. Cumulative histor-
ical decompositions (net of base predictions) are depicted in Figure 1-5 for
selected global variables. In all plots, dashed lines portray the behavior of
a global factor over the whole 1986-2010 sample, and solid lines show the
contribution of each structural shock of interest to global factor dynamics.
Shaded areas in the gures correspond to four global recessionary episodes
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that we identify with protracted declines in the real activity global factor
(Y , see Figure 1): (i) a recession in the early 1990s (from 1990:2 to 1993:2),
following the collapse of the high-yield market (1989-1990) and the peak of
the Savings & Loans crisis (1986-1989) in the US, the burst of the real es-
tate bubble in Japan (1989-1991), the economic crisis in India (1991), the
banking crisis in Finland and Sweden (1991-1993), and the rst Persian Gulf
War and the ensuing oil price shock (1990); (ii) a relatively short down-
turn in the late 1990s (1997:3-1998:3), associated with the nancial crisis in
East-Asia and Russia (1997-1998); (iii) a recessionary period in the early
2000s (2000:4-2003:2), following the burst of the dot-com nancial bubble,
accounting scandals (2000) and the September 11th terrorist attack (2001) in
the US, the economic crisis in Argentina (1999-2002) and the second Persian
Gulf War (started in 2003) and the related oil price shock; and nally (iv)
the Great Recession (2008:2-2009:3) ignited by the US subprime nancial cri-
sis (2007-2009) and the third oil price shock (2007-2008).8 Tables 4-6 focus
on those four episodes, presenting the contributions of various categories of
structural disturbances to the overall change of selected global variables in
the detected recessionary periods, as well as in the four quarters preceding
and following recessions.
4.1 Real activity, employment and ination
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, consistently with the forecast error variance de-
composition results, the dynamics of global real activity (Y ) and employment
(E) are shaped by shocks from all (supply-side, demand-side and nancial)
sources over the 1986-2010 sample as a whole. Yet, two sub-periods can be
broadly distinguished with somewhat di¤erent macro-nancial features: the
rst decade of the sample up to the mid-1990s and the latter part of the
period starting thereof.
Wider uctuations in the contribution of several structural disturbances
to global output are detected from the mid-1990s onwards, particularly for
productivity (PR), goodsaggregate demand (AD), global saving rate (SAV )
shocks (Figure 1, rst row) and, to a smaller extent, for shocks to portfolio
allocation (PA) and to the US terms of trade (TT ) (Figure 1, second row).
On the other hand, a similar contribution to global output dynamics across
subsamples is provided by other structural disturbances, such as those orig-
8For the sake of comparison, the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) identies three recessions in the US over the whole
1986-2010 period: 1990:3-1991:1; 2001:1-2001:4; 2007:4-2009:2. Two recessionary episodes
for the Euro Area countries are detected by the Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Com-
mittee of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR): 1992:1-1993:3; 2008:1-2009:2.
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inated in the labor market (LM , rst row) and the risk factor shocks (RF ,
second row). Due to sign compensations, the increased variability of some im-
portant sources of shocks did not a¤ect the actual volatility of global output
until the recent Great Recession episode and went unnoticed in the literature.
In fact, many empirical studies relate the widening in real activity uctua-
tions to the 2008-2009 recession only (Clark, 2009; Canarella, Fang, Miller
and Pollard, 2010; Chen, 2011; Stock and Watson, 2012; Charles, Darné and
Ferrara, 2014; Gadea, Gomez-Loscos and Pérez-Quiros, 2014), whereas our
ndings point to an increase in volatility of various important sources of dis-
turbances preceding the onset of the Great Recession. Moreover, at a more
general level, they also raise the issue of the potential contribution of nancial
innovation and liberalization to macroeconomic instability, as the widening
in real activity uctuations associated with productivity, portfolio allocation,
and aggregate demand disturbances might be related to changes in the nan-
cial structure of the global economy.9 Global employment uctuations show
a broadly similar, though less clear-cut, pattern across sub-periods (Figure
2), with saving rate shocks and (to a lesser extent) productivity disturbances
displaying a larger variability since the mid-1990s, in contrast to risk factor
and labor market shocks.
Focusing on the global recessionary periods mentioned above, several ad-
ditional features of global real activity and employment uctuations can be
noted in Panel A and B of Table 4. Overall, demand-side and nancial
shocks account for the bulk of output declines during all recessions from the
mid-1980s. For example, in the 2000-2003 recession, they determine a drop
of -5.3% out of an overall decrease in output of -6.9% (reported in the last
9For example, Gorton and Ordonez (2014) present a model where a credit cycle is ini-
tially sustained by a productivity growth revival, subsequently dampened as productivity
advances fade away. Enhanced credit conditions, amplifying the response of consumption
and investment to improvements in the economic outlook and increasing the leverage of
nancial institutions, might then enhance economic volatility during upturns and nan-
cial fragility over the business cycle. Indeed, the timing of the 1996-2004 US productivity
growth revival (2.9% yearly on average; Gordon, 2012) is consistent with a link between
productivity dynamics and the ensuing nancial crisis. Moreover, De Haan and Sterk
(2011) found weak evidence of a stabilizing role of nancial innovation since the mid-
1980s. Actually, the increasing contribution of the nance and building sectors to GDP
formation in the US and in other G-7 countries, occurring over a period of sustained
growth in asset prices, might have led to a decline in the diversication of the sectoral
composition of the economy and in the stabilizing e¤ect of macroeconomic shocks (Car-
valho and Gabaix, 2013). Indeed, Bagliano and Morana (2014) detect a rising fragility in
the US nancial sector already since the mid-1990s, more sizably surging since mid-2000s,
driven by nancial and oil market supply-side disturbances. The latter were dominated
by stabilizing macroeconomic shocks until the mid-1990s, and o¤set thereafter, until the
nancial crisis set in.
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column of Panel A), and explain -9.3% of the output decline amounting to
-15.4% during the 2008-2009 Great Recession. A similar observation applies
to global employment, for which demand-side and nancial shocks account
for -14% out of an overall -18% decline in the early-1990s contraction and
-7.3% out of -10.6% in the Great Recession period. However, supply-side
disturbances become more relevant for global output uctuations since the
late-1990s, explaining -1.5% and -6% of real activity drops in the early 2000s
and Great Recession periods, respectively. This result is mostly attributable
to a di¤erent role played by productivity shocks across recessions, partially
dampening the contractionary e¤ects of demand-side disturbances in the two
recessions of the 1990s and sizably contributing to deepen the output drop
in the 2000s episodes. Oil market shocks provided a relatively limited con-
tribution to all recessions (e.g. explaining only -0.5% of the -15% drop in
global output in 2008-2009), but imparted a persistent downward trend in
real activity from the mid-1990s (Figure 1, rst row).
The identication strategy adopted here allows also to uncover similarities
between the recent Great Recession and some of the previous contractionary
episodes in terms of their main structural driving forces. In particular, in
both the 2008-2009 and the early 1990s recessions, shocks originated in the -
nancial sector of the economy played a remarkable role in determining output
and employment drops. Portfolio allocation shocks (PA) sizably contributed
to both recessions, accounting for around -2%/-3% of actual declines in out-
put and employment, whereas disturbances related to the monetary policy
stance (MP ) had a larger impact in the 1990-1993 contraction, when they can
explain some -3.8% and -4.2% drops in output and employment, respectively
(-1.6% and -1.1% during the Great Recession, respectively). Conversely, in-
novations to risk factors (RF ), signalling changes in investorsexpectations
and risk attitudes, gave a more substantial contribution in the Great Re-
cession, accounting for -2% of the output and -2.5% of the employment fall
(-0.8% for both during the early 1990s recession). Within the latter category
of disturbances, size (SZ) and leverage (LV ) shocks were the most relevant
determinants. Overall, those results can be understood by noting that the
early-1990s and the 2008-2009 recessions share a broadly similar boom-bust
credit cycle origin, rooted in the Savings & Loans and in the subprime mort-
gage market crisis respectively, as well as deep contractions in asset prices
(see below). They are also consistent with Stock and Watson (2012), point-
ing to a more sizable contribution to the depth of the Great Recession by
nancial disturbances rather than oil market shocks. Our global perspective,
however, provides evidence of the relevance of disturbances from a broader
range of sources, including productivity, the labor market, portfolio alloca-
tion choices, and risk factor measures.
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Table 4 also shows the contribution of various structural shocks to global
output and employment uctuations in the rst four quarters of the recoveries
following each recession. Several features are worth mentioning. Concerning
real activity (Panel A), all recoveries, with the only partial exception of the
1997-1998 episode, are mainly driven by supply-side forces, with demand-
side and nancial shocks having an o¤setting e¤ect in the two most recent
recessions, providing a -0.3%/-0.4% contribution to relatively mild output
expansions of around 0.5%. Global employment (Panel B) displays reduc-
tions not only in the year following the Great Recession (-1.5%), but also
during the recoveries occurred after the early-1990s and the early-2000s con-
tractions (amounting to -1.4% and -0.5%, respectively).10 The latter results
are notable since they document that the jobless recovery phenomenon,
so far detected for the US economy only (Groshen and Potter, 2003; Cama-
cho, Pérez-Quiros and Mendizabal, 2011; Kolesnikova and Liu, 2011), has
an important global dimension, and extends back to (at least) the early
1990s. According to our structural historical decomposition, both supply-
side and demand-side/nancial driving forces account for the jobless recovery
episodes, the latter disturbances showing the larger contribution. Focusing on
the recovery phase following the Great Recession, portfolio allocation shocks
and, within the risk factor shocks category, innovations to the leverage factor
were the most relevant structural determinants of a nancial nature. Among
supply-side inuences, productivity disturbances (-0.4%) and labor market
shocks (-0.7%), only partially o¤set by oil market shocks (0.9%), sizably
contributed to jobless growth in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 recession.
Relative to Stock and Watson (2012), arguing that the jobless recovery from
the Great Recession in the US was caused mostly by a slowing down in trend
labor force growth, our results, based on a ner identication of structural
shocks, describe a more composite picture, pointing also to productivity and
nancial shocks (-1.3%) as signicant determinants of the jobless recovery
phenomenon.
Finally, as shown in Figure 3 and Table 4 (Panel C), global ination
dynamics (N) are consistent with the empirical features detected for real
activity and employment over the investigated sample. Oil market shocks
(OIL) put an upward pressure on prices only up to the mid-1990s (Figure
3, rst row), having a downward inuence over the second sub-period, es-
pecially since 2005. Additional negative e¤ects over the whole sample are
10The exception to this pattern is the recovery after the 1997-1998 recession, during
which employment rose by 3.8%. However, from the perspective of global employment,
the whole late-1990s episode displays peculiar features, since even during the recession
period employment actually rose by 4.6% in the face of a contraction of global output of
2.8%.
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attributable to global monetary policy stance shocks (MP , rst row), coher-
ently with their recessionary trend impact on global output and employment
(rst row of Figures 1 and 2). Overall, both cost-push and demand-pull fac-
tors account for ination uctuations over the Great Moderation. Yet, while
ination dynamics up to the mid-1990s are mostly determined by supply-side
disturbances mainly originated in the oil and labor markets (LM , rst row),
the contribution of demand-side, especially goodsaggregate demand (AD)
and global saving rate (SAV , rst row), shocks is larger over the second
sub-sample. A similar pattern is detected for some nancial source of distur-
bances, namely portfolio allocation (PA) and risk factor shocks (RF , second
row). As shown in Table 4 (Panel C), demand-side and nancial shocks
also provide larger disinationary impulses in all recessionary episodes, ac-
counting for -0.47% of the global ination decline occurred in the early-1990s
contraction (-0.64%) and -0.22% out of a -0.36% decrease in the Great Re-
cession. In the latter episode, a notable contribution of risk factor shocks,
explaining -0.15% of the global ination decline, is also detected.
4.2 Global imbalances, liquidity and nancial markets
uctuations
We now turn to a discussion of the main determinants of uctuations in
additional important US and global macroeconomic and nancial variables
and to the analysis of the developments leading to the onset of the recent
nancial crisis and Great Recession. Our results point to tight relationships
between the buildup of global imbalances, the global monetary policy stance
and liquidity conditions, and uctuations in risk factors and asset prices. The
overall picture is broadly consistent with the explanation of the deep origins
and main mechanisms underlying the recent crisis and ensuing recession pro-
vided by Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2008a, 2008b), that we adopt as
an organizing framework to discuss our evidence. According to this account,
three phases can be distinguished in macro-nancial dynamics since the late
1990s. The pre-crisis period is characterized by the building up of global
external imbalances and a savings glutphenomenon, with a global excess
demand for safe assets, directing capital ows from emerging markets to the
US. This reallocation of capital ows contributed to maintain low US and
world real interest rates, reinforcing the expansionary e¤ects of the Federal
Reserves monetary policy, and fuelled a boom in the US housing and related
credit markets, putting pressure on the securitization mechanism, that even-
tually broke down in early 2007 in the face of falling house prices. The rst
stage of the crisis, from mid-2007 through mid-2008, is then marked by the
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freezing of the entire securitization industry, vanishing condence and per-
vasive ights to quality, creating even more pressure on the provision of safe
nancial assets. The ensuing deterioration of balance sheets forced nancial
institutions into deleveraging and re sales of assets, transmitting the nega-
tive house price shock to the US and world stock markets, that experienced
a sharp contraction through early 2009. At the same time, driven by fast
growth in emerging economies and portfolio allocation e¤ects, oil as well as
other commodity prices rose considerably, even accelerating their pace from
mid-2007 to mid-2008. Finally, the second phase of the crisis, from mid-2008
to mid-2009, is characterized by the real e¤ects of the nancial turmoil, the
bursting of the oil and non-energy commodity price bubbles, and the ensuing
decline in global real activity. A sequence of asset price misalignments, mi-
grating over time from bond to housing, credit, stock and oil and non-energy
commodity markets, is then a distinguishing feature of the 2000s.
In what follows, we will focus rst on global imbalances and monetary
policy conditions, and then on the dynamics of asset prices.
4.2.1 The savings glut, the Great Deviation and the Great
Leveraging
Figure 4 shows the historical decomposition of several variables that play a
key role in the above explanation of the main macro-nancial developments
leading to the recent nancial and economic crisis: the US trade decit to
GDP ratio (Td), global excess liquidity (L), the leverage factor (LEV ), and
the US exchange rate return index (X). Several results are consistent with
the proposed account. The pre-crisis period is indeed characterized by the
building up of global external imbalances, as the deterioration in the US
current account decit (rst row, dashed line), while ongoing since 1991,
rapidly worsened in 1998 in the aftermath of the East Asia nancial crisis,
and again in 2000 following the burst of the dot-com bubble. Consistent
with the savings gluthypothesis and the pre-crisis scenario envisaged by
Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2008b), the worsening in the US trade bal-
ance since the late-1990s is largely explained by global non-US saving rate
shocks (GTI), as well as oil market disturbances (OIL), due to the potential
impact of oil price dynamics on the US trade balance. Yet, while OIL nega-
tively a¤ected trade balance conditions over the whole time span considered,
since 2006 saving rate disturbances actually contributed to its improvement,
reecting a shift away from US housing market-related securities by interna-
tional investors. Moreover, both innovations in the global monetary policy
stance (MP ) and risk factor disturbances (RF ) deepened the US trade im-
balance since the early 2000s, while portfolio allocation shifts (PA) and terms
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of trade shocks (TT ) had a partially o¤setting e¤ect. The worsening of Td
determined by monetary policy shocks accords with the basic mechanism
of the international risk-taking channel of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu,
2012; Bruno and Shin, 2015): over-expansionary US monetary policy caused
a contraction in perceived risk and funding costs, fuelling asset prices and the
net worth of nancial institutions, as well as their leverage and risk-taking
attitude, resulting in capital inows into the US and depreciation of the US$.
In fact, the remarkable depreciation of the US$ observed in the 2000s until
the Great Recession (Figure 4, fourth row, dashed line) is importantly de-
termined by portfolio allocation shocks (PA), particularly related to housing
preference (PH), alongside terms of trade disturbances (TT ).
The increase in global excess liquidity (L) occurred since the mid-1990s
(Figure 4, second row, dashed line) is accounted for by shocks originated in
the oil and labor markets (LM), reecting the countercyclical use of mon-
etary policy in OECD countries since the 1980s (Sutherland, 2010) and in
some emerging economies following the subprime nancial crisis (McGettigan
et al., 2013), while shocks to risk factors (RF ), productivity (PR) and goods
aggregate demand (AD, shown together in the second row, last plot) have
moderated global excess liquidity creation. The latter set of disturbances
were also important drivers of leverage (LEV ) uctuations (Figure 4, third
row), consistent with the view that nancial institutions adjust their lever-
age according to the actual and expected state of the business cycle (Minsky,
1993). Feedback e¤ects from asset prices to excess liquidity generation are de-
tected through the contributions of portfolio allocation shocks (mostly due
to housing, PH, and stock preferences, PF ) to global liquidity dynamics,
as well as the relevance of leverage-credit spirals unrelated to fundamentals
through the contribution of the (own) leverage shock (LV ) to nancial lever-
age uctuations (not reported in the gure). Moreover, the existence of a
linkage between global excess demand for safe assets and excess risk taking
by US nancial institutions, and the relevance of a risk-taking channel of
monetary policy, are supported by the sizable contribution of global saving
rate (SAV ) and monetary policy (MP ) disturbances to leverage uctuations.
Overall, the above features are consistent with the Great Deviation and
Great Leveraging hypotheses, pointing to an empirically relevant relationship
between global excess liquidity creation, excessive risk taking and boom-bust
asset price cycles over the time span investigated.
Global imbalance dynamics in recessions. Table 5 shows the behav-
ior of the four factors discussed above (Td, L, LEV and X) during and
around the recessionary episodes in the sample, providing additional sup-
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porting evidence. The savings gluthypothesis can explain the worsening
of the US trade decit (Panel A) in the late 1990s and early 2000s recessions
(by 0.9% and 0.6% respectively), with a considerable contribution of global
savings shocks (SAV ) during the former episode (1%). Such disturbances
also played a signicant role in the Great Recession, contributing by -0.7%
to the -2.3% improvement in the US trade decit, along with other nancial
shocks, mainly related to the global monetary policy stance and portfolio
allocation shifts.
Excess liquidity (L, Panel B) remarkably increased during the Great Re-
cession (10.6%, largely driven by demand-side (6.8%), and especially global
monetary policy disturbances (MP , 2.3%), due to the generous countercycli-
cal policies implemented in industrialized and emerging countries during the
crisis. Similarly, L increased, though by smaller amounts, in the late 1990s
(3.8%) and early 2000s (0.8%) recessions, but in those episodes mostly driven
by supply-side shocks (accounting for 3.5% and 1.9%, respectively). Finally,
the deep contraction in the nancial leverage factor (LEV , Panel C) dur-
ing the Great Recession (-60.4%) is a clear-cut distinguishing feature from
previous recessionary episodes, mostly accounted for by nancial shocks. In
the latter category, the largest share is attributable to risk factor distur-
bances (RF , -32.7%), and to uncertainty shocks (RAV , -22.9%) in partic-
ular. Over previous recessions, leverage displyed di¤erent features: a small
contraction in the early 2000s episode (-2.1%), and an increase during the
late 1990s episode (10.3%), both the result of conicting e¤ects of supply-
side (positively contributing by 21% and 17.7%, respectively) and demand-
side/nancial disturbances (accounting for -23% and -7.4%, respectively).
Even in those episodes, a sizable role of risk factor shocks (explaining -8.1%
and -17% of the leverage drop, respectively) is detected, with uncertainty
shocks being particularly relevant (-15% and -17.6%).
4.2.2 Asset price dynamics
The historical decomposition of a set of important nancial variables, namely
the global real short-term interest rate (SR) and global real house (H), stock
(F ) and non-energy commodity prices (M) is portrayed in Figure 5 and sug-
gests several remarks. The downward shift in global real short-term rates
(rst row) from mid-1990s can be associated with shocks to global saving
rates (SAV ), as predicted by the savings glut hypothesis, while global
monetary policy disturbances (MP ) contributed to maintain a low interest
rate environment. On the other hand, risk factor shocks (RF ) are an impor-
tant driving force of the downward short-rate path in the early 2000s, that
can be related to investorsmisperceptions of actual macro-nancial risk.
25
According to the migrating bubble narrative, the excess demand for
safe assets initially directed to the US bond market, partially shifted over
time to the housing and stock markets, and eventually moved to commod-
ity markets. The behavior of house, stock and commodity prices broadly
accord with this reading. Indeed, as shown in Figure 5 (row 2), the house
price (H) cycle started in the late 1990s and lasting over the 2000s, is mostly
driven by disturbances to portfolio allocation preferences (PA), especially
housing preference shocks (PH), consistent with shifts in investorsprefer-
ences in favor of the housing market and with a growing fad component in
house prices as well. Some of the main driving forces of movements in short
rates also sizably a¤ected house prices over both the boom and bust cyclical
phases. In particular, shocks to global monetary policy contributed to the
surge in H up to 2003, as well as to its stabilization until 2008, and decline
thereafter. Disturbances to global savings rates and risk factors drove house
prices upward since 2003 and then downward since 2007. Moreover, consis-
tent with shifts in investorspreferences in favor of stocks and commodities
taking place as prot opportunities in the housing market were fading away,
PA sizably accounts for the rise in stock (F , third row) and commodity (M ,
last row) prices over the 2003-2007 period.
In addition to portfolio allocation shifts, other factors sustained the boom
phase of the stock and commodity price cycles. For instance, in accordance
with the savings gluthypothesis and the evidence for house prices, global
saving rate shocks drove both M and F upward since the early 2000s, and
then downward during the Great Recession. On the other hand, productivity
disturbances (PR) and goodsaggregate demand shocks had opposite e¤ects
on F and M over the entire time span, imparting downward and upward
trends, respectively, to stock and commodity prices. While the former, over
a period of growing productivity, is consistent with a Shumpeterian view of
innovation as a process of creative destruction, as suggested by Kogan et
al., 2012, and with the e¤ects of e¢ ciency gains in production, the latter
may reect the driving role of global aggregate demand in the surge of oil
and non-energy commodity prices until the onset of the Great Recession (see
Morana, 2013b, for similar evidence for the real oil price).
Asset price dynamics in recessions. Focusing on the Great Recession
episode, the contraction in housing prices started in early 2007 led to the
break down of the securitization industry. The deterioration of US nancial
institutions balance sheets then forced them into deleveraging and sharp
asset sales, transmitting the negative house price shock rst to stock markets,
and then to commodity markets. As shown in Figure 5 (rows 3 and 4,
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dashed lines), a sizable contraction in stock prices (F ) occurred from 2007:4
to 2009:1, while a decline in house prices (M) only over the period 2008:3-
2009:1. As the nancial crisis turned into an economic crisis, the decline
in global real activity (2008:1-2009:2) drove down the demand for oil and
commodities, amplifying the negative nancial shock and eventually bursting
the oil and commodity price bubbles.
Table 6, showing the behavior of global short rates and asset prices during
and around recessions, conrms that the decline in asset prices during the
Great Recession was generalized, yet particularly sizable for house (-12.7%,
Panel B) and commodity prices (-27.6%, Panel D), and driven by a wide
array of macroeconomic (both supply-side and demand-side) and nancial
shocks. Some similarities between the Great Recession and the early 1990s
episode can be noted, consistent with their analogous boom-bust credit cycle
origin, while asset prices behavior during the late 1990s and early 2000s
episodes are more heterogeneous. The e¤ects of shocks during the Great
Recession were however larger than in the early 1990s contraction in the case
of house prices (-7.6% in 1990-1993) and commodity prices (-16%), whereas
the overall drop in stock prices was more pronounced in the early 1990s
recession (-9.1%). Among individual sources of disturbances for asset prices,
a signicant contribution of global monetary policy and portfolio allocation
disturbances to house and commodity price uctuations is observed in all
recessionary episodes.
5 Early warning signals of the real downturn
The forecast error variance and historical decomposition results presented in
the previous sections point to a remarkable contribution of shocks to a large
set of risk factors in shaping uctuations of global macroeconomic and nan-
cial variables over the whole sample investigated. Due to our identication
strategy, those disturbances are all orthogonal to past and current changes in
global macroeconomic factors, oil supply, the global monetary policy stance
and interest rate movements. Therefore, they are able to capture changes in
investorsexpectations and risk attitudes in a more complete fashion and are
also likely to show early warningproperties for mounting macro-nancial
imbalances. To explore this issue, we now take a further step and assess
the out-of-sample forecasting properties of structural risk factor shocks with
reference to the predictability of the Great Recession and the subsequent
recovery, spanning the 2008:2-2010:3 period.
Our forecasting exercise is implemented by recursive estimation of the
econometric model in (1) and (2) and the associated structural innovations.
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The latter are then employed in various forecasting models, in order to assess
the incremental gain in predicting power yielded by their inclusion, relative to
past information on global, US and Euro area real activity measures. Fore-
casting models are specied by means of a general-to-specic econometric
approach and estimated over the sample 1986:1 through 2008:1. Out of sam-
ple 1-step (quarter)-ahead predictions are then generated over the period
2008:2 through 2010:3 without updating the models parameter estimates,
which makes our forecasting exercise more challenging. The analysis is car-
ried out in two steps, focusing rst on the predictability of the timing of the
real downturn and the following recovery, and then on the magnitude of real
activity uctuations. In the rst step, the variable to be predicted is the
probability of a recession to occur, simply measured by a dummy variable
taking an unitary value during recessions and zero elsewhere. For robustness,
predictability is assessed with reference not only to the global output factor
(Y ), but also to the US and the Euro area output growth rates.11 Results
are presented in Table 7 and Figure 6 (left column). The Table shows, for
each real activity measure (Y , GDPUS and GDPEA), a benchmark autore-
gressive model (OD) and the best performing dynamic models augmented
with lagged structural shocks to various risk factors (OD   X, OD   X1
and OD   X2) estimated on 1986:4- 2008:1. The 1-quarter-ahead out-of-
sample predictions are then generated over the period 2008:2-2010:3 and the
forecasting performance of the models is assessed. Irrespective of the metric
employed (RMSE, MAFE and TIC), the gain in forecasting power ob-
tained by the augmented models is always remarkable, delivering reductions
ranging from 50% to 90% of the corresponding forecast error measure for the
benchmark autoregressive specication. Indeed, as shown in Figure 6, the
improvement in forecasting performance yielded by risk factor innovations
stems from their ability to accurately signal the beginning (2008:2 for global
output and Euro area GDP growth, and 2008:3 for US GDP growth) and
the end of the economic downturn (especially 2009:4 for global output), as
well as the further decline in global real activity occurred at the end of the
sample in 2010:3. In contrast, standard dynamic models fail to accurately
predict both events.
11For the global economy, as discussed in Section 4 for the whole sample, recessions
are identied with declines in the global real activity factor Y , occurring in the period
2008:2-2009:3 and again in 2010:3. Applying the same criterion to the US output growth
rate, we consider the US economy to be in recession in the 2008:3-2009:2 period (the
second quarter of 2008, though being part of the Great Recession according to the NBER
chronology, is not considered a recession quarter here since US output actually increased
by an annual rate of 2% over the previous quarter). Finally, the recession period for the
Euro area economy goes from 2008:2 to 2009:2.
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In the second step of the forecasting exercise we specify forecasting mod-
els augmented with structural risk factor innovations directly for the actual
rates of change of the global output factor and US and Euro area GDP. This
allows to assess the predictability of the magnitude of real activity uctua-
tions over the 2008:2-2010:3 period, and of the depth of the Great Recession
in particular. As shown in Table 8 and Figure 6 (right column), a 30% to 60%
improvement in forecasting accuracy, depending on metric and target vari-
able, is obtained by means of (asymmetric) augmented models, conditioned
on censored (according to sign) risk factor innovations. In particular, a 40%
to 60% contraction in RMSFE, MAFE and TIC gures is obtained for US
and Euro area GDP growth models, while for global real activity growth the
improvement is about 30%.
Overall, two main conclusions can be drawn from the forecasting exer-
cise. First, the timing of economic downturn and recovery following the
nancial crisis cannot be accurately predicted by standard dynamic models,
conditioned on own relevant information only. However, it can be accurately
predicted when they are augmented with information contained in past risk
factor structural innovations. Second, the magnitude of output uctuations
and the depth of the Great Recession cannot be accurately predicted even
by the factor innovations-augmented autoregressive models. Both ndings
are consistent with the in-sample results, showing that the Great Recession
was peculiar for its depth, rather than for its mechanics, and therefore pre-
dictable along the timing, but not the size dimension. In this respect, the
superior performance of risk factor innovation-augmented over standard au-
toregressive models is clear-cut, providing compelling evidence of their early
warning properties.
6 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature on the sizable dampening of global
macroeconomic uctuations occurred since the mid-1980s, dubbed the Great
Moderation, yielding new insights on its structural features, as well as on the
process leading to the Great Recession. Grounded on the view that those
phenomena share an important global dimension and are tightly related, we
employ a large-scale, global-economy econometric model to identify struc-
tural macroeconomic and nancial global factors as driving forces of observed
uctuations. A second distinctive feature of our approach is the introduction
of a comprehensive array of risk factor indicators in the estimated model.
Structural innovations in the latter variables are interpreted as complemen-
tary signals of revisions in investorsexpectations and risk attitudes, with
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a potential role as early warning indicators of upcoming real activity down-
turns.
Our results show that observed macro-nancial dynamics over the 1986-
2010 period were the outcome of a composite set of disturbances coming from
all (demand-side, supply-side and nancial) sources, rather than being asso-
ciated only with subdued productivity and oil shocks and improved monetary
policy management. Moreover, macroeconomic uctuations do not show the
same features over the whole Great Moderation, as heterogeneity in terms of
amplitude and determinants are detected, in contrast to the existing litera-
ture, well before the onset of the Great Recession. In fact, much wider real
uctuations are detected from the mid-1990s, determined by productivity,
goodsaggregate demand and global saving rate shocks, as well as portfo-
lio allocation and US terms of trade disturbances. In this perspective, the
late-2000s nancial crisis and economic contraction were then the eventual
outcome of an already ongoing process, determined by both macroeconomic
and nancial disturbances, broadly consistent with the account provided by
Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2008b).
Our ndings also point to the savings glutview of the buildup of global
imbalances (Bernanke, 2005), the Great Deviationhypothesis on the global
monetary policy stance (Taylor, 2013), and the Great Leveraging view
about nancial intermediariesrisk-taking behavior (Taylor, 2012) as com-
plementary explanations of the transition dynamics leading to the Great
Recession. Misalignments in asset prices also appear to have migrated from
bond to housing and credit markets since the early 2000s, and then to stock
and commodity markets following the contraction in house prices since 2007.
Peculiar to the Great Recession was the much larger magnitude of shocks
than in previous episodes, rather than their source, and the size of global real
activity contraction, which was (on average per quarter) four times larger
than during the previous three episodes. Demand-side and nancial shocks
account for about two-thirds out of the -15% drop in global output over the
2008:2-2009:3 period, with disturbances to portfolio allocation and innova-
tions to risk factors playing a substantial role. The overall evidence is then
consistent with the narrative pointing to the real e¤ects of the subprime -
nancial crisis working mainly through aggregate demand shortages, due to
the credit crunch, the increased level of uncertainty and larger precautionary
savings.
The identication strategy adopted allows also to uncover similarities
between recoveries following recessionary episodes over the sample period in-
vestigated. In particular, we nd that the jobless recovery phenomenon
is not limited to the aftermath of the Great Recession but extends back to
at least the early-1990s recession and displays an important global dimen-
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sion, previously unnoticed in the literature. In this respect, our ndings
cast some doubts on a purely structural explanation of this phenomenon.
In fact, demand-side and nancial shocks (particularly portfolio allocation,
terms of trade and risk factor), in addition to accounting for as much as cycli-
cal employment variance than supply-side (productivity and labor market)
disturbances over the whole sample, had an even larger slowing down e¤ect
in the year following the end of the Great Recession (-1.2% out of -1.5%).
Finally, the out-of-sample forecasting properties of structural risk factor
shocks, that remarkably contributed to macro-nancial uctuations over the
whole Great Moderation, are assessed by looking at the predictability of the
Great Recession and the ensuing recovery. We nd that dynamic models aug-
mented with lagged risk factor innovations could have accurately predicted
the timing of the cyclical downturn and upturn in the global economy output
factor and in the US and Euro area GDP growth. The latter ndings are
then promising concerning the inclusion of risk factor structural innovations
in early warning systems of indicators of macro-nancial risk. The assess-
ment of their predictive power along other dimensions, e.g. ination and
asset price uctuations, is left for further research.
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Appendix: Data, estimation methods and iden-
tication of structural shocks
This Appendix presents details on the dataset used, the adopted econometric method-
ology, and the identication strategy implemented to obtain economically interpretable
innovations.
A1. The data
Countries. The dataset contains macroeconomic and nancial data for 50 countries: 31
advanced economies (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom, United States),
5 advanced emerging economies (Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South Africa), and
14 secondary emerging economies (Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey).
Variables in the local-economies model. For each country, with few exceptions due
to data availability, 17 quarterly macroeconomic variables are employed: the growth rates
of real GDP, private consumption and private investment, the change of the public ex-
penditure to GDP ratio, nominal bilateral US$ exchange rate (value of 1 US$ in units of
domestic currency) returns, the CPI ination rate, the change of the M2 (or M3) to GDP
ratio, the nominal M2 (or M3) growth rate, the civilian employment growth rate, the
change in the unemployment rate, the real wages growth rate, the rates of change of real
stock prices and real housing prices, the real short and long term interest rates, the real
e¤ective exchange rate returns, the change of the bank loans to the private sector to GDP
ratio. Macroeconomic data are seasonally adjusted. A total of over 800 equations is then
considered in the local-economies block (2).
Sample. The macro-nancial sample extends from 1980:1 through 2010:3 for OECD
economies, and from 1995:1 through 2010:3 for non-OECD countries (the latter being:
Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Brazil, South Africa, and the secondary emerging economies
listed above with the exceptions of Chile and Turkey). The unobserved global factors in
F1;t, estimated from the local-economies block, therefore reect commonalities occurring
across OECD countries only over the period 1980-1994. Due to the limited sample available
for the oil market variables (1986-2010), vector Ft in the global-economy model collects
factors over the period 1986:1 to 2010:3.
Sources. The main data sources are: IMF International Financial Statistics, FRED2
(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis); OECD and BIS (uno¢ cial) house price data sets,
and International Energy Agency (IEA-OECD) data sets. Additional sources for specic
variables are listed below.
Observed global factors (F2;t). 11 observed factors are included in the vector F2;t.
Nine are US variables, namely:
- a US nancial fragility index (FRA) obtained as the common component in the
TED, corporate and agency spreads (Bagliano and Morana, 2012). The TED
spread (between the 3-month LIBOR, Euro-dollar deposit rate and the yield on 3-
month Treasury bills), being the di¤erence between an unsecured deposit rate and a
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risk-free rate, yields a measure of credit and liquidity risk; the spread between BAA-
rated and AAA-rated corporate bonds (BAA AAA) yields a measure of corporate
default risk, as well as a measure of investorsrisk-taking attitude, a contraction in
the spread signalling an increase in the demand for riskier bonds relative to safer
ones; nally, the agency spread between the 30-year Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac bonds
yield and the 30-year Treasury bonds yield is meant to measure the stress in the
mortgage market. This index therefore summarizes overall credit conditions, with
reference to corporate, interbank and mortgage markets;
- a size factor (SMB, the return di¤erential between small and big sized portfolios)
and a value factor (HML, the return di¤erential between high and low book-to-
market-ratio portfolios) from Fama and French (1993), and the Carhart (1997)
momentum factor (MOM , the di¤erence between the returns on the high and low
past performance portfolios, measured over the previous four quarters);12
- a stock market liquidity factor (PSL), computed by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003,
equation (8)) as the cross-sectional weighted average of individual-stock liquidity
measures, the latter being the e¤ect of the transaction volume in one month on the
next-month individual return;13
- changes in the S&P 500 stock return volatility (FV ), estimated from an asymmetric
GARCH(1,1) model of monthly stock returns;
- a leverage factor (LEV ) constructed by Adrian, Etula and Muir (2014) as the ratio
of total nancial assets over the di¤erence between total nancial assets and total
nancial liabilities of security brokers-delears, as reported in Table L.129 of the
US Federal Reserve Flow of Funds. It may be considered as a proxy for nancial
instability (i.e., the higher the ratio, the higher the fragility of the nancial sector);14
- changes in the ratio of scal decit to GDP (Fd) and in the ratio of trade decit
to GDP (Td).
The remaining two observed factors are: returns on the real gold price (GD) and on the
IMF non-energy commodity price index (M).
Observed oil market factors (Ot). 10 variables are included in the global-economy
model to capture various dimensions of oil market dynamics: (i) global oil supply con-
ditions: world oil reserves growth (R), positive (Pp) and negative (Pm) net world oil
production changes (see Hamilton, 1996 for details on the construction of the net change
variables), and OECD oil reneries margins growth (RM); (ii) ow oil demand condi-
tions: world oil consumption growth (C); and (iii) oil futures and spot market conditions:
OECD oil inventories growth (INV ), real WTI oil price return (OP ), changes in nominal
WTI oil price volatility (OV ) computed from a GARCH model, the 12-month futures
basis (FB), being the ratio of the nominal 12-month futures-spot spread over the nominal
spot oil price computed using Crude Oil (Light-Sweet, Cushing, Oklahoma) 12th Contract
settle futures prices, and the rate of change of the oil futures market Working (1960) T
12 SMB, HML and MOM data are available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Developed .
13 Data for the PSL factor are available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/lubos.pastor/ re-
search/liq_data_1962_2011.txt.
14 The authors are grateful to T. Muir for providing the data.
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speculation index (WT ), computed using US Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) Commitment of Trades (COT) data.15
A2. Estimation of the econometric model
The model is estimated by means of a two-stage approach. First, the iterative procedure
proposed in Morana (2014a) is applied to the local-economies block, delivering consistent
and asymptotically normal estimates of the coe¢ cients in (2) and the unobserved global
factors. Then, conditional on the estimated unobserved factors, consistent estimation of
the global-economy model (1) is obtained using the PC-VAR method (Morana 2012).
Estimation of the unobserved factors and the local-economies block
Iterative estimation of the unobserved global factors and the local-economies model in (2)
is performed through the following steps.
Initialization. An initial estimate of the R unobserved common factors in F1;t is obtained
by applying Principal Components (PC) analysis to subsets of homogeneous cross-country
data in the vector Zt of macro-nancial variables in the local-economies model; for in-
stance, a GDP growth global factor is estimated by means of the rst PC extracted from
cross-country GDP growth data, a stock return global factor by means of the rst PC
extracted from cross-country stock return series, and so on. Then, conditional on the esti-
mated unobserved factors, preliminary estimates of the polynomial matrix C(L) and the
factor loading matrix  are obtained by means of OLS estimation of the local-economies










constructed and C^(L) obtained by means of OLS estimation of the VAR model in (2).
The iterative procedure. Next, a new estimate of the unobserved common factors in





























, ltering out the e¤ects on Zt of the observed global factors in F2;t
and the oil market variables in Ot. Then, conditional on the new unobserved common
factors, an updated estimate of C(L) and the factor loading matrix  is obtained as
described above. This procedure is then iterated until convergence.
Note that the proposed iterative procedure bears the interpretation of QML estima-
tion performed by means of the EM algorithm using a Gaussian likelihood function. In the
E-step the unobserved factors are estimated, given the observed data and the current esti-
mate of model parameters, by means of PC analysis; in theM -step the likelihood function
is maximized (implementing OLS estimation of the C(L) matrix) under the assumption
that the unobserved factors are known, conditioning on their E-step consistent estimate.
Consistent and asymptotically normal estimation of unobserved I(0) factors by means of
15 The Workings T index is calculated as the ratio of speculative open interest to total open
interest resulting from hedging activity, i.e., as 1+SS/(HS+HL) if HSHL and 1+SL/(HS+HL)
if HS<HL, where open interest held by speculators (non-commercials) and hedgers (commercials)
is denoted as follows: SS = Speculation, Short; HL = Hedging, Long; SL = Speculation, Long;
HS = Hedging, Short.
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PC analysis is proved in Bai (2003) under general conditions.,16 Moreover, as shown by Bai
and Ng (2006), when the unobserved factors are estimated by means of PC analysis in the
E-step, the generated regressors problem is not an issue for consistent estimation in the
M -step, due to faster vanishing of the estimation error, provided
p
T=N ! 0. The factors
estimated by PC analysis can then be considered as they were actually observed, therefore
not requiring Kalman smoothing at the E-step, i.e., the computation of their conditional
expectation. Convergence to the one-step QML estimate is ensured, as the value of the
likelihood function is increased at each step. See Morana (2014a) for additional details
and Monte Carlo results, validating the use of the iterative estimation procedure in small
samples.
Estimation of the global model
Consistent and asymptotically normal estimates of the polynomial matrix P(L) in the
VAR model (1), still relying on Bai and Ng (2006), can be obtained by means of PC-
VAR estimation (Morana, 2012), by holding the latent factors F1;t as observed; then, by
employing P^(L) and the nal estimates of the C(L) and  matrices, the (L) polynomial





PC-VAR estimation of the reduced form global-economy model. Letting the
R  1 vector xt  F^t   ^, PC-VAR estimation of the VAR model in (1) exploits the
following algebraic identity
xt  ^f^ t; (4)
where f^t = ^0xt is the R 1 vector of estimated principal components of xt, and ^ is the
R  R matrix of orthogonal eigenvectors associated with the R (ordered) eigenvalues of
^ (where  =E [xtx0t]). This follows from the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of ^,
i.e. ^ 1^^ = ^, where  ^ =diag(^1; :::; ^R) is the R  R diagonal matrix containing the
(ordered) eigenvalues of ^. The estimation of P(L) is then implemented as follows:
(i) PC analysis is applied to xt, delivering f^t = ^0xt;
(ii) the stationary dynamic vector regression model
xt = D(L)f^t + "t (5)
where "t  iid(0;") andD(L)  D1L+D2L2+:::+DpLp has all the roots outside
the unit circle is estimated by OLS, yielding D^(L);
(iii) nally, the (implied OLS) estimates of the actual parameters of the unrestricted
VAR model (1) are retrieved by solving the linear constraints
P^(L)PCV AR = D^(L)^
0: (6)
16 In particular, under some general conditions, given any invertible matrix  and the vector
of unobserved I(0) factors ft,
p
N consistency and asymptotic normality of PCA for ft, at each
point in time, is established for N;T ! 1 and pN=T ! 0 and the case of I(0) idiosyncratic
components, the latter also displaying limited heteroskedasticity in both their time-series and
cross-sectional dimensions (Bai, 2003). Moreover,
p
T consistency and asymptotic normality






consistency and asymptotic normality of PC anaysis for the unobserved common components
fft at each point in time, for N;T !1.
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In the actual implementation only the rst R1 < R ordered PCs are employed, yielding












. Morana (2012) provides further details on PC-VAR
estimation and its asymptotic properties with extensive Monte Carlo results.
A3. Identication of structural shocks
As discussed in Section 2 in the text, a Choleski decomposition approach has been imple-
mented to achieve identication of the structural global-economy disturbances, based on
the following recursive ordering of the variables in Ft:
 oil supply conditions: reserves (R), oil production changes (Pp; Pm), reneries
margins (RM);
 macroeconomic conditions: employment (E), unemployment (U), real activity (Y ),
scal policy stance (G), US scal and trade decits (Fd, Td), core ination (N), real
wages (W );
 ow oil demand conditions: oil consumption (C);
 monetary policy stance and interest rates: excess liquidity (L), real short term rate
(SR) and term spread (TS);
 nancial conditions I : real housing prices (H), US$ exchange rate index (X), stock
return volatility (FV ), Fama-French size and value factors (SMB, HML), Carhart mo-
mentum factor (MOM), Pastor-Stambaugh stock market liquidity factor (PSL), Adrian-
Etula-Muir leverage factor (LEV );
 oil futures and spot market conditions: Working-T index (WT ), futures market basis
(FB), oil inventories (INV ), oil price (OP ), oil price volatility (OV );
 nancial conditions II : non-energy commodities price index return (M), stock mar-
ket return (F ), gold price return (GD), US nancial fragility index (FRA).
Structural innovations are grouped into two broad classes, supply-side and demand-
side and nancialdisturbances, each including shocks coming from various sources. The
Tables below list the categories of shocks (with labels used in the tables in the text),
and the corresponding global factor equations from which orthogonalized innovations are
obtained. Additional material on the economic interpretation of structural disturbances
are provided in Tables A1-A3 of the Supplementary Appendix", where impulse response








Oil supply shocks (OS)
Other oil market shocks (OO)
R, Pp, Pm, RM, INV
C, WT, FB, OP, OV
Labor supply (LS) E
Labor market (LM) Labor demand (LD) U
Unit labor cost
(core ination, CI) N
Productivity Productivity shock (PR) W
Commodities markets
Non-energy commodity
price shock (PM) M
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Goods market Aggregate demand (AD) Y
Saving rates (SAV)
Global and US saving
rate shocks (GFI, GDI, GTI) G, Fd, Td
Monetary policy and
interest rates (MP)
Excess liquidity, short-term rate and
term structure slope shocks (EL, TL, TS) L, SR, TS
Foreign exchange
market
US$ exchange rate shock
(terms of trade, TT) X
Portfolio
allocation (PA)
Preference shocks to housing (PH),




stock market liquidity (SL),
leverage (LV), uncertainty (RAV),








Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM  Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  20.2  9.6  9.6  ‐  10.6  8.5  2.1  ‐  0.0  ‐  0  79.8  79.8  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  25.3  4.4  2.2  2.2  20.5  17.2  2.9  0.4  0.1  0.3  2  74.7  58.2  8.4  4.5  3.8  0.1  0.2  0.6  0.1  0.2  0.3  3.3  0.4  2.6  4.0  0.4  2.2  0.0  0.7 
4  30.9  5.9  2.5  3.4  23.0  20.7  1.4  0.9  1.8  0.2  4  69.1  35.3  12.4  9.3  2.4  0.7  0.8  3.8  0.1  2.3  1.4  5.5  0.9  4.5  11.3  0.3  7.4  0.1  2.0 
6  33.6  7.2  3.5  3.7  20.5  18.3  0.8  1.4  5.8  0.1  6  66.4  21.5  15.3  12.1  1.3  1.9  2.4  7.4  0.3  4.3  2.8  6.1  0.8  5.2  13.9  0.5  8.8  0.1  2.9 
8  36.2  8.8  4.8  4.0  18.3  16.2  0.6  1.5  9.0  0.1  8  63.8  14.4  16.5  13.4  0.8  2.3  3.8  9.1  0.2  5.7  3.2  5.9  0.7  5.1  14.1  0.7  8.1  0.5  3.1 
12  36.4  11.1  6.6  4.5  14.3  12.5  0.5  1.3  10.9  0.1  12  63.6  9.5  17.1  13.8  0.6  2.7  5.9  10.8  0.2  6.7  3.9  4.9  0.5  4.3  15.5  0.8  8.0  1.4  3.2 
20  38.9  14.1  9.5  4.6  10.3  8.9  0.5  0.9  14.5  0.0  20  61.1  6.7  16.6  13.1  0.6  2.9  8.6  10.9  0.3  6.5  4.1  3.6  0.3  3.2  14.7  0.6  6.2  2.9  2.8 
40  44.9  20.0  15.3  4.7  5.8  4.8  0.6  0.4  19.1  0.0  40  55.1  4.9  15.4  11.1  0.8  3.5  9.8  9.8  0.4  5.7  3.7  2.6  0.2  2.4  12.4  0.3  3.5  4.4  2.1 
Panel B: employment 
Supply‐side shocks  Demand‐side and financial shocks 
Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM  Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  100.0  10.0  10.0  ‐  90.0  90.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  0  0.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  73.7  13.3  12.7  0.6  58.9  57.2  1.5  0.2  1.5  0.1  2  26.3  7.4  12.0  4.7  5.4  1.9  0.1  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.0  1.9  0.7  0.8  4.5  0.1  2.3  1.1  0.4 
4  64.0  14.2  12.9  1.3  48.9  47.8  0.8  0.3  0.9  0.1  4  36.0  5.6  13.8  7.5  5.5  0.8  0.3  1.6  0.3  1.1  0.2  3.5  1.5  1.9  11.3  0.1  7.9  0.4  1.5 
6  57.1  14.3  12.5  1.8  42.4  41.4  0.3  0.7  0.4  0.0  6  42.9  3.5  14.1  9.7  4.1  0.3  0.9  3.4  0.1  2.3  1.0  4.4  1.7  2.6  16.5  0.6  11.3  0.3  2.4 
8  54.1  15.4  13.4  2.0  38.2  37.0  0.2  1.0  0.5  0.1  8  45.9  2.1  14.3  11.1  3.0  0.2  1.7  5.0  0.1  3.4  1.5  4.6  1.7  2.9  18.2  1.2  11.9  0.2  3.0 
12  51.2  17.9  15.5  2.4  32.5  31.1  0.1  1.3  0.7  0.1  12  48.8  1.0  14.2  12.0  2.1  0.1  2.7  6.8  0.1  4.5  2.2  4.3  1.5  2.8  19.9  1.9  12.4  0.1  3.5 
20  50.3  21.0  18.6  2.4  28.7  27.3  0.1  1.3  0.6  0.1  20  49.7  0.5  13.7  11.8  1.8  0.1  3.9  7.6  0.1  4.8  2.7  3.5  1.4  2.0  20.4  2.1  12.6  0.1  3.5 
40  52.1  24.4  22.1  2.3  27.4  26.1  0.1  1.2  0.4  0.1  40  47.9  0.3  13.2  11.1  2.0  0.1  4.1  7.3  0.1  4.5  2.7  3.1  1.5  1.6  19.7  1.8  12.5  0.1  3.2 
Panel C: core inflation 
Supply‐side shocks  Demand‐side and financial shocks 
Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM  Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  84.8  1.7  1.7  ‐  83.1  5.3  17.7  60.1  ‐  ‐  0  15.2  2.9  12.2  3.3  1.7  7.2  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  75.7  10.4  8.8  1.6  63.8  2.3  15.0  46.5  1.1  0.4  2  24.3  5.2  7.1  1.2  1.4  4.5  0.1  0.9  0.4  0.2  0.3  1.4  0.5  0.6  9.6  2.9  2.6  2.4  0.3 
4  69.2  8.4  6.9  1.5  59.3  1.6  15.1  42.6  1.2  0.3  4  30.8  5.2  9.6  0.7  1.4  7.5  0.3  1.4  0.3  0.6  0.5  2.7  0.8  1.7  11.5  2.6  5.7  1.6  0.5 
6  62.4  7.3  5.5  1.8  53.8  1.3  14.3  38.2  1.2  0.2  6  37.6  4.6  13.6  0.7  2.1  10.8  0.3  2.4  0.2  1.1  1.1  4.4  0.8  3.4  12.1  1.9  6.9  1.2  1.1 
8  58.8  7.4  5.0  2.4  49.6  1.4  14.5  33.7  1.5  0.2  8  41.2  4.1  15.8  0.8  2.3  12.7  0.4  3.3  0.2  1.9  1.2  6.1  0.8  5.0  11.6  1.4  7.0  0.9  1.4 
12  52.0  7.8  4.6  3.2  42.2  1.4  14.4  26.4  1.8  0.2  12  48.0  3.5  18.2  1.3  2.8  14.1  0.4  4.7  0.1  2.9  1.7  7.9  0.8  6.7  13.3  1.0  8.5  0.7  2.1 
20  47.6  9.4  5.5  3.9  35.8  1.1  14.0  20.7  2.3  0.1  20  52.4  2.8  19.9  1.7  3.7  14.5  0.4  6.0  0.1  3.8  2.1  8.6  0.7  7.4  14.7  0.8  9.0  0.9  2.7 
40  47.8  11.2  7.1  4.1  33.7  0.7  14.2  18.8  2.8  0.1  40  52.2  2.4  21.0  1.6  4.5  14.9  0.3  6.0  0.1  3.8  2.1  8.4  0.5  7.4  14.0  0.5  8.2  1.1  2.6 
Panel D: US trade deficit to GDP ratio 
Supply‐side shocks  Demand‐side and financial shocks 
Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM  Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  8.9  7.0  7.0  ‐  1.9  1.5  0.4  ‐  ‐  ‐  0  91.1  0.3  90.9  7.7  3.2  80.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  20.1  13.3  9.5  3.8  3.6  3.3  0.1  0.2  2.9  0.3  2  79.9  6.5  70.4  6.6  4.2  59.6  0.1  0.6  0.1  0.5  0.0  0.5  0.2  0.0  1.9  0.1  0.5  0.3  0.3 
4  23.2  12.5  9.1  3.4  7.0  5.4  0.8  0.8  3.5  0.2  4  76.8  4.5  64.7  8.5  4.2  52.0  0.5  0.7  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.8  0.6  0.0  5.5  0.4  3.2  0.2  0.4 
6  21.7  10.5  7.7  2.8  8.2  5.0  1.9  1.3  2.8  0.2  6  78.3  3.3  63.5  10.0  4.1  49.4  2.0  1.6  1.0  0.4  0.2  1.0  0.6  0.1  7.0  0.3  4.3  0.2  0.7 
8  20.9  10.0  7.7  2.3  8.4  4.3  2.7  1.4  2.3  0.2  8  79.1  2.4  64.4  10.3  3.7  50.4  3.4  1.6  1.0  0.4  0.2  1.3  0.5  0.4  6.0  0.3  3.5  0.2  0.7 
12  20.7  10.5  8.6  1.9  7.5  2.9  3.5  1.1  2.5  0.2  12  79.3  1.5  64.0  8.7  3.9  51.4  4.9  1.4  1.0  0.3  0.1  2.5  0.4  1.7  5.0  0.3  2.5  0.1  0.4 
20  20.8  10.6  9.0  1.6  7.0  1.6  4.7  0.7  3.0  0.2  20  79.2  0.9  61.8  5.9  4.1  51.8  5.9  1.4  0.8  0.5  0.1  4.5  0.2  3.5  4.7  0.6  1.4  0.1  0.3 
40  20.6  10.4  9.2  1.2  6.8  0.9  5.5  0.4  3.2  0.2  40  79.4  0.5  61.1  4.5  4.5  52.1  6.3  1.4  0.7  0.6  0.1  5.4  0.1  4.3  4.7  0.9  0.7  0.1  0.2 
The table reports the forecast error variance decomposition for real activity, employment, core inflation and the US trade deficit to GDP ratio at various horizons (impact (0) and 2 to 40 quarters), relative to various identified structural 







  Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM    Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  22.1  9.8  9.0  0.8  6.6  2.3  3.9  0.4  5.7  ‐  0  77.9  29.5  13.3  11.9  0.1  1.3  ‐  35.0  35.0  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  31.1  12.8  11.5  1.3  13.1  6.2  6.0  0.9  5.0  0.2  2  68.9  30.8  13.2  11.4  1.3  0.5  0.3  19.3  19.2  0.0  0.1  0.3  0.2  0.1  5.0  1.2  2.5  0.4  0.0 
4  28.5  17.2  16.1  1.1  8.2  3.7  3.9  0.6  3.0  0.1  4  71.5  22.6  13.3  12.1  0.9  0.3  2.7  23.1  21.6  0.2  1.3  0.5  0.1  0.1  9.3  0.9  4.9  1.4  0.2 
6  29.6  20.5  19.2  1.3  6.3  3.1  2.6  0.6  2.5  0.3  6  70.4  15.9  13.1  10.6  2.2  0.3  5.7  26.2  24.1  0.1  2.0  1.5  0.3  0.3  8.0  0.6  3.4  2.2  0.1 
8  35.7  24.9  23.5  1.4  7.8  5.0  2.0  0.8  2.7  0.3  8  64.3  11.1  11.5  8.0  3.3  0.2  6.9  23.8  22.0  0.2  1.6  2.9  0.7  1.1  8.2  0.4  3.4  3.0  0.2 
12  46.5  31.2  29.1  2.1  13.5  10.4  1.2  1.9  1.7  0.1  12  53.5  6.0  7.4  3.8  3.4  0.2  5.9  17.8  16.1  0.9  0.8  5.3  1.3  2.9  11.0  0.9  4.9  3.7  0.9 
20  54.0  35.5  33.4  2.1  17.0  13.4  0.7  2.9  1.4  0.1  20  46.0  3.1  4.9  1.7  3.0  0.2  3.8  12.9  10.6  1.9  0.4  6.3  1.7  3.4  15.1  1.9  7.7  3.3  1.7 
40  61.5  42.1  40.3  1.8  16.8  13.1  0.8  2.9  2.6  0.0  40  38.5  1.9  4.2  0.6  3.5  0.1  2.7  9.7  7.9  1.6  0.2  5.3  1.8  2.4  14.7  1.6  7.8  3.4  1.5 
Panel B: real short term rate 
Supply‐side shocks  Demand‐side and financial shocks 
  Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM    Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  40.5  5.3  4.9  0.4  9.5  0.9  4.2  4.4  25.7  ‐  0  59.5  13.9  15.3  1.9  1.4  12.0  ‐  30.3  0.8  29.5  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  38.4  7.6  6.4  1.2  11.2  3.2  4.1  3.9  19.5  0.1  2  61.6  12.9  14.1  2.2  4.4  7.5  0.5  31.1  2.8  28.3  0.0  1.6  0.1  1.4  1.4  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.6 
4  38.9  9.9  8.0  1.9  11.9  2.9  3.4  5.6  16.5  0.6  4  61.1  9.8  12.3  2.7  3.4  6.2  2.1  32.3  2.8  29.2  0.3  2.1  0.1  1.6  2.7  1.1  0.3  0.1  0.8 
6  36.1  9.5  7.3  2.2  11.8  2.4  3.1  6.3  14.1  0.7  6  63.9  8.0  10.8  2.4  2.9  5.5  3.1  35.5  4.1  31.1  0.3  1.9  0.1  1.4  4.6  1.8  1.2  0.1  0.7 
8  36.1  9.8  7.5  2.3  11.0  2.0  3.0  6.0  14.6  0.7  8  63.9  6.5  10.4  2.0  2.7  5.7  3.2  37.9  5.1  32.5  0.3  1.6  0.1  1.1  4.4  1.6  1.4  0.1  0.6 
12  36.6  10.4  7.5  2.9  8.8  1.5  2.5  4.8  16.9  0.5  12  63.4  4.7  9.4  1.5  2.8  5.1  3.0  41.3  5.8  35.2  0.3  1.2  0.1  0.9  3.7  1.2  1.3  0.1  0.5 
20  35.9  9.9  6.2  3.7  7.0  1.0  2.0  4.0  18.5  0.5  20  64.1  3.2  9.0  1.1  3.1  4.8  2.3  45.2  6.9  37.9  0.4  0.9  0.1  0.6  3.6  0.8  1.7  0.2  0.4 
40  37.2  9.2  5.3  3.9  6.7  0.8  1.7  4.2  20.9  0.4  40  62.8  2.0  8.6  0.6  3.6  4.4  1.7  47.5  7.9  39.3  0.3  0.6  0.1  0.4  2.5  0.4  1.2  0.3  0.2 
Panel C: financial leverage 
Supply‐side shocks  Demand‐side and financial shocks 
  Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM    Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  20.3  10.3  7.3  3.0  6.6  3.5  0.9  2.2  3.4  ‐  0  79.7  0.0  6.1  0.0  1.1  5.0  0.3  1.6  0.2  0.9  0.5  2.3  ‐  2.0  69.5  12.1  2.2  0.2  53.8 
2  30.1  14.1  9.5  4.6  8.2  4.7  1.9  1.6  7.4  0.4  2  69.9  1.2  16.3  0.6  10.5  5.2  0.4  3.7  0.7  1.3  1.7  2.3  0.3  1.4  46.4  13.4  3.2  1.1  26.9 
4  31.5  15.2  10.9  4.3  9.0  5.5  1.8  1.7  6.9  0.4  4  68.5  1.3  14.9  0.6  9.7  4.6  0.6  4.2  0.8  1.3  2.1  2.8  0.4  1.3  45.2  14.2  3.3  1.3  24.0 
6  33.3  17.5  12.9  4.6  8.9  5.3  1.9  1.7  6.5  0.5  6  66.7  1.2  14.2  0.6  9.3  4.3  0.8  5.1  1.6  1.3  2.2  4.3  0.4  1.2  43.1  14.1  3.3  1.3  22.3 
8  33.7  18.0  13.6  4.4  8.7  5.1  1.9  1.7  6.5  0.5  8  66.3  1.3  13.9  0.6  9.1  4.2  0.9  5.0  1.6  1.3  2.1  5.5  0.5  1.2  42.6  14.1  3.6  1.4  21.2 
12  34.2  18.6  14.5  4.1  8.8  5.1  2.0  1.7  6.4  0.5  12  65.8  1.4  13.8  0.6  9.0  4.2  0.9  5.0  1.6  1.3  2.1  5.9  0.5  1.2  42.2  14.0  3.6  1.4  20.7 
20  34.4  18.7  14.9  3.8  8.8  5.1  2.0  1.7  6.4  0.5  20  65.6  1.4  13.8  0.7  8.9  4.2  0.9  5.0  1.6  1.3  2.1  5.6  0.5  1.2  42.0  14.0  3.6  1.4  20.5 




price  (PM). Demand‐side and  financial  shocks: goods aggregate demand  (AD); global  (GFI), US  (GDI) and global ex‐US  (GTI)  saving  rate,  joint global  saving  rate  (SAV: GFI+GDI+GTI); US  terms of  trade  (TT); excess  liquidity  (EL),  term 










  Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM    Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  35.0  10.3  6.0  4.3  24.7  7.2  13.5  4.0  0.0  ‐  0  65.0  12.4  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.0  49.6  2.6  0.9  0.7  1.0  0.2  ‐  0.2  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  43.2  18.6  7.1  11.5  24.1  8.1  11.2  4.8  0.1  0.4  2  56.8  8.6  2.3  1.6  0.5  0.2  35.5  3.3  2.5  0.5  0.3  3.3  0.1  1.9  3.7  0.4  1.2  0.3  0.8 
4  44.2  23.3  8.1  15.2  20.3  6.2  9.1  5.0  0.2  0.4  4  55.8  4.6  4.5  1.4  1.1  2.0  30.8  3.9  1.5  2.1  0.3  5.0  0.3  3.1  7.2  0.3  4.2  0.2  0.7 
6  43.5  23.8  8.5  15.3  19.1  5.5  8.3  5.3  0.2  0.4  6  56.5  3.0  5.0  1.3  1.0  2.7  29.4  4.4  1.5  2.6  0.3  6.0  0.3  3.6  8.9  0.4  5.0  0.2  0.8 
8  44.0  25.0  9.3  15.7  18.3  5.1  8.0  5.2  0.2  0.5  8  56.0  2.2  4.8  1.1  1.0  2.7  28.9  4.3  1.5  2.6  0.2  6.4  0.3  3.6  9.4  0.4  4.9  0.3  0.7 
12  43.9  25.8  10.2  15.6  16.9  4.5  7.6  4.8  0.5  0.7  12  56.1  1.7  3.9  0.7  0.8  2.4  29.8  4.0  1.4  2.4  0.2  6.4  0.3  3.2  10.4  0.3  5.6  0.3  0.7 
20  44.0  25.7  10.3  15.4  16.4  4.4  7.2  4.8  1.2  0.7  20  56.0  1.5  2.8  0.4  0.6  1.8  31.4  3.5  1.4  2.0  0.1  6.4  0.4  3.1  10.4  0.4  5.7  0.2  0.6 
40  44.6  25.4  10.9  14.5  16.4  5.3  6.0  5.1  2.1  0.7  40  55.4  1.4  1.8  0.3  0.3  1.2  31.0  3.3  1.4  1.8  0.1  6.5  0.5  3.0  11.3  0.5  6.8  0.1  0.7 
Panel B: real stock prices 
Supply‐side shocks  Demand‐side and financial shocks 
  Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM    Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  21.3  8.8  6.0  2.8  3.6  1.3  2.2  0.1  8.4  0.5  0  78.7  9.1  7.0  3.9  2.6  0.5  0.4  2.8  0.1  2.5  0.2  21.1  20.9  0.2  38.2  11.2  19.1  1.9  1.7 
2  24.4  8.3  6.4  1.9  9.4  6.7  2.0  0.7  6.4  0.3  2  75.6  6.6  12.6  5.5  6.6  0.5  0.4  3.8  0.1  3.5  0.2  16.8  15.9  0.8  35.4  5.7  21.6  2.5  2.1 
4  28.4  11.7  9.1  2.6  12.2  7.0  3.8  1.4  4.3  0.2  4  71.6  3.9  11.2  6.0  4.6  0.6  0.8  5.2  0.2  4.3  0.7  15.3  13.9  1.2  35.3  3.0  22.9  2.9  3.2 
6  31.6  15.2  12.6  2.6  13.0  6.7  4.3  2.0  3.2  0.2  6  68.4  2.7  10.5  6.2  3.7  0.6  0.9  6.1  0.3  4.8  1.0  14.2  12.9  1.3  34.0  2.1  21.8  3.9  3.6 
8  34.4  17.6  15.0  2.6  13.4  6.7  4.3  2.4  3.2  0.2  8  65.6  2.1  10.2  6.3  3.4  0.5  0.8  5.9  0.2  4.7  1.0  13.4  12.1  1.2  33.1  1.6  21.1  4.2  3.8 
12  38.4  20.5  18.2  2.3  13.5  6.3  4.5  2.7  4.3  0.1  12  61.6  1.6  9.4  5.7  3.4  0.3  0.6  5.4  0.2  4.2  1.0  12.2  11.2  0.9  32.3  1.1  20.8  4.6  3.7 
20  46.8  26.5  24.5  2.0  13.5  5.6  5.2  2.7  6.7  0.1  20  53.2  1.0  8.5  4.2  3.9  0.4  0.4  3.9  0.1  3.1  0.7  10.6  10.0  0.5  28.7  0.6  18.2  5.2  2.9 
40  55.1  33.0  31.2  1.8  13.4  5.7  5.1  2.6  8.6  0.1  40  44.9  0.6  7.5  2.7  4.4  0.4  0.2  2.6  0.1  2.0  0.5  8.7  8.5  0.3  25.1  0.3  15.3  5.9  2.2 
Panel C: real housing prices 
Supply‐side shocks  Demand‐side and financial shocks 
  Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM    Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  22.4  4.3  3.9  0.4  9.1  6.8  2.1  0.2  9.0  ‐  0  77.6  0.2  6.8  4.6  1.2  1.0  0.0  1.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  68.8  ‐  68.8  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
2  35.5  14.5  11.4  3.1  12.7  10.9  0.3  1.5  8.2  0.1  2  64.5  0.1  11.7  9.3  0.6  1.8  0.5  7.4  3.2  4.0  0.2  40.4  0.2  40.1  4.3  0.1  3.1  0.1  0.5 
4  39.6  18.4  14.0  4.4  12.3  10.3  0.1  1.9  8.7  0.2  4  60.4  0.1  13.9  11.2  0.8  1.9  1.1  9.4  3.9  5.2  0.3  26.6  0.2  26.2  9.3  1.4  4.7  0.5  1.4 
6  41.1  21.2  15.6  5.6  11.1  9.1  0.2  1.8  8.6  0.2  6  58.9  0.1  14.4  12.0  1.0  1.4  1.6  9.6  3.8  5.4  0.4  20.3  0.2  19.9  12.8  2.8  4.9  0.9  2.0 
8  41.8  23.8  17.4  6.4  9.6  7.7  0.3  1.6  8.2  0.2  8  58.2  0.1  14.5  12.3  1.2  1.0  1.9  9.6  3.9  5.2  0.5  16.4  0.1  16.1  15.4  4.0  5.0  1.4  2.3 
12  44.0  28.0  21.0  7.0  7.2  5.5  0.4  1.3  8.6  0.2  12  56.0  0.1  14.4  12.1  1.7  0.6  2.7  9.8  4.1  4.9  0.8  12.0  0.1  11.6  17.1  5.3  4.4  1.9  2.5 
20  47.9  34.0  27.4  6.6  4.3  3.1  0.3  0.9  9.4  0.2  20  52.1  0.1  13.4  10.8  2.2  0.4  4.5  9.2  4.3  4.2  0.7  8.6  0.1  8.2  16.1  5.0  2.9  3.2  2.1 
40  54.2  40.8  34.9  5.9  2.1  1.4  0.3  0.4  11.0  0.3  40  45.8  0.1  11.7  8.9  2.6  0.2  5.9  8.2  4.6  3.1  0.5  6.4  0.1  5.4  13.5  3.9  1.4  4.2  1.4 
Panel D: real non‐energy commodity prices 
Supply‐side shocks  Demand‐side and financial shocks 
  Total   OIL  OS  OO  LM  LS  LD  CI  PR  PM    Total  AD  SAV  GFI  GDI  GTI  TT  MP  EL  TL  TS  PA  PF  PH  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  LV 
0  45.5  9.3  3.6  5.7  9.4  0.5  8.4  0.5  2.8  24.0  0  54.5  24.9  2.1  0.9  1.2  0.0  14.5  4.5  3.1  1.4  0.0  0.4  ‐  0.4  8.1  1.1  1.7  4.8  0.0 
2  46.2  13.0  3.3  9.7  16.4  3.4  12.9  0.1  2.0  14.9  2  53.8  21.2  3.5  2.6  0.7  0.2  12.2  3.3  2.7  0.4  0.2  3.5  0.1  2.3  9.9  0.3  4.0  3.5  0.3 
4  44.1  14.4  4.1  10.3  15.3  3.5  11.7  0.1  1.5  12.9  4  55.9  15.7  5.3  3.2  0.5  1.6  10.1  3.9  2.0  0.8  1.1  4.7  0.3  3.1  16.3  0.2  9.3  3.6  0.7 
6  42.6  15.0  4.6  10.4  14.4  3.3  11.0  0.1  1.0  12.1  6  57.4  12.5  6.9  3.9  0.4  2.6  8.7  4.7  1.8  1.3  1.6  5.3  0.3  3.6  19.3  0.2  11.0  4.0  0.9 
8  43.4  16.4  5.1  11.3  14.1  3.2  10.8  0.1  0.8  12.0  8  56.6  10.5  7.1  4.0  0.4  2.7  8.0  5.2  2.1  1.6  1.5  5.4  0.3  3.5  20.6  0.2  11.0  4.8  1.0 
12  44.7  17.6  5.9  11.7  13.5  2.6  10.8  0.1  1.1  12.6  12  55.3  8.7  6.3  3.3  0.3  2.7  7.6  5.4  2.4  1.6  1.4  5.1  0.3  3.0  22.1  0.2  11.2  5.7  0.8 
20  45.4  17.4  6.0  11.4  13.2  2.2  10.9  0.1  1.6  13.2  20  54.6  8.1  5.4  2.6  0.2  2.6  8.6  5.3  2.8  1.3  1.2  4.9  0.3  2.7  22.3  0.3  11.1  6.0  0.7 




energy commodities price  (PM). Demand‐side and  financial shocks: goods aggregate demand  (AD); global  (GFI), US  (GDI) and global ex‐US  (GTI) saving rate,  joint global saving rate  (SAV: GFI+GDI+GTI); US terms of trade  (TT); excess 
liquidity (EL), term structure level (TL) and slope (TS), monetary policy stance (MP: EL+TL+TS); stocks (PF) and housing (PH) preference, joint portfolio allocation (PA: PF+PH+gold preference shock; the latter shock is not reported); size 




  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  Y 
89(2)‐90(1)  0.33  1.10  ‐0.83  0.05  1.55  1.09  ‐0.37  ‐0.14  1.39  0.26  ‐0.69  0.07  ‐0.54  0.26  ‐0.24  0.20  ‐0.52  0.07  1.88 
90(2)‐93(3)  0.19  ‐0.40  1.86  ‐1.26  ‐8.64  0.64  ‐1.27  ‐3.83  ‐2.87  ‐0.51  ‐0.79  ‐0.80  0.41  ‐0.47  ‐0.14  ‐0.30  0.28  0.24  ‐8.45 
93(4)‐94(3)  1.36  1.79  ‐0.40  ‐0.03  1.58  ‐0.73  1.70  ‐0.06  1.77  0.30  ‐1.41  ‐0.71  ‐0.11  0.27  ‐0.04  0.21  ‐0.93  ‐0.10  2.95 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  3.41  ‐1.25  0.30  4.35  ‐1.90  1.29  ‐3.49  0.00  ‐2.08  0.44  1.93  0.34  0.21  0.33  0.14  0.04  0.97  ‐0.11  1.50 
97(3)‐98(3)  0.96  ‐0.77  2.50  ‐0.77  ‐3.72  ‐6.00  2.34  ‐1.21  ‐0.85  0.99  1.01  0.01  0.67  0.07  ‐0.03  ‐0.14  0.55  ‐0.12  ‐2.76 
98(4)‐99(3)  0.55  ‐0.06  1.18  ‐0.57  1.82  2.96  0.43  ‐1.42  0.23  0.99  ‐1.38  0.53  ‐1.07  ‐0.10  ‐0.06  ‐0.38  ‐0.28  ‐0.02  2.38 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  0.45  0.19  0.42  ‐0.17  0.38  0.86  ‐0.28  ‐0.10  ‐0.33  0.00  0.23  0.30  ‐0.30  0.13  0.00  0.06  0.03  0.00  0.83 
00(4)‐03(2)  ‐1.53  ‐0.49  ‐3.85  2.82  ‐5.35  ‐1.44  ‐3.82  0.43  1.65  0.24  ‐2.42  ‐0.51  ‐0.77  0.01  ‐0.44  0.03  ‐0.51  ‐0.22  ‐6.88 
03(3)‐04(2)  0.87  0.07  ‐0.32  1.12  ‐0.36  0.15  ‐0.50  ‐0.25  0.33  0.21  ‐0.28  ‐0.05  ‐0.74  0.17  0.07  0.09  0.22  ‐0.04  0.51 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  ‐0.16  0.08  0.11  ‐0.35  0.27  ‐0.62  0.25  0.08  0.00  0.36  0.21  0.12  ‐0.02  ‐0.14  ‐0.12  0.27  0.03  0.07  0.11 
08(2)‐09(3)  ‐6.04  ‐0.55  ‐3.51  ‐1.98  ‐9.32  ‐1.15  ‐0.33  ‐1.58  ‐2.71  ‐1.56  ‐1.99  ‐0.06  ‐0.71  0.43  0.02  ‐0.22  ‐1.24  ‐0.20  ‐15.36 
09(4)‐10(3)  0.77  0.62  ‐0.04  0.19  ‐0.29  ‐0.29  0.66  0.05  ‐0.09  ‐0.19  ‐0.44  0.47  ‐0.56  ‐0.12  0.13  0.13  ‐0.40  ‐0.09  0.48 
Panel B: Employment
  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  E 
89(2)‐90(1)  0.00  0.87  ‐0.07  ‐0.80  0.95  ‐0.12  ‐0.85  0.19  1.28  0.50  ‐0.06  0.72  ‐0.13  0.02  ‐0.28  0.21  ‐0.53  ‐0.08  0.95 
90(2)‐93(3)  ‐4.03  ‐3.23  ‐0.21  ‐0.60  ‐14.03  0.54  ‐3.52  ‐4.19  ‐2.27  ‐0.58  ‐4.01  ‐1.98  ‐1.03  ‐0.34  ‐0.18  ‐0.28  ‐0.44  0.25  ‐18.07 
93(4)‐94(3)  ‐1.18  0.40  0.89  ‐2.48  ‐0.24  ‐0.35  1.16  ‐1.16  1.03  0.05  ‐0.98  ‐0.87  0.72  0.06  ‐0.26  ‐0.03  ‐0.58  ‐0.01  ‐1.42 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  3.56  ‐0.75  ‐0.17  4.48  ‐2.02  0.27  ‐3.92  0.89  ‐1.22  0.30  1.66  0.47  0.23  0.13  0.06  0.09  0.76  ‐0.07  1.54 
97(3)‐98(3)  6.01  2.57  0.76  2.68  ‐1.36  ‐2.02  ‐0.26  ‐0.56  ‐1.76  0.93  2.32  0.52  0.38  0.11  0.20  0.15  1.24  ‐0.29  4.65 
98(4)‐99(3)  3.13  1.92  0.40  0.82  0.67  ‐0.70  1.67  ‐1.24  ‐0.28  1.05  0.18  0.79  ‐0.14  0.20  ‐0.12  ‐0.52  0.02  ‐0.05  3.81 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  0.03  0.03  0.08  ‐0.08  ‐0.37  0.36  ‐0.02  ‐0.35  ‐0.21  0.01  ‐0.16  0.39  ‐0.45  ‐0.02  0.02  ‐0.13  0.08  ‐0.04  ‐0.34 
00(4)‐03(2)  5.84  3.89  ‐2.41  4.36  ‐6.68  ‐0.24  ‐3.36  ‐0.32  2.45  0.55  ‐5.74  ‐1.26  ‐0.88  ‐0.95  ‐0.48  0.24  ‐2.10  ‐0.31  ‐0.84 
03(3)‐04(2)  0.79  0.26  ‐0.41  0.95  ‐1.28  ‐0.69  ‐0.52  0.02  0.01  0.26  ‐0.36  ‐0.18  ‐0.32  0.03  ‐0.09  0.20  0.04  ‐0.05  ‐0.48 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  ‐0.29  0.42  ‐0.44  ‐0.27  0.02  ‐0.31  ‐0.01  ‐0.23  0.14  0.20  0.24  0.36  0.09  ‐0.26  ‐0.15  0.12  0.02  0.06  ‐0.27 
08(2)‐09(3)  ‐3.30  0.46  ‐0.99  ‐2.77  ‐7.33  ‐0.64  ‐0.38  ‐0.98  ‐1.82  ‐1.06  ‐2.46  ‐1.09  0.09  0.31  0.09  ‐0.47  ‐1.16  ‐0.24  ‐10.63 






  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  N 
89(2)‐90(1)  0.27  0.11  ‐0.03  0.20  0.20  0.04  0.04  ‐0.02  0.13  ‐0.01  0.01  0.00  ‐0.02  0.04  0.01  0.01  ‐0.02  0.00  0.47 
90(2)‐93(3)  ‐0.17  0.10  0.05  ‐0.32  ‐0.47  0.00  ‐0.13  ‐0.18  ‐0.10  0.02  ‐0.08  0.04  0.00  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.04  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.64 
93(4)‐94(3)  0.23  0.06  ‐0.01  0.18  0.06  0.01  0.09  ‐0.01  0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.03  ‐0.08  ‐0.01  0.05  0.02  0.03  ‐0.05  0.00  0.29 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  ‐0.01  ‐0.15  ‐0.06  0.20  0.00  0.06  ‐0.04  0.03  ‐0.10  0.00  0.05  0.03  ‐0.03  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.01 
97(3)‐98(3)  0.17  0.05  0.08  0.04  ‐0.40  ‐0.16  ‐0.07  ‐0.02  ‐0.08  ‐0.04  ‐0.02  ‐0.03  0.05  ‐0.01  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  0.02  0.00  ‐0.23 
98(4)‐99(3)  0.11  0.06  0.04  0.01  ‐0.20  0.09  ‐0.12  ‐0.09  ‐0.08  ‐0.01  0.00  0.10  ‐0.07  ‐0.02  0.01  ‐0.03  0.01  ‐0.01  ‐0.09 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  0.13  ‐0.02  0.05  0.10  0.05  0.01  0.07  ‐0.01  ‐0.05  ‐0.02  0.04  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01  ‐0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.18 
00(4)‐03(2)  ‐0.07  0.04  ‐0.13  0.02  ‐0.16  ‐0.03  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.17  0.02  ‐0.30  ‐0.08  ‐0.12  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  0.02  ‐0.06  0.01  ‐0.24 
03(3)‐04(2)  0.03  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.04  ‐0.11  0.01  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  ‐0.02  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  0.03  ‐0.04  0.03  0.02  ‐0.04  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.08 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.01  0.02  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.04  ‐0.04  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.06 
08(2)‐09(3)  ‐0.15  ‐0.05  ‐0.14  0.04  ‐0.22  ‐0.04  0.07  ‐0.02  ‐0.07  ‐0.01  ‐0.15  ‐0.10  0.01  0.02  0.01  ‐0.04  ‐0.05  0.00  ‐0.36 
09(4)‐10(3)  0.20  0.06  0.01  0.14  0.02  ‐0.01  0.08  ‐0.04  ‐0.01  0.00  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.03  0.06  0.00  0.01  ‐0.03  0.00  0.22 
   
















  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  Td 
89(2)‐90(1)  ‐0.50  ‐0.37  ‐0.12  0.00  0.13  0.17  0.14  ‐0.05  0.09  0.03  ‐0.25  ‐0.04  ‐0.15  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  0.03  ‐0.07  0.02  ‐0.37 
90(2)‐93(3)  ‐0.32  ‐0.09  ‐0.01  ‐0.21  ‐0.31  0.03  ‐0.28  0.06  ‐0.37  ‐0.12  0.37  0.00  0.30  ‐0.04  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  0.15  0.02  ‐0.63 
93(4)‐94(3)  0.65  0.29  0.01  0.34  ‐0.34  ‐0.09  ‐0.35  0.08  0.24  0.08  ‐0.29  ‐0.06  ‐0.20  0.05  0.04  0.01  ‐0.13  ‐0.01  0.32 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  0.40  ‐0.05  ‐0.20  0.65  ‐0.61  0.08  ‐0.98  ‐0.01  ‐0.18  0.11  0.37  0.03  0.09  0.03  0.04  0.03  0.15  0.01  ‐0.20 
97(3)‐98(3)  ‐0.01  0.53  ‐0.01  ‐0.53  0.92  ‐0.62  0.99  ‐0.14  0.39  0.22  0.08  ‐0.08  0.11  0.00  ‐0.02  0.05  0.00  0.02  0.91 
98(4)‐99(3)  ‐0.08  0.37  ‐0.31  ‐0.14  1.10  0.49  0.78  ‐0.17  0.22  0.18  ‐0.41  0.03  ‐0.30  0.06  ‐0.02  ‐0.08  ‐0.10  ‐0.01  1.02 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  ‐0.06  ‐0.14  0.14  ‐0.05  ‐0.09  0.13  ‐0.26  ‐0.10  0.05  0.02  0.06  0.12  ‐0.08  0.01  ‐0.01  0.03  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.15 
00(4)‐03(2)  0.73  0.27  0.03  0.43  ‐0.17  ‐0.11  ‐0.23  0.33  ‐0.18  ‐0.01  0.03  0.06  ‐0.07  0.03  ‐0.08  ‐0.05  0.16  ‐0.01  0.56 
03(3)‐04(2)  0.17  ‐0.06  ‐0.01  0.24  ‐0.75  ‐0.15  ‐0.44  ‐0.08  0.07  0.06  ‐0.21  ‐0.05  ‐0.26  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.02  0.00  ‐0.58 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  ‐0.10  0.08  ‐0.13  ‐0.05  ‐0.23  ‐0.14  ‐0.01  ‐0.04  ‐0.15  0.09  0.03  0.06  ‐0.04  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  0.06  0.02  0.01  ‐0.33 
08(2)‐09(3)  ‐0.24  0.24  ‐0.17  ‐0.31  ‐2.05  ‐0.15  ‐0.72  ‐0.37  ‐0.36  ‐0.31  ‐0.14  0.15  ‐0.17  0.03  ‐0.03  0.03  ‐0.15  ‐0.01  ‐2.29 
09(4)‐10(3)  0.56  0.20  0.22  0.14  0.23  0.03  0.03  0.07  0.10  ‐0.01  0.01  0.11  ‐0.08  ‐0.08  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.79 
Panel B: Excess liquidity 
  Supply shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  L 
89(2)‐90(1)  ‐1.16  ‐0.92  0.75  ‐0.99  0.45  ‐0.79  ‐0.39  0.49  ‐0.03  0.20  0.97  0.58  0.84  ‐0.21  0.11  ‐0.24  0.02  ‐0.13  ‐0.71 
90(2)‐93(3)  ‐4.96  ‐5.60  ‐1.10  1.74  ‐4.53  ‐0.41  ‐1.96  ‐0.29  0.87  0.23  ‐2.96  ‐0.44  ‐2.03  0.13  0.04  0.23  ‐0.73  ‐0.17  ‐9.49 
93(4)‐94(3)  ‐4.55  ‐1.73  0.16  ‐2.98  ‐0.27  0.51  ‐0.36  ‐0.87  ‐0.46  ‐0.43  1.34  ‐0.06  1.38  0.01  ‐0.35  ‐0.17  0.32  0.20  ‐4.82 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  ‐0.38  0.78  0.55  ‐1.72  0.92  ‐0.87  1.03  1.35  0.76  ‐0.52  ‐0.82  0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.17  ‐0.23  ‐0.06  ‐0.42  0.06  0.53 
97(3)‐98(3)  3.51  0.64  ‐1.16  4.03  0.29  3.74  ‐3.37  1.65  ‐1.91  ‐0.77  0.94  0.56  ‐0.46  ‐0.03  0.33  0.01  0.58  ‐0.05  3.80 
98(4)‐99(3)  2.30  1.10  ‐0.08  1.29  ‐1.54  ‐2.76  0.23  ‐0.55  ‐0.66  ‐0.52  2.71  ‐0.08  1.59  0.54  0.03  0.20  0.49  ‐0.07  0.76 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  0.76  0.32  ‐0.27  0.72  ‐0.97  ‐0.78  0.28  ‐0.33  0.01  ‐0.10  ‐0.07  ‐0.13  0.12  ‐0.11  ‐0.02  ‐0.03  0.10  ‐0.01  ‐0.21 
00(4)‐03(2)  1.93  1.64  0.76  ‐0.47  ‐1.11  1.34  1.22  ‐3.51  1.57  0.34  ‐2.07  ‐0.56  0.18  ‐0.93  0.41  0.20  ‐1.49  0.12  0.82 
03(3)‐04(2)  ‐0.59  ‐0.04  0.23  ‐0.78  ‐0.09  ‐0.06  0.06  ‐0.06  ‐0.39  0.02  0.33  ‐0.13  1.07  ‐0.20  ‐0.12  ‐0.05  ‐0.24  0.01  ‐0.68 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  0.54  0.17  0.22  0.14  ‐0.11  0.46  ‐0.59  0.07  0.44  ‐0.34  ‐0.16  ‐0.03  0.03  0.01  0.04  ‐0.15  ‐0.03  ‐0.02  0.43 
08(2)‐09(3)  3.77  1.04  1.94  0.79  6.78  0.52  0.98  2.31  1.28  1.14  0.56  ‐1.19  1.13  0.05  0.31  ‐0.08  0.25  0.08  10.55 





  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  LEV 
89(2)‐90(1)  21.23  21.35  0.91  ‐1.02  11.76  1.55  ‐3.27  ‐2.66  2.13  ‐1.94  7.95  7.27  ‐0.03  ‐0.17  ‐1.77  2.32  8.01  0.33  33.00 
90(2)‐93(3)  ‐8.00  6.07  ‐8.99  ‐5.09  43.28  1.01  4.25  18.14  ‐3.04  0.43  28.53  28.98  1.36  2.36  0.53  ‐4.11  ‐6.06  ‐0.58  35.28 
93(4)‐94(3)  19.67  8.64  9.03  2.00  10.44  1.70  ‐6.23  ‐8.03  ‐1.29  1.25  ‐6.14  ‐3.91  ‐1.00  ‐3.84  0.42  0.71  29.18  1.48  30.11 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  ‐0.99  ‐8.45  ‐10.70  18.15  9.20  5.86  0.78  2.74  3.81  1.73  3.84  1.12  2.91  ‐1.27  ‐1.65  2.57  ‐9.55  0.16  8.20 
97(3)‐98(3)  17.70  28.10  ‐7.38  ‐3.02  ‐7.39  ‐2.45  0.22  2.45  3.45  0.10  ‐17.03  ‐17.61  ‐2.29  1.77  1.08  ‐0.35  5.87  0.36  10.31 
98(4)‐99(3)  ‐9.97  ‐9.76  ‐6.74  6.52  ‐9.12  ‐0.25  ‐4.51  ‐7.69  ‐1.90  0.26  0.36  14.50  ‐2.96  ‐4.17  ‐0.59  ‐4.97  4.60  ‐1.45  ‐19.10 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  5.44  4.44  0.88  0.13  ‐1.48  1.49  ‐1.89  ‐4.64  0.38  0.24  2.33  3.15  ‐1.59  3.01  ‐0.67  ‐1.08  0.61  ‐0.50  3.97 
00(4)‐03(2)  20.97  1.26  9.36  10.35  ‐23.04  1.71  ‐7.59  5.36  ‐2.11  ‐0.19  ‐8.02  ‐15.01  2.66  2.13  ‐1.90  3.01  ‐12.21  1.10  ‐2.08 
03(3)‐04(2)  7.13  5.87  ‐2.01  3.27  ‐7.93  ‐3.06  ‐1.03  ‐0.28  0.70  ‐0.11  ‐7.04  ‐4.92  ‐2.48  ‐0.56  ‐1.42  1.55  2.88  0.79  ‐0.81 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  ‐5.95  4.43  ‐7.12  ‐3.27  ‐4.33  0.65  4.47  ‐6.67  ‐1.87  ‐0.03  8.57  7.57  0.91  ‐0.26  ‐2.18  1.89  ‐9.44  0.64  ‐10.28 
08(2)‐09(3)  ‐16.06  ‐5.70  10.04  ‐20.40  ‐44.38  ‐2.58  ‐10.72  ‐5.20  ‐2.85  ‐1.17  ‐32.73  ‐22.90  ‐1.32  ‐1.77  ‐3.07  ‐4.00  10.87  0.32  ‐60.44 
09(4)‐10(3)  2.39  ‐3.40  ‐0.67  6.46  3.89  0.53  4.96  ‐1.29  ‐1.79  2.00  4.61  ‐0.30  0.42  1.66  1.95  0.59  ‐5.14  0.29  6.28 
Panel D: US$ exchange rate index 
  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  X 
89(2)‐90(1)  ‐3.01  ‐2.51  ‐0.31  ‐0.19  1.79  0.76  0.57  ‐0.16  1.08  0.17  ‐0.62  ‐0.07  ‐0.33  0.06  ‐0.03  ‐0.09  ‐0.20  0.04  ‐1.21 
90(2)‐93(3)  ‐1.74  ‐0.34  0.44  ‐1.84  ‐3.68  ‐0.16  ‐0.72  ‐1.37  ‐1.11  ‐0.54  0.21  ‐0.23  0.53  ‐0.14  ‐0.25  0.22  0.20  ‐0.11  ‐5.42 
93(4)‐94(3)  ‐0.52  ‐0.61  ‐0.78  0.87  1.24  ‐0.09  0.55  0.32  1.22  0.18  ‐0.95  ‐0.14  ‐0.47  0.09  0.17  0.15  ‐0.75  0.00  0.71 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  ‐0.33  ‐2.66  ‐0.18  2.51  ‐1.11  0.44  0.50  0.13  ‐1.12  ‐1.30  0.25  ‐0.12  0.26  ‐0.12  0.14  ‐0.20  0.28  0.00  ‐1.43 
97(3)‐98(3)  ‐2.69  ‐1.94  ‐0.06  ‐0.68  ‐2.24  ‐1.96  1.62  0.24  ‐0.54  ‐1.90  0.31  0.33  0.52  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.28  ‐0.29  0.09  ‐4.93 
98(4)‐99(3)  1.59  1.92  ‐0.41  0.07  ‐2.39  2.29  ‐1.23  ‐0.56  ‐0.04  ‐1.55  ‐1.29  ‐0.27  ‐1.12  ‐0.23  ‐0.06  0.45  ‐0.06  0.01  ‐0.80 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  ‐1.06  ‐0.31  0.22  ‐0.97  1.78  0.01  0.09  0.23  ‐0.22  0.85  0.83  0.04  0.26  0.36  ‐0.03  0.09  0.10  0.01  0.72 
00(4)‐03(2)  1.26  ‐1.80  0.06  2.99  2.39  ‐0.56  0.14  ‐1.14  1.13  1.90  0.93  0.53  ‐0.72  1.13  ‐0.20  ‐0.18  0.33  0.04  3.65 
03(3)‐04(2)  0.24  ‐0.45  0.07  0.62  0.25  0.67  ‐0.34  ‐0.23  ‐0.08  1.11  ‐0.90  ‐0.10  ‐0.53  ‐0.15  0.06  ‐0.28  0.13  ‐0.01  0.49 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  ‐0.43  0.09  0.33  ‐0.85  0.44  ‐0.07  0.29  0.07  ‐0.20  0.50  ‐0.15  ‐0.05  ‐0.17  0.33  ‐0.12  ‐0.13  ‐0.01  0.00  0.01 
08(2)‐09(3)  ‐2.33  0.32  ‐0.58  ‐2.07  ‐0.49  ‐0.24  0.58  ‐0.20  ‐0.49  0.21  ‐0.34  0.21  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.16  0.22  ‐0.56  0.02  ‐2.82 









  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  SR 
89(2)‐90(1)  0.10  ‐0.04  0.17  ‐0.02  0.28  ‐0.29  ‐0.02  0.09  0.03  0.10  0.37  0.23  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.04  0.00  0.38 
90(2)‐93(3)  0.73  0.64  ‐0.30  0.39  ‐0.88  0.09  ‐0.22  ‐0.48  ‐0.03  ‐0.01  ‐0.22  ‐0.03  ‐0.09  0.01  0.00  ‐0.01  ‐0.11  0.01  ‐0.16 
93(4)‐94(3)  ‐0.47  ‐0.31  0.41  ‐0.56  0.03  0.07  0.11  ‐0.08  ‐0.07  ‐0.04  0.04  0.00  0.05  ‐0.06  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  0.13  0.01  ‐0.44 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  0.46  0.06  0.54  ‐0.15  ‐0.16  ‐0.10  ‐0.03  ‐0.06  0.11  ‐0.13  0.04  0.01  0.03  0.02  ‐0.04  0.05  ‐0.02  0.00  0.30 
97(3)‐98(3)  0.79  0.41  0.04  0.34  ‐0.64  0.76  ‐0.57  ‐0.48  ‐0.23  ‐0.08  ‐0.05  ‐0.11  ‐0.14  0.00  0.04  0.01  0.15  0.00  0.15 
98(4)‐99(3)  ‐0.48  ‐0.35  ‐0.10  ‐0.03  ‐0.28  ‐0.76  0.02  0.22  ‐0.03  0.04  0.24  0.15  0.24  ‐0.01  0.00  ‐0.11  0.00  ‐0.02  ‐0.76 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  0.48  0.14  0.09  0.25  ‐0.26  0.06  0.30  ‐0.47  0.05  ‐0.09  ‐0.11  0.08  ‐0.13  ‐0.02  0.00  ‐0.06  0.01  ‐0.01  0.22 
00(4)‐03(2)  ‐0.31  0.20  ‐0.13  ‐0.37  0.83  0.11  0.45  0.52  ‐0.04  0.18  ‐0.38  ‐0.27  0.19  ‐0.13  0.00  0.04  ‐0.24  0.03  0.51 
03(3)‐04(2)  ‐0.02  0.07  0.05  ‐0.14  ‐0.61  ‐0.47  0.01  0.04  ‐0.02  0.00  ‐0.17  ‐0.04  ‐0.05  0.01  ‐0.08  ‐0.01  ‐0.01  0.02  ‐0.63 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  0.27  0.21  ‐0.24  0.30  0.04  0.03  ‐0.17  ‐0.01  0.03  0.01  0.15  0.16  0.06  ‐0.03  ‐0.06  ‐0.01  0.02  0.01  0.31 
08(2)‐09(3)  0.22  ‐0.27  0.09  0.40  0.08  0.08  0.00  0.28  0.00  0.04  ‐0.31  ‐0.22  0.00  0.01  ‐0.04  ‐0.12  0.06  0.00  0.30 
09(4)‐10(3)  ‐0.20  0.20  ‐0.44  0.03  0.24  0.15  0.09  0.03  ‐0.12  ‐0.02  0.10  0.03  0.00  0.05  0.05  0.03  ‐0.06  0.00  0.03 
Panel B: Housing prices 
  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  H 
89(2)‐90(1)  1.48  1.93  ‐0.24  ‐0.21  0.11  0.07  ‐0.69  0.30  0.85  0.40  ‐0.82  0.45  ‐0.39  0.19  ‐0.25  ‐0.28  ‐0.54  0.00  1.59 
90(2)‐93(3)  3.17  2.95  1.67  ‐1.45  ‐10.79  ‐0.22  ‐2.48  ‐2.69  ‐2.51  ‐0.12  ‐2.77  ‐3.12  0.13  ‐0.26  ‐0.17  0.35  0.10  0.21  ‐7.62 
93(4)‐94(3)  ‐0.80  ‐0.16  ‐0.81  0.16  1.85  0.43  2.16  ‐0.37  1.95  0.17  ‐2.49  ‐1.47  0.24  ‐0.12  ‐0.22  ‐0.01  ‐0.88  ‐0.03  1.04 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  3.46  ‐1.00  1.42  3.04  ‐4.63  0.15  ‐3.69  ‐0.71  ‐3.12  0.46  2.29  1.01  0.19  0.21  0.00  ‐0.19  1.14  ‐0.05  ‐1.17 
97(3)‐98(3)  0.44  ‐2.05  2.05  0.44  ‐0.02  0.13  ‐0.51  ‐2.11  ‐0.96  1.00  2.42  1.07  0.55  0.13  0.29  ‐0.53  0.99  ‐0.08  0.42 
98(4)‐99(3)  0.33  ‐0.62  1.71  ‐0.76  ‐0.23  ‐0.83  0.24  ‐0.63  ‐0.13  0.96  0.17  1.02  ‐0.60  ‐0.37  ‐0.21  0.38  ‐0.08  0.03  0.10 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  0.57  ‐0.08  0.45  0.20  ‐0.23  ‐0.50  0.19  ‐0.07  ‐0.49  0.15  0.49  0.13  0.24  ‐0.01  ‐0.07  0.15  0.02  0.03  0.34 
00(4)‐03(2)  1.72  2.41  ‐2.83  2.14  2.79  0.76  ‐2.53  3.15  3.91  0.83  ‐3.33  ‐1.41  ‐0.64  0.44  ‐0.28  ‐0.18  ‐1.18  ‐0.08  4.51 
03(3)‐04(2)  0.02  ‐0.34  0.02  0.34  0.12  0.16  ‐0.31  0.30  ‐0.18  0.10  0.05  0.11  0.01  0.11  ‐0.01  ‐0.25  0.13  ‐0.06  0.15 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  ‐0.13  ‐0.30  0.54  ‐0.37  1.69  0.31  0.54  0.57  0.23  0.11  ‐0.08  ‐0.07  0.08  ‐0.09  ‐0.02  0.01  ‐0.02  0.04  1.56 
08(2)‐09(3)  ‐2.83  0.81  ‐2.08  ‐1.57  ‐9.83  ‐0.38  ‐0.34  ‐2.08  ‐3.52  ‐0.62  ‐2.90  ‐0.80  ‐0.88  0.23  ‐0.02  0.07  ‐1.27  ‐0.24  ‐12.66 




  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  F 
89(2)‐90(1)  ‐1.28  0.22  ‐0.65  ‐0.85  ‐0.68  0.81  ‐0.52  ‐0.13  1.49  ‐0.28  ‐2.04  ‐0.43  ‐1.10  ‐0.23  0.25  ‐0.01  ‐0.50  ‐0.02  ‐1.96 
90(2)‐93(3)  ‐5.49  ‐4.89  0.49  ‐1.09  ‐3.57  ‐0.24  ‐0.24  ‐2.19  ‐1.60  ‐0.22  0.92  0.29  0.76  0.08  ‐0.47  ‐0.19  0.30  0.13  ‐9.06 
93(4)‐94(3)  0.15  0.45  ‐0.96  0.66  ‐1.27  0.04  0.28  0.74  ‐0.12  0.29  ‐2.50  ‐0.72  ‐0.56  0.01  0.29  0.08  ‐1.53  ‐0.08  ‐1.12 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  2.01  0.88  ‐1.14  2.27  0.82  0.63  ‐0.89  ‐0.01  ‐0.33  0.27  1.16  0.03  ‐0.49  0.05  0.45  0.35  0.79  ‐0.03  2.83 
97(3)‐98(3)  1.38  2.50  ‐0.34  ‐0.78  ‐2.24  ‐2.24  1.30  ‐0.94  ‐0.02  0.16  ‐0.51  ‐0.01  0.74  0.00  ‐0.36  ‐0.60  ‐0.15  ‐0.12  ‐0.86 
98(4)‐99(3)  ‐0.08  0.38  ‐0.73  0.28  2.87  1.88  ‐0.09  ‐0.30  0.01  0.05  1.33  1.11  ‐0.55  0.73  0.00  0.06  ‐0.12  0.10  2.80 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  0.41  0.15  0.35  ‐0.09  0.44  0.01  ‐0.08  0.22  ‐0.22  ‐0.07  0.59  ‐0.59  0.36  0.46  0.24  0.10  ‐0.04  0.05  0.85 
00(4)‐03(2)  1.76  0.44  ‐0.35  1.68  ‐4.73  ‐0.23  ‐2.01  0.26  2.06  ‐0.97  ‐3.84  ‐0.45  ‐1.92  ‐0.88  ‐0.29  ‐0.10  0.09  ‐0.31  ‐2.97 
03(3)‐04(2)  0.05  ‐0.08  ‐0.04  0.18  1.06  0.56  0.05  0.02  1.37  ‐0.17  ‐0.75  0.00  ‐0.79  ‐0.22  0.16  0.04  0.13  ‐0.07  1.11 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  ‐0.69  ‐0.81  0.10  0.02  3.25  ‐0.11  0.75  0.58  1.00  0.08  0.95  0.27  0.34  ‐0.12  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.01  2.56 
08(2)‐09(3)  ‐0.60  0.85  ‐0.52  ‐0.93  ‐2.23  ‐0.43  ‐0.35  0.04  ‐1.61  0.14  ‐0.03  0.00  0.05  0.41  0.26  0.21  ‐0.95  ‐0.02  ‐2.83 
09(4)‐10(3)  2.10  0.56  1.02  0.52  ‐1.05  ‐0.14  ‐0.47  ‐0.01  0.42  0.18  ‐1.02  0.46  ‐0.82  ‐0.47  0.02  ‐0.13  ‐0.01  ‐0.06  1.05 
Panel D: Non‐energy commodity index 
  Supply side shocks  Demand side and financial shocks Risk factor shocks Actual 
  Total  OIL  PR  LM  Total  AD  SAV  MP  PA  TT  RF  RAV  SZ  VL  MM  SL  LV  RAP  M 
89(2)‐90(1)  ‐18.76  ‐18.12  ‐0.63  1.85  5.09  5.29  0.89  ‐1.72  5.44  0.38  ‐5.19  ‐1.65  ‐3.71  1.42  ‐0.42  0.09  ‐1.10  0.17  ‐13.67 
90(2)‐93(3)  0.37  8.73  ‐8.36  ‐10.63  ‐16.40  1.49  ‐2.63  ‐8.46  ‐7.10  ‐2.20  2.51  1.48  4.31  ‐3.39  ‐1.37  0.35  1.18  ‐0.05  ‐16.03 
93(4)‐94(3)  0.76  ‐3.29  4.05  6.25  7.97  ‐2.67  4.60  3.10  6.56  0.75  ‐4.37  ‐0.33  ‐3.96  2.08  0.83  0.86  ‐3.44  ‐0.41  8.73 
                                     
96(3)‐97(2)  ‐2.02  ‐10.74  8.72  13.02  ‐6.00  5.12  ‐1.41  0.99  ‐7.60  ‐2.87  ‐0.23  ‐1.16  0.65  ‐1.41  1.62  ‐1.38  1.68  ‐0.23  ‐8.02 
97(3)‐98(3)  ‐12.92  ‐7.27  ‐5.65  ‐6.45  ‐9.86  ‐20.83  12.95  0.79  0.49  ‐4.28  1.02  ‐0.17  3.20  0.23  ‐1.07  ‐0.01  ‐1.43  0.26  ‐22.78 
98(4)‐99(3)  ‐0.92  1.90  ‐2.82  ‐1.18  ‐8.70  15.37  ‐6.03  ‐4.83  0.37  ‐3.60  ‐9.99  0.51  ‐5.95  ‐4.44  ‐0.59  1.42  ‐0.90  ‐0.05  ‐9.63 
                                     
99(4)‐00(3)  0.65  2.58  ‐1.93  ‐2.99  4.83  2.54  0.97  1.56  ‐1.76  2.05  ‐0.52  ‐0.64  ‐1.00  ‐0.71  0.21  1.05  0.13  0.44  5.48 
00(4)‐03(2)  ‐3.16  ‐15.56  12.40  13.36  ‐3.95  ‐5.90  ‐4.94  ‐7.73  3.98  5.32  5.32  2.54  ‐5.54  9.51  ‐2.55  ‐0.85  2.23  ‐0.02  ‐7.11 
03(3)‐04(2)  0.57  ‐3.08  3.66  4.36  ‐2.04  1.70  ‐1.94  ‐1.75  0.11  3.70  ‐3.88  ‐0.21  ‐4.23  0.38  0.61  ‐1.05  1.02  ‐0.40  ‐1.47 
                                     
07(2)‐08(1)  ‐7.60  ‐7.22  ‐0.39  ‐1.07  2.49  ‐2.40  1.14  1.76  ‐1.34  2.03  1.31  0.32  ‐0.86  1.25  0.68  ‐0.50  0.14  0.28  ‐5.11 
08(2)‐09(3)  ‐9.78  3.09  ‐12.87  ‐7.52  ‐17.81  ‐3.33  0.05  ‐2.27  ‐3.73  ‐3.16  ‐5.37  1.65  ‐1.56  ‐2.09  ‐0.49  0.72  ‐3.36  ‐0.24  ‐27.59 






















































(0.395)  RAV(‐1)     
1.418 






(0.486)  RAP(‐4)     
‐1.573 






(0.428)  PF(‐3)     
1.486 




(0.379)  MM(‐8)     
1.168 
(0.344)         
                     
AIC  0.743  0.470  AIC  0.465  0.511  0.408  AIC  0.409  0.389  0.276 
BIC  0.801  0.680  BIC  0.522  0.569  0.619  BIC  0.469  0.449  0.397 
HQ  0.766  0.554  HQ  0.488  0.535  0.492  HQ  0.433  0.413  0.324 
                     
RMSE  0.396  0.151  RMSE  0.326  0.260  0.154  RMSE  0.490  0.382  0.061 
MAFE  0.260  0.061  MAE  0.222  0.179  0.086  MAE  0.344  0.227  0.019 





over  the period  1986:4‐2008:1, with  robust  coefficient  standard  errors  in  brackets. AIC, BIC  and HQ  are  the Akaike, Bayes‐



































































































(0.057)  MM(p,‐3)     
‐0.126 
(0.050) 
RAV(p,‐1)      ‐0.246 (0.097) 
‐0.251 
(0.088)  SL(n,‐7)     
‐0.133 
(0.060)  RAP(n,‐4)     
‐0.114 
(0.047) 
RAV(p,‐2)      ‐0.242 (0.092) 
‐0.226 
(0.086)  LV(n,‐5)     
‐0.109 
(0.065)  RAP(p,‐6)     
‐0.133 
(0.053) 
EL(n,‐8)      0.219 (0.082) 
0.152 
(0.078)  RAV(n,‐8)     
0.166 
(0.067)  VL(n,‐4)     
‐0.103 
(0.049) 
TL(n,‐6)      ‐0.151 (0.083) 
‐0.182 
(0.077)  PG(p,‐3)     
‐0.199 
(0.068)  SL(p,‐5)     
0.211 
(0.054) 
GFI(n,‐1)      ‐0.219 (0.078) 
‐0.160 
(0.079)  PG(p,‐7)     
‐0.353 
(0.068)  RAV(n,‐6)     
0.207 
(0.051) 
ORP(n,‐2)        ‐0.202 (0.078)  TL(p,‐2)     
‐0.204 
(0.077)  RAV(p,‐1)     
‐0.229 
(0.058) 
ORP(p,‐1)        ‐0.179 (0.088)  PM(n,‐3)     
0.174 
(0.063)  TL(n,‐6)     
‐0.104 
(0.052) 
ORP(p,‐5)        ‐0.244 (0.083)  GDI(n,‐7)     
‐0.122 
(0.063)  TL(n,‐7)     
‐0.242 
(0.057) 
ORP(p,‐6)        ‐0.247 (0.088)  TT(n,‐3)     
‐0.252 






        GFI(n,‐1)      ‐0.203 (0.051) 
                         
R2  0.376  0.479  0.660  0.741  R2  0.130  0.278  0.701  R2  0.138  0.188  0.719 
R2c  0.376  0.466  0.615  0.688  R2c  0.109  0.230  0.635  R2c  0.138  0.178  0.652 
AIC  1.781  1.547  1.264  1.096  AIC  1.428  1.325  0.688  AIC  1.134  1.074  0.222 
BIC  1.810  1.635  1.566  1.519  BIC  1.514  1.505  1.141  BIC  1.191  1.132  0.705 
HQ  1.793  1.582  1.385  1.265  HQ  1.462  1.397  0.870  HQ  1.157  1.097  0.415 
                         
RMSE  1.152  1.093  0.877  0.788  RMSE  0.931  0.824  0.508  RMSE  1.055  0.815  0.508 
MAFE  0.892  0.838  0.564  0.528  MAE  0.682  0.663  0.407  MAE  0.774  0.659  0.410 























































































In the Figure the historical decomposition for real activity (Y), relatively to the various identified structural shocks, is plotted over the estimation sample: oil  market (OIL: oil  reserves, flow oil  supply, oil  production mix, oil  consumption and 
inventories preferences, oil  futures market-pressure, residual oil futures market, other real oil  price and nominal oil  price volatility), productivity (PR), labor market (LM: labor supply and demand, core inflation); good’s aggregate demand 
(AD); saving rate (SAV: global saving rate, US saving rate, global ex-US saving rate), monetary policy (MP: excess l iquidity, term structure level and slope); US terms of trade (TT); portfolio allocation (PA: stocks, housing and gold 
preferences); risk factor (RF: size (SZ), value (VL), momentum (MM), stocks' l iquidity (SL), leverage (LV), risk aversion (RAV), risk appetite (RAP)). 
  































































In the Figure the historical decomposition for employment (E), relatively to the various identified structural shocks, is plotted over the estimation sample: oil  market (OIL: oil  reserves, flow oil  supply, oil  production mix, oil  consumption 
and inventories preferences, oil  futures market-pressure, residual oil  futures market, other real oil  price and nominal oil  price volatil ity), productivity (PR), labor market (LM: labor supply and demand, core inflation); good’s aggregate 
demand (AD); saving rate (SAV: global saving rate, US saving rate, global ex-US saving rate), monetary policy (MP: excess l iquidity, term structure level and slope); US terms of trade (TT); portfolio allocation (PA: stocks, housing and gold 


























































In the Figure the historical decomposition for core inflation (N), relatively to the various identified structural shocks, is plotted over the estimation sample: oil  market (OIL: oil  reserves, flow oil  supply, oil  production mix, oil  consumption 
and inventories preferences, oil  futures market-pressure, residual oil  futures market, other real oil  price and nominal oil  price volatil ity), productivity (PR), labor market (LM: labor supply and demand, core inflation); good’s aggregate 
demand (AD); saving rate (SAV: global saving rate, US saving rate, global ex-US saving rate), monetary policy (MP: excess l iquidity, term structure level and slope); US terms of trade (TT); portfolio allocation (PA: stocks, housing and gold 













































































































































In the Figure the historical decomposition for the US Trade deficit to GDP ratio (Td), excess l iquidity (L), leverage factor (LEV) and US$ exchange rate index (X), relatively to the selected identified structural shocks, is plotted over the 
estimation sample: oil  market (OIL: oil  reserves, flow oil  supply, oil  production mix, oil  consumption and inventories preferences, oil  futures market-pressure, residual oil futures market, other real oil  price and nominal oil  price volatil ity), 
productivity (PR), labor market (LM: labor supply and demand, core inflation); aggregate demand (AD); saving rate (SAV: global saving rate (GFI), US saving rate, global ex-US saving rate (GTI)), monetary policy (MP: excess l iquidity (EL), 
term structure level and slope); US terms of trade (TT); portfolio allocation (PA: stock (PF), housing (PH) and gold preferences); risk factor (RF: size (SZ), value (VL), momentum (MM), stocks' l iquidity (SL), leverage (LV), risk aversion (RAV), 
risk appetite (RAP)).   
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In the Figure the historical decomposition for the real short-term rate (SR), real housing (H), stock (F) and non-energy commodity (M) prices, relatively to the selected identified structural shocks, is plotted over the estimation sample: oil  
market (OIL: oil  reserves, flow oil  supply, oil  production mix, oil  consumption and inventories preferences, oil  futures market-pressure, residual oil futures market, other real oil  price and nominal oil  price volatility), productivity (PR), labor 
market (LM: labor supply and demand, core inflation); good’s aggregate demand (AD); saving rate (SAV: global saving rate, US saving rate, global ex-US saving rate), monetary policy (MP: excess l iquidity, term structure level and slope); 
US terms of trade (X); portfolio allocation (PA: stock (PF), housing (PH) and gold preferences); risk factor (RF: size (SZ), value (VL), momentum (MM), stocks' l iquidity (SL), leverage (LV), risk aversion (RAV), risk appetite (RAP)). 
Figure 6: Actual and predicted recession probabilities and real activity/GDP growth. 
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In the Figure actual and forecast values for recession probabilities (left-hand side plots) and global real activity (Y) and GDP growth rates (right-hand side plots) 
are plotted over the period 2008:2-2010:3. Top panels report results for the global economy, center panels for the US, bottom panels for the Euro area. In the 
left-hand side plots, actual recession periods are highlighted by shaded bars: 2008:2-2009:3 (and 2010:3) for the global economy output; 2008:3-2009:2 for the 
US; 2008:2-2009:2 for the Euro area. The 0.5 probability demarcation value is denoted by the horizontal dotted l ine. Forecasts generated by the own-dynamics 
autoregressive model (OD), the own-dynamic autoregressive model augmented by lagged global real activity growth (OD-X1, for the US and the Euro area) and 
lagged structural innovations (OD-X for global activity, and OD-X2 for the US and the Euro area) are reported using dashed, dotted and solid l ines, respectively. 
Forecasting models are specified as in Table 7. In the right-hand side plots the actual figures are denoted by dashed lines; forecasts generated by the 
autoregressive model (AR), the autoregressive model augmented by lagged global real activity (AR-X1) and by lagged structural innovations (AR-X2) are denoted 
by dotted and solid l ines. Forecasting models are specified as in Table 8. 
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This Appendix provides details on the identication of structural shocks (Section A1) and
a full account of the forecast error variance decomposition results discussed in the main
text (Section A2).
A1. Identication of structural shocks
The assumed recursive structure allows for identication of three broad sets of struc-
tural disturbances, namely oil and non-energy commodities, macroeconomic and nancial
shocks, which might be further grouped in the two broad categories of supply-sideand
demand-side and nancialdisturbances, as in Section 2 of the paper. Here we present
and discuss the main e¤ects of each identied shock on the global-economy variables by
means of impulse response analysis, shown in Tables A1-A3. In the discussion, we refer to
selected time horizons: very short-term (VST; within 2 quarters), short-term (ST; between
1 and 2 years), medium-term (MT; 3 to 5 years), and long-term (LT; 10 years). Results in
each Panel of the tables are the impulse responses of relevant variables to a given shock;
the variable in the rst column of each panel corresponds to the global factor equation
from which the structural shock is obtained as orthogonalized innovation. For instance,
Panel A in Table A1, reports impulse responses of oil reserves (R), future basis (FB),
real oil price (OP ), nominal oil price volatility (OV ), real activity (Y ) and the price level
(N) to a unitary oil reserves shock (OR); such disturbance is obtained from the estimated
innovation of the oil reserves (R) equation.
Oil and non-energy commodities market shocks
Table A1, Panel A-M, shows responses of selected variables to disturbances originated in
the oil and non-energy commodities markets. The identication of oil market shocks is
ner than that discussed in the text (where only two aggregate oil market disturbances
were considered). Here oil market supply-side shocks include disturbances to oil reserves
(OR), ow oil supply (positive, OSP ; negative, OSN), the oil production mix (OX),
and oil inventories preference (OI). Other oil market disturbances collect shocks to oil
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consumption preferences (OC), oil futures market-pressure (OFP ), residual oil futures
market (OFR), other real oil price (ORP ) and nominal oil price volatility (ONV ).
Oil market supply side shocks. A positive oil reserves (OR) shock (Panel A) signals
a future downward shift in ow oil supply, and drives the futures and the spot oil prices
downward. OR leads to a permanent increase in oil reserves (R), reaching 1.66% in the
long-run, and to a temporary contraction in the futures (FB, -1.90% after 2 quarters) and
spot real oil price (OP , -1.03%), as well as in nominal oil price volatility (OV ). Along
with lower oil price uncertainty, a short- to long-term positive e¤ect on real activity (Y )
is detected (up to 0.44% in the long-run), as well as a contraction in the gold price (GD,
up to -3.61%). Negative (OSN) and positive (OSP ) ow oil supply shocks (Panel B and
C) capture shifts in the current ow oil supply, a¤ecting oil production and the real oil
price. OSN leads to a permanent contraction in oil production (Pm) and a short-term
increase in oil price (3.26%) and volatility (0.74%), the latter e¤ect being reversed in the
medium- to long-run. Output displays a negative reaction on impact, but is positively
a¤ected in the long-run because of the decreased oil price volatility. Opposite e¤ects occur
following a OSP shock: oil price contracts in the short-run, whereas oil production (Pp)
permanently increases along with oil price volatility, determining a (quantitatively small)
long-term decline in output.
Positive oil production mix shocks (OX, Panel D) capture shifts in the mix favoring
(relatively less expensive) medium and heavy sour crudes, leading to a permanent increase
in reneries output (RM), a decline in the real oil price, and a long-run rise in price
volatility, causing a contraction in real activity over the medium-term horizon only. A
positive oil inventories (OI) preference shock (Panel F), by construction unrelated to
macroeconomic fundamentals, causes a slack in supply and a contraction in the spot oil
price, both e¤ects persisting over the long-run. Global oil inventories (INV ) permanently
increase and oil price declines together with price volatility, gradually boosting output.
Aggregating the above disturbances, the oil market supply-side (joint) shock (OS)
introduced in Section 2 of the paper is obtained. A positive realization of OS signals a
current and/or future downward shift in the ow oil supply schedule and drives down the
spot oil price, causing a negative correlation between oil supply and the real oil price.
Other oil market shocks. In this category, additional sources of shocks coming from
the oil market are considered. As shown in Panel E, a positive oil consumption (OC) pref-
erence disturbance, by construction unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals, causes an
upward shift in the ow oil demand function, determining a positive correlation between
oil consumption and the real oil price. OC leads to a sizeable permanent increases in
global oil consumption (C) and the real oil price, and a moderate dampening of oil price
volatility, determining a (small but signicant) increase in real activity. A positive oil fu-
tures market-pressure shock (OFP , Panel G) results in a positive correlation between the
excess supply for long (speculative) traders positions and the demand for short (hedging)
positions (captured by the Workings T index, WT ) and the oil futures prices (FB), con-
sistent with the Normal Backwardation and Market Pressure theories. As price discovery
spills over from the futures to the spot market, a positive correlation with the spot oil
price is also observed over all time horizons. A residual oil futures market shock (OFR,
Panel H), capturing innovations in FB purged of the e¤ect of traders positions, leads
to a contemporaneous increase in the futures basis and a permanent rise in the real oil
price. Also a mild decrease in oil price volatility and a small positive e¤ect on real activity
are detected in the long-run. Finally, Panels I and L show the e¤ects of other real oil
price (ORP ) and nominal oil price volatility (ONV ) shocks, to which we do not attribute
precise economic content. Given the chosen identication strategy, both are capturing
innovations unrelated to past and current macroeconomic and nancial developments, as
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well as physical and futures oil market conditions. Empirically, both shocks determine
permanent rises in the real oil price and in oil price volatility, and medium- to long-term
contractions in real activity.
Non-energy commodities price index shock. A positive non-energy commodities
(PM) price index shock captures an unexpected increase in non-energy commodities
prices, uncorrelated with global macroeconomic as well as nancial fundamentals. PM
causes a permanent increase in real non-energy commodities prices (M) and a mild
medium-term transitory recessionary e¤ect on real activity, with no impact on the price
level at any horizon. The shock also triggers increases in real gold and oil prices in the
long-run.
Macroeconomic structural shocks
Table A2, Panel A-H, displays the responses of selected variables to various sources of
macroeconomic shocks, coming from labor supply and demand, productivity dynamics,
aggregate goods demand, and global saving rate changes.
Labor market shocks. A positive labor supply (LS) shock (Panel A) has contempora-
neous impacts of opposite sign on employment (E, 0.24%) and the real wage (W;-0.16%),
that build up monotonically as the horizon increases to reach 1.33% for E and -1.30% for
W in the long-run. A decline in the unemployment rate (U) and a positive e¤ect on output
in the short- to medium-run are detected. This disturbance can also be rationalized as a
disturbance to factor shares as in Luteae and Ludvigson (2014) boosting stock prices (F ,
0.47% in the long-run) while depressing real wages. Panel B shows the e¤ects of a negative
labor demand (LD) shock, leading to a persistent increase of the unemployment rate, a
reduction in output and a delayed negative e¤ect on the real wage. Finally, the e¤ects of a
positive core ination shock (CI) are reported in Panel E. Being unrelated by construction
to innovations in employment and output, this disturbance can bear the interpretation of
a shock to unit labor costs, capturing an upward shift of the short-term Phillips curve
consistent with Ecksteins (1981) insight.1 The price level (N) increases permanently,
whereas real activity contracts and unemployment rises only over the medium-run, with
no long-run responses.
Aggregate demand and productivity shocks. A positive goodsaggregate demand
(AD) shock (Panel C) has a persistent, hump-shaped e¤ect on real activity, reaching a
peak within the rst year and slowly declining thereafter, with only a moderate e¤ects on
the price level, and stock prices showing a positive response over all horizons. Panel D
reports the e¤ects of a positive productivity shock (PR) that rises the real wage gradually
by 0.4% on impact to reach 1.6% over the long-run. The positive response of output builds
up steadily over time up to 0.85% over the 10-year horizon. A productivity shock also
determines a sizeable increase in real housing prices (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2014) and a
decrease in stock prices. The latter e¤ect is consistent with a Shumpeterian view of inno-
vation as a process of creative destruction as in Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Sto¤man
(2012): while shareholderswealth increases at innovative rms, due to booming prots
from the introduction of new technologies, wealth destruction occurs at competitor rms,
which fail to fully adopt technological advances. Hence, a positive link between productiv-
ity shocks and stock prices at the rm level can be consistent with a negative relationship
at the market level, as the aggregate return is a weighted average of heterogeneous and
1 According to Eckstein (1981), core ination is measured by the weighted average of the rate
of increase in unit labor costs and the user cost of capital, i.e. the rate of growth of the supply
price of output along the steady-state growth path (steady-state ination).
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mostly negatively correlated individual rms stock returns. The countercyclical impact
of a productivity shock on stock prices may also be rationalized along the lines of Canova
and De Nicolò (1995), if a su¢ ciently persistent PR shock has a negative e¤ect on the
stockspricing kernel (through consumption and working hours smoothing) which o¤sets
the increase in expected future cashows, determining an overall decline in stock prices.
Global saving rate shocks. The remaining Panels F-H of Table A2 show the main
e¤ects of various innovations to global and US saving rates. A negative shock to the
global saving rate (GFI, Panel F), signalled by a permanent increase in the common
component of the public consumption to GDP ratio (G), leads to a long-run contraction
in real activity and a decline in stock prices. Panel G displays the e¤ects of a negative
US-specic saving rate (GDI) disturbance, that causes a long-lasting increase in the US
scal decit/GDP ratio (Fd) along with a decline in global stock prices; the contractionary
e¤ect on real activity is limited to the rst year, being followed by a small expansionary
response in the longer run. Finally, a non-US saving rate (GTI) shock is obtained from the
orthogonalized innovations to the US trade decit to GDP ratio (Td). Since this innovation
is by construction uncorrelated with global output movements and with changes in the US
government budget position (Fd), GTI is meant to capture disturbances related to the
savings glut phenomenon, associated with capital inows from relatively fast-growing
emerging countries (especially Asian economies) into the US over the last two decades.
Consistent with Bernankes (2005) view, a positive savings glutshock (Panel H) leads
to a permanent increase in the US trade decit/GDP ratio, a persistent appreciation of
the US$ exchange rate (X), a downward movement in real short-term interest rates (SR),
and a contraction in global output.2
Financial structural shocks
The large set of nancial variables in the dataset allows for identication of a broad range
of structural disturbances related to the stance of global monetary policy and interest
rate movements, foreign exchange markets, changes in portfolio allocation in international
nancial markets, and movements in a comprehensive array of risk factor indicators, inter-
preted as complementary signals of revisions in expectations of investment opportunities.
Results from the impulse response functions to structural nancial innovations are reported
in Table A3, Panel A-P.
Monetary policy stance and interest rate shocks. An excess liquidity shock (EL),
capturing changes in the growth rate of monetary aggregates and bank loans uncorrelated
with current and past movements in macroeconomic conditions (in particular real activity
and ination), may be interpreted as a measure of innovations to the stance of global
monetary policy. As shown in Panel A, a positive EL impacts negatively on real short-
term interest rates (SR) -a standard liquidity e¤ect-, and also, though by a smaller
amount, on real long-term rates, consistent with the expectation hypothesis of the term
structure.3 The dynamic response of real activity and asset prices broadly accords with
2 According to this view, higher non-US global savings, servicing the growing US trade decit,
can be attributed to various causes: increased savings and reserves accumulation in emerging
Asian economies following the 1997-1998 nancial crisis, fostered by their export-led growth and
currency undervaluation policies; aging population in industrialized countries, requiring larger
savings to nance retirement; the increase in oil prices leading to trade balance surpluses in oil
exporting countries. According to Caballero, Fahri and Gourinchas (2008), the savings glut view
is also compatibile with the shortage of stores of values in less developed economies.
3 The responses for the real long-term interest rate (LR) are obtained from the responses of the
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a boom-bust cycle: EL triggers an increase in real activity (though not signicant), the
price level, real stock prices and nancial leverage (LEV ) in the very short-term, turning
into an output contraction over longer horizons, accompanied by declining stock prices and
leverage measures after 1-2 years; a persistent increase in stock market uncertainty (FV )
is also detected. A positive real short-term interest rate shock (TL, Panel B) causes a
permanent increase in the real short rate and a delayed reaction of long rates in the same
direction. Due to the smaller magnitude of long-term interest rates changes, the term
spread (TS) contracts; as the spread tends to be lower near business cycle peaks (Fama
and French, 1989), its reduction may be consistent with the subsequent observed increase
in real activity and in real stock (F ) and housing prices (H). Finally, a positive term
structure slope shock (TS, Panel C) tilts upward the term structure of interest rates, with
a permanent increase in the long-term interest rate in the face of a substantially unchanged
short rate. That innovation might signal improved expectations of future macroeconomic
conditions: the observed positive dynamic e¤ects on global output and (by a moderate
amount) on the price level support this interpretation. Positive responses over time of
global stock and housing prices complete the picture.
Foreign exchange market shock. A negative shock to US terms of trade (TT , Panel
D), captured by an innovation in the US$ exchange rate (X) uncorrelated with current
and past developments in real activity and other global macroeconomic conditions, causes
a permanent depreciation of the US dollar and, with a one-year delay, a contraction in
the US trade decit to GDP ratio (Td). Reduced US imports have a recessionary impact
on global real activity, with an associated negative e¤ect on global house and (to a lesser
extent) stock prices.
Portfolio allocation shocks. Changes in stock, house and gold prices, unrelated to
global macro-nancial and oil market developments, are interpreted as demand-driven and
attributed to innovations in investorspreferences, triggering portfolio reallocation across
asset classes and potentially impacting, through wealth and Tobins q e¤ects, on real
activity as well. A positive stocks preference shock (PF , Panel E) leads to a permanent
increase in real stock prices (F ) and transitory increases in house (H) and long-term
securities prices (i.e. the long-term real interest rates decreases). Similar e¤ects follow
a positive housing preference shock (PH, Panel F), with a permanent rise in real house
prices and transitory increases in stock and (short- and long-term) bond prices. Overall,
unexpected stock and house price surges boost demand and prices of a wide range of
assets through wealth e¤ects. In addition to wealth e¤ects, Tobins q and nancial
accelerator mechanisms may be responsible for the observed expansion of global real
activity (more persistent in the case of a shock to house prices).4 Finally, Panel G shows
that a shock to preferences for gold (PG), leading to a permanent increase in the real gold
price (G) is associated with a rise in real oil (OP ) and non-energy commodities (M) prices
and decreases in house and (especially long-term) securities prices; no signicant response
of global real activity is detected.
Risk factor shocks. A rich array of variables in the global-economy model try to capture
changes in investorsexpectations and risk attitudes on US nancial markets, grounded on
the view that disturbances originated in the US nancial sector had important spillovers on
the global economy in the sample period considered. The remaining Panels H-P of Table
real term spread (TS) and short-term interest rate (SR), as TS = LR SR, i.e., LR = TS+SR.
4 Financial accelerator e¤ects may be generated through rms and households spending
decisions. Both groups of agents can borrrow posting their equities as collateral; changes in asset
prices then a¤ect net worth and eventually spending by changing their external nance premium,
i.e. their cost of credit.
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A3 display the responses of selected variables to some identied sources of shocks, that
are all orthogonal by construction to past and current changes in global macroeconomic
factors, oil supply, the global monetary policy stance and global interest rate movements.
Positive innovations to Fama-French size (SZ, Panel I) and value (V L, Panel L) fac-
tors, determining long-run increases in the SMB and HML variables respectively, are
interpreted as revealing expectations of favorable changes in the investment opportunity
set. Small, poorly collateralized rms have limited access to external capital markets and
are more vulnerable than large rms to adverse changes in credit conditions (Gertler and
Gilchrist, 1994). Improved credit and, in general, macroeconomic prospects may then
be associated with a rise in the protability of small stocks, resulting in a higher SMB
factor (Hahn and Lee, 2006; Petkova, 2006). A positive size innovation is then interpreted
as signalling improved expected credit market and general macroeconomic conditions.
Similarly, rms with high book-to-market ratios are likely to su¤er more from a higher
debt burden and be more vulnerable to adverse changes in monetary policy and interest
rates. Value stocks are more exposed to news about future economic activity than growth
stocks (Koijen, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2012), are more strongly correlated with
consumption growth during recessions (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001), and do worse when
the expected aggregate stock market return declines (Campbell, Giglio, Polk and Turley,
2012). Improved economic conditions may then be associated with higher protability of
value stocks, resulting in a larger HML factor. A positive value innovation may then
reveal expectations of favorable changes in macroeconomic conditions and investment op-
portunities. Panels I and L show that size and value shocks lead to large and persistent
increases in the SMB and HML factors, pointing to larger protability of small and
value stocks respectively, and are both followed by positive and persistent responses of
real activity5 and a rise in the prices of other real (house) and nancial assets (long-term
bonds, with a corresponding decrease in the term spread). Opposite e¤ects are yielded by
a positive shock to a momentum factor (MM , Panel M): a persistent innovation inMOM
(the di¤erence between returns on high and low past performance portfolios) is followed
by a contraction in real activity and a temporary increase of global liquidity (L) due to an
expansionary change in the global monetary policy stance. This pattern can be consistent
with a momentum shock signalling unfavorable changes in expectations of future macro-
economic conditions. Indeed, if rms with stronger fundamentals outperform rms with
weaker fundamentals during economic downturns and fundamentals are persistent and re-
ected in stock returns, positive momentum should be observed during recessions, and a
positive innovation MM can reveal adverse changes in the economic outlook.6 Consis-
tent with this interpretation, MM triggers ight to safetyportfolio rebalancing towards
short-term securities (with a decrease in the short rate SR), and away from stocks (F ),
housing (H), and long-term securities, leading to declines in their prices.
A positive stock market liquidity shock (SL, Panel N), associated with an increase in
the Pastor-Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor (PSL), leads to a short-term expansion in
real activity and a contraction in global liquidity due to a monetary policy tightening.
As improving economic conditions lead to a reduction in investorsrisk aversion and to
5 This nding is consistent with the evidence of forecasting power of SMB and HML for
US GDP growth, as well as for other industrialized countries, and with the view that investors
hold large and growth stocks when the economy is in a bad state, shifting to small and value
stocks when expectations of future economic growth improve (Liew and Vassalou, 2000; Lettau
and Ludvigson, 2001).
6 This e¤ect outweighs the positive link between momentum returns and expansionary business
cycle phases detected by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Liu and Zhang (2008).
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portfolio rebalancing towards riskier assets, higher stock market liquidity may signal an
expected improvement in the economic outlook. Hence, a high PSL factor can be expected
during expansions, and a positive liquidity shock reveals expectations of favorable changes
in the investment opportunity set. Consistent with improved economic prospects, SL
leads to portfolio rebalancing favoring stocks over other assets: in fact, real stock prices
increase, while short-term securities and house prices decline. Panel O shows the e¤ects
of a positive innovation in the Adrian-Etula-Muir (2014) nancial intermediariesleverage
measure, i.e. a leverage shock (LV ). Being uncorrelated with current and past movements
in global macroeconomic, monetary policy, and interest rates conditions, and in the US
risk factors discussed so far, LV captures nancial intermediaries excessive risk-taking
behavior, potentially leading to nancial instability and credit crunches. As such, this
disturbance determines a sizeable increase in the leverage measure (LEV ) followed by a
contraction in real activity and global liquidity conditions (L), and triggers a generalized
decline in asset prices, particularly in the stock, housing, and long-term bond markets.
Panel H displays the e¤ects of a positive innovation in a measure of stock return
volatility, bearing the interpretation of a shock to the degree of uncertainty (RAV ) sur-
rounding future economic fundamentals and discount rates driving stock prices. Higher
uncertainty, reected in more volatile stock markets, can be observed during economic
downturns (Schwert, 1989; Hamilton and Lin, 1996; Beltratti and Morana, 2006), to-
gether with an increase in investorsrisk aversion (Cochrane, 2007). Thus, an upsurge in
uncertainty beyond the level related to current and past macroeconomic and monetary
policy conditions may signal worsening expectations of future economic scenarios, lead-
ing to a persistent increase in stock return volatility (FV ), a short-run (and relatively
mild) contraction in global real activity, and a somewhat looser monetary policy stance
as global liquidity increases (L). This disturbance also causes portfolio rebalancing shifts
away from stocks, as investor favor safer assets, determining price increases in the short-
and long-term securities and housing markets.
Finally, the responses to an innovation in a measure of (corporate, interbank and
mortgage) credit conditions, already used by Bagliano and Morana (2012), are shown
in Panel P. The shock to this nancial fragility index - the variable placed last in the
recursive ordering - is orthogonal to past and contemporaneous changes in oil market,
macroeconomic and nancial conditions, and is unrelated to innovations in all other risk
factors. As such, it may contain residual information on investorswillingness to bear credit
risk, or risk appetite. Empirically, a risk appetite shock (RAP ) leads to a permanent
increase in the credit condition index (FRA), associated with a mild expansion in real
activity in the short- and medium-run, and an increase in the credit ow to the economy
(L), as well as in stock and house prices.
A2. Forecast error variance decomposition
Tables A4-A6 report a full account of the forecast error variance decomposition results for
the same global factors presented in Tables 1-3 and discussed in Section 3 in the text, over
time horizons going from impact up to 10 years. Table A4 shows the decomposition for
the real activity (Y ), employment (E), core ination (N) global factors and for the US
trade decit to GDP ratio (Td). Table A5 displays results for the excess liquidity (L), the
real short-term interest rate (SR) and the leverage (LEV ) factors. The decomposition for
the US$ exchange rate (X), the global real stock price (F ) and house price (H) factors,
and the real non-energy commodities price factor (M) are shown in Table A6.
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Table A1: Identification of oil market structural shocks: Impulse response functions of selected variables to oil market  structural 
shocks (up to a 40-quarter horizon) 
 Panel A: Oil reserve shock (OR)  Panel B: Negative flow oil supply shock (OSN) 
 R FB OP OV Y N M GD  Pm FB OP OV Y N M GD 
0 0.39 0.65 -0.92 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 0.36 -0.41 0 -0.21 0.63 1.59 0.74 -0.11 0.00 0.03 -0.18 
2 0.79 -1.90 -1.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.06 -0.68 2 -0.17 -1.96 3.26 0.14 0.00 0.03 1.10 0.34 
4 1.00 -0.59 -0.05 -0.39 0.12 -0.01 -0.19 -1.12 4 -0.15 -0.64 0.73 -0.40 0.04 0.00 0.74 0.37 
6 1.20 -1.03 0.73 -0.65 0.22 0.00 0.09 -1.63 6 -0.15 -0.09 -0.04 -0.52 0.04 0.01 0.84 -0.21 
8 1.29 -0.15 -0.61 -0.55 0.23 0.00 -0.31 -2.16 8 -0.15 -0.77 0.80 -0.65 0.11 0.01 1.06 -0.62 
12 1.43 0.31 -0.74 -0.52 0.22 0.01 -0.51 -2.49 12 -0.13 -0.19 0.38 -0.79 0.28 0.02 0.92 -1.09 
20 1.53 -0.05 -0.91 -0.64 0.29 0.01 -0.47 -2.88 20 -0.14 -0.02 0.38 -0.85 0.44 0.03 0.69 -2.09 
40 1.66 -0.01 -0.98 -0.75 0.44 0.01 -0.56 -3.61 40 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 -1.02 0.62 0.03 0.51 -3.26 
 Panel C: Positive flow oil supply shock (OSP)  Panel D: Oil production mix shock (OX) 
 Pp FB OP OV Y N M GD  RM FB OP OV Y N M GD 
0 0.40 -0.17 -0.96 0.32 -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.32 0 0.32 -1.09 -1.44 0.16 -0.07 -0.01 0.47 0.09 
2 0.41 -0.14 0.34 0.82 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -1.48 2 0.43 -0.31 -2.07 0.65 -0.06 -0.01 -0.11 0.20 
4 0.42 1.14 -1.85 1.18 -0.05 0.00 -0.97 -1.85 4 0.40 -0.22 -0.25 0.48 -0.11 0.00 0.15 -0.05 
6 0.41 0.35 0.00 1.05 0.07 0.01 -0.65 -1.97 6 0.46 -0.39 -0.55 0.51 -0.13 0.00 -0.10 -0.26 
8 0.42 0.34 0.26 1.00 0.10 0.02 -0.56 -1.88 8 0.50 0.08 -1.25 0.58 -0.20 0.00 -0.33 -0.33 
12 0.36 0.25 -0.16 1.24 -0.01 0.01 -0.83 -1.77 12 0.54 0.08 -1.39 0.55 -0.21 0.00 -0.21 -0.31 
20 0.35 0.08 -0.23 1.18 -0.13 0.00 -0.70 -1.26 20 0.64 -0.13 -1.36 0.59 -0.08 0.00 -0.16 -0.65 
40 0.36 0.03 0.03 1.26 -0.19 0.00 -0.61 -0.72 40 0.68 -0.01 -1.42 0.52 -0.01 0.00 -0.28 -1.13 
 Panel E: Oil consumption preference shock (OC)  Panel F: Oil inventories preference shock (OI) 
 C FB OP OV Y N M GD  INV FB OP OV Y N M GD 
0 0.54 1.15 0.16 -0.39 - - 0.43 0.22 0 0.50 0.00 -1.35 -0.44 - - -0.20 0.41 
2 0.45 -2.09 2.79 -0.42 0.14 0.01 1.41 0.50 2 0.58 1.26 -1.98 -0.61 0.07 0.00 0.48 0.60 
4 0.53 -0.83 3.12 -0.29 0.25 0.01 1.54 0.89 4 0.51 0.90 -2.32 -0.46 0.13 0.00 0.63 0.89 
6 0.58 -0.37 2.91 -0.29 0.24 0.01 1.24 0.64 6 0.45 0.24 -1.56 -0.42 0.24 0.00 0.85 1.07 
8 0.59 -0.62 3.54 -0.37 0.27 0.01 1.31 0.55 8 0.39 -0.12 -0.66 -0.50 0.32 0.01 1.03 1.10 
12 0.57 0.30 3.24 -0.35 0.25 0.02 1.01 0.34 12 0.42 -0.17 -0.71 -0.50 0.35 0.01 0.83 0.64 
20 0.53 0.10 3.33 -0.38 0.16 0.02 1.10 0.68 20 0.45 0.08 -0.93 -0.56 0.28 0.01 0.72 0.63 
40 0.55 0.01 3.27 -0.39 0.22 0.02 1.12 0.46 40 0.44 0.00 -0.93 -0.56 0.29 0.01 0.78 0.68 
 Panel G: Oil futures market pressure shock (OFP)  Panel H: Residual oil futures market shock (OFR) 
 WT FB OP OV Y N M GD  FB WT OP OV Y N M GD 
0 0.72 0.24 0.36 -0.43 - - -0.06 0.01 0 4.36 0.00 0.30 -0.15 - - 0.26 0.11 
2 0.68 0.24 -0.22 -0.31 -0.03 0.00 -0.14 0.28 2 -0.06 0.08 2.60 -0.21 0.08 0.01 0.61 0.25 
4 0.68 -0.04 0.78 -0.25 -0.07 0.00 -0.11 0.36 4 0.19 -0.01 2.00 -0.10 0.10 0.00 0.72 0.69 
6 0.71 0.01 0.75 -0.26 -0.11 0.00 -0.15 0.60 6 0.35 0.00 2.05 -0.05 0.10 0.00 0.65 0.73 
8 0.72 -0.05 0.73 -0.27 -0.14 0.00 -0.14 0.68 8 -0.26 0.00 2.67 -0.13 0.13 0.01 0.82 0.62 
12 0.72 0.10 0.48 -0.23 -0.18 0.00 -0.14 0.79 12 0.00 -0.01 2.34 -0.10 0.13 0.01 0.69 0.50 
20 0.73 -0.02 0.59 -0.20 -0.15 0.00 -0.06 0.88 20 0.03 -0.01 2.42 -0.12 0.10 0.01 0.69 0.60 
40 0.73 0.00 0.59 -0.20 -0.15 0.00 -0.08 0.85 40 0.00 0.00 2.39 -0.11 0.09 0.01 0.72 0.73 
 Panel I: Other real oil price shock (ORP)  Panel L: Other nominal oil price volatility shock (ONV) 
 OP FB OV Y N M GD   OV FB OP Y N M GD  
0 3.73 - 0.22 - - -0.41 -0.45  0 0.98 - - - - -0.48 -0.51  
2 3.69 -0.44 0.18 -0.05 0.00 -0.89 -0.59  2 1.28 0.30 0.21 -0.02 0.01 -0.94 -0.40  
4 3.63 -0.41 0.10 -0.08 0.00 -1.05 -0.80  4 1.00 -0.49 1.79 0.07 0.01 -0.78 -0.61  
6 3.24 0.01 0.12 -0.15 0.00 -1.09 -0.84  6 0.95 -0.35 1.75 0.08 0.02 -0.78 -0.76  
8 2.64 0.23 0.18 -0.21 -0.01 -1.23 -0.83  8 1.14 0.20 0.83 0.02 0.01 -1.11 -0.97  
12 2.86 0.05 0.15 -0.23 -0.01 -1.04 -0.46  12 1.17 0.21 1.06 -0.08 0.01 -1.14 -0.66  
20 2.92 -0.06 0.19 -0.19 -0.01 -0.98 -0.44  20 1.17 0.00 0.92 -0.12 0.01 -1.00 -0.33  
40 2.95 0.00 0.21 -0.21 -0.01 -1.00 -0.36  40 1.19 0.01 1.05 -0.14 0.01 -0.96 -0.13  
 Panel M: Real non-energy commodities price shock (PM)   
 M FB OP OV Y N GD           
0 1.64 - - - - - 0.58           
2 2.14 -0.25 0.79 -0.27 0.06 0.00 0.75           
4 2.04 0.31 -0.13 -0.08 0.01 0.00 1.01           
6 1.98 0.36 -0.13 0.06 -0.04 0.00 1.11           
8 2.09 0.11 0.34 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 1.27           
12 2.16 0.00 0.36 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 1.33           
20 2.16 -0.02 0.37 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 1.31           
40 2.14 0.00 0.32 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 1.27           
Each Panel in the Table reports cumulative impulse responses of selected variables to a given oil market shock, i.e., oil reserves (OR, 
Panel A), flow oil supply (positive, OSP, Panel B; negative, OSN, Panel C), oil production mix (OX, Panel D), oil consumption and 
inventories preferences (OC, Panel E; OI, Panel F), oil futures market-pressure (OFP, Panel G), residual oil futures market (OFR, Panel 
H), other real oil price (ORP, Panel I), nominal oil price volatility (ONV, Panel L) and non-energy commodities price (PM, Panel M). The 
variables of interest are oil reserves (R), oil production changes (negative and positive: Pm and Pp), refineries margins (RM), oil 
consumption and inventories (C, INV), Working-T index (WT), oil futures market basis (FB), real oil price (OP), nominal oil price 
volatility (OV), real activity (Y), core inflation (N) and the non-energy commodities price index (M). Figures in bold denote statistical 
significance at the 5% level. Cumulative impulse responses are reported in all cases, except for the oil future market basis (FB). A (-) 
sign denotes imposed zero restrictions on contemporaneous effects. 
Table A2: Identification of macroeconomic structural shocks: Impulse response functions of selected variables to macroeconomic 
structural shocks (up to a 40-quarter horizon) 
 Panel A: Labor supply shock (LS)  Panel B: (Negative) Labor demand shock (LD) 
 E W U Y F H N   U W E Y F H N  
0 0.24 -0.16 -0.10 0.13 0.09 0.13 -0.02  0 0.28 0.03 - -0.07 0.11 -0.07 -0.04  
2 0.57 -0.40 -0.41 0.43 0.37 0.35 0.01  2 0.40 0.04 -0.10 -0.14 0.19 0.01 -0.03  
4 0.94 -0.52 -0.74 0.62 0.32 0.48 0.00  4 0.37 -0.01 -0.08 -0.08 0.30 -0.03 -0.03  
6 1.17 -0.60 -0.85 0.64 0.35 0.54 0.01  6 0.31 -0.09 -0.04 -0.06 0.29 -0.12 -0.03  
8 1.33 -0.70 -0.92 0.60 0.34 0.53 0.01  8 0.32 -0.10 -0.01 -0.08 0.28 -0.16 -0.04  
12 1.38 -0.90 -0.84 0.43 0.33 0.36 0.02  12 0.34 -0.15 -0.01 -0.12 0.34 -0.14 -0.04  
20 1.23 -1.10 -0.58 0.18 0.37 0.09 0.01  20 0.31 -0.24 0.06 -0.12 0.39 -0.08 -0.04  
40 1.31 -1.30 -0.58 0.14 0.47 0.04 0.01  40 0.35 -0.33 0.07 -0.17 0.42 -0.15 -0.04  
 Panel C: Aggregate demand shock (AD)  Panel D: Productivity shock (PR) 
 Y N F H W     W Y N F H    
0 0.41 0.02 0.23 0.02 -0.10    0 0.40 - - -0.22 0.14    
2 0.67 0.02 0.23 -0.02 -0.31    2 0.66 0.04 -0.01 -0.27 0.28    
4 0.59 0.02 0.12 -0.01 -0.31    4 0.77 0.26 0.00 -0.17 0.48    
6 0.39 0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.22    6 0.77 0.56 0.01 -0.14 0.58    
8 0.32 0.02 0.13 0.10 -0.21    8 0.86 0.67 0.02 -0.27 0.63    
12 0.29 0.02 0.12 0.01 -0.25    12 1.12 0.66 0.02 -0.40 0.80    
20 0.28 0.02 0.13 -0.05 -0.23    20 1.33 0.70 0.02 -0.55 0.79    
40 0.29 0.02 0.13 -0.04 -0.22    40 1.58 0.85 0.02 -0.63 0.96    
 Panel E: Core inflation shock (CI)  Panel F: (Negative) Global saving rate shock (GFI) 
 N U Y E      G F Y SR     
0 0.07 - - -     0 0.34 -0.15 - 0.04     
2 0.06 -0.01 -0.08 -0.04     2 0.59 -0.29 -0.25 0.04     
4 0.05 0.05 -0.16 -0.10     4 0.80 -0.34 -0.49 0.03     
6 0.05 0.15 -0.23 -0.21     6 0.88 -0.33 -0.63 0.01     
8 0.05 0.19 -0.24 -0.30     8 0.86 -0.34 -0.70 0.00     
12 0.04 0.15 -0.15 -0.34     12 0.70 -0.30 -0.65 -0.01     
20 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.28     20 0.54 -0.22 -0.47 -0.01     
40 0.05 0.02 0.01 -0.30     40 0.59 -0.26 -0.50 0.00     
 Panel G: (Negative) US saving rate shock (GDI)  Panel H: Saving glut shock (GTI) 
 Fd F Y SR      Td F Y SR X    
0 0.40 -0.12 - 0.04     0 0.16 -0.05 - -0.11 -0.01    
2 0.18 -0.31 -0.23 0.06     2 0.23 -0.06 -0.03 0.00 -0.05    
4 0.20 -0.19 -0.13 0.01     4 0.22 -0.13 -0.17 -0.01 -0.25    
6 0.17 -0.20 -0.03 0.02     6 0.22 -0.09 -0.30 -0.04 -0.25    
8 0.18 -0.25 0.01 0.04     8 0.27 0.01 -0.30 -0.05 -0.22    
12 0.16 -0.28 0.08 0.04     12 0.29 0.05 -0.32 -0.05 -0.19    
20 0.16 -0.38 0.13 0.04     20 0.29 0.12 -0.29 -0.04 -0.15    
40 0.15 -0.43 0.21 0.04     40 0.29 0.15 -0.37 -0.04 -0.12    
 
Each Panel in the Table reports cumulative impulse responses of selected variables to a given macroeconomic shock, i.e., labor supply 
(LS; Panel A) and demand (LD, Panel B), aggregate demand (AD, Panel C), productivity (PR, Panel D), core inflation (CI, Panel E), global 
saving rate (GFI, Panel F), US saving rate (GDI, Panel G) and ex-US global saving rate (GTI, Panel H). The variables of interest are real 
activity (Y), core inflation (N), employment (E), the unemployment rate (U), real wage (W), real stock prices (F), real house prices (H), 
global fiscal stance (G), the ratios of US fiscal and trade deficits to GDP (Fd and Td), the US$ exchange rate return (X) and the real 
short-term interest rate (SR). Figures in bold denote statistical significance at the 5% level. A (-) sign denotes imposed zero restrictions 











 Table A3: Identification of financial structural shocks: Impulse response functions of selected variables to financial  structural 
shocks (up to a 40-quarter horizon) 
 Panel A: Excess liquidity shock (EL)  Panel B: Short-term interest rate shock (TL) 
 L SR TS Y N F LEV FV  SR TS Y N F H GD FV 
0 0.29 -0.03 -0.01 - - 0.03 0.24 0.01 0 0.17 -0.01 - - 0.12 0.04 -0.65 0.03 
2 0.33 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.12 2 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.23 0.23 -0.14 -0.04 
4 0.51 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.00 -0.09 -0.24 0.18 4 0.11 -0.02 0.28 0.01 0.30 0.38 0.10 -0.02 
6 0.54 -0.07 0.04 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 -0.48 0.25 6 0.12 -0.02 0.44 0.01 0.31 0.47 0.15 -0.04 
8 0.50 -0.06 0.04 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.10 0.23 8 0.13 -0.04 0.51 0.02 0.28 0.52 0.01 0.00 
12 0.53 -0.06 0.04 -0.11 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 0.27 12 0.14 -0.06 0.49 0.03 0.24 0.54 -0.51 0.04 
20 0.56 -0.06 0.04 -0.10 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.26 20 0.14 -0.04 0.34 0.02 0.19 0.39 -0.24 0.08 
40 0.62 -0.07 0.04 -0.14 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.28 40 0.13 -0.04 0.37 0.02 0.21 0.40 -0.18 0.07 
 Panel C: Term structure slope shock (TS)  Panel D: US terms of trade shock (TT) 
 TS SR Y N F H GD FV  X Td Y F H SR TS GD 
0 0.23 - - - 0.04 0.03 -0.42 0.04 0 0.47 - - -0.05 - - - 1.45 
2 0.26 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.15 0.00 2 0.59 0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.07 0.03 -0.01 1.92 
4 0.22 -0.02 0.22 0.01 0.18 0.10 -0.07 -0.09 4 0.61 -0.04 -0.17 -0.15 -0.19 0.04 0.01 2.36 
6 0.18 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.14 0.15 -0.59 -0.06 6 0.67 -0.08 -0.34 -0.12 -0.27 0.04 0.03 2.57 
8 0.18 0.00 0.36 0.01 0.16 0.21 -0.85 -0.05 8 0.72 -0.10 -0.45 -0.08 -0.35 0.04 0.05 3.02 
12 0.17 0.01 0.40 0.02 0.16 0.26 -1.05 -0.02 12 0.78 -0.11 -0.54 -0.08 -0.53 0.03 0.07 3.71 
20 0.18 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.10 0.16 -0.97 0.02 20 0.84 -0.10 -0.54 -0.02 -0.66 0.02 0.10 4.22 
40 0.18 0.01 0.31 0.02 0.12 0.16 -0.87 0.02 40 0.84 -0.10 -0.56 0.02 -0.68 0.02 0.10 4.26 
 Panel E: Stocks preferences shock (PF)  Panel F: Housing preferences shock (PH) 
 F H SR TS M OP GD Y  H F SR TS M OP GD Y 
0 0.35 - - - - - -0.15 - 0 0.40 0.03 - - 0.21 -0.87 1.26 - 
2 0.43 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.25 0.61 0.15 0.08 2 0.57 0.12 -0.04 0.00 1.12 0.73 1.69 0.19 
4 0.44 0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.43 0.82 0.31 0.15 4 0.68 0.16 -0.03 -0.02 1.32 1.89 1.98 0.34 
6 0.43 0.07 0.01 -0.03 0.34 0.75 0.31 0.13 6 0.73 0.17 -0.01 -0.04 1.29 2.40 1.72 0.40 
8 0.44 0.06 0.00 -0.02 0.29 0.98 0.37 0.12 8 0.74 0.14 0.01 -0.06 1.01 2.32 1.56 0.39 
12 0.45 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.29 1.27 0.50 0.08 12 0.66 0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.80 2.61 1.53 0.29 
20 0.48 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.33 1.07 0.82 -0.01 20 0.44 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.91 2.24 2.00 0.16 
40 0.51 -0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.38 1.14 1.05 -0.03 40 0.47 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.95 2.32 1.94 0.21 
 Panel G: Gold preference shock (PG)  Panel H: Uncertainty shock (RAV) 
 GD F H SR TS M OP Y  FV Y L F H SR TS M 
0 2.47 - - - - - - - 0 0.57 - - -0.26 - - - -0.35 
2 2.80 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.75 0.97 0.06 2 0.60 -0.08 0.12 -0.18 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 
4 3.26 -0.06 -0.09 0.02 0.02 0.77 0.51 0.00 4 0.42 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.25 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 
6 3.44 -0.03 -0.09 0.01 0.04 0.76 0.78 0.00 6 0.31 0.14 -0.02 0.07 0.44 -0.02 -0.08 0.07 
8 3.61 0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.04 0.92 1.52 0.02 8 0.26 0.18 0.02 0.09 0.56 -0.01 -0.13 0.04 
12 3.58 0.00 -0.17 0.01 0.03 0.86 1.28 0.01 12 0.34 0.13 0.25 0.03 0.66 0.01 -0.14 -0.35 
20 3.80 0.01 -0.23 0.01 0.04 0.89 1.33 -0.04 20 0.40 0.00 0.34 -0.04 0.44 0.00 -0.10 -0.34 
40 3.93 0.04 -0.26 0.00 0.05 0.92 1.34 -0.06 40 0.38 0.03 0.30 0.00 0.45 0.00 -0.10 -0.23 
 Panel I: Size shock (SZ)  Panel L: Value shock (VL) 
 SMB Y L F H SR TS M  HML Y L F H SR TS M 
0 3.08 - - 0.33 - - - 0.44 0 3.81 - - -0.10 - - - 0.74 
2 2.71 0.19 -0.18 0.54 0.22 -0.02 -0.03 1.35 2 3.57 -0.03 -0.07 -0.17 0.03 0.01 -0.04 1.15 
4 2.01 0.45 -0.25 0.65 0.36 -0.01 -0.13 2.60 4 4.38 0.03 -0.15 -0.25 0.14 0.01 -0.05 1.18 
6 1.43 0.49 0.03 0.56 0.45 0.05 -0.15 2.11 6 3.99 0.07 -0.20 -0.31 0.23 0.00 -0.04 1.43 
8 1.36 0.47 0.27 0.61 0.54 0.02 -0.12 1.96 8 4.16 0.18 -0.27 -0.31 0.31 0.00 -0.04 1.61 
12 1.40 0.48 0.44 0.65 0.43 0.03 -0.13 2.03 12 3.88 0.32 -0.34 -0.34 0.43 0.01 -0.06 1.61 
20 1.60 0.19 0.65 0.63 0.16 0.02 -0.10 1.92 20 3.90 0.36 -0.36 -0.43 0.53 0.01 -0.08 1.34 
40 1.74 0.15 0.72 0.71 0.09 0.02 -0.09 2.08 40 3.87 0.41 -0.49 -0.49 0.58 0.02 -0.08 1.33 
 Panel M: Momentum shock (MM)  Panel N: Stock market liquidity shock (SL) 
 MOM Y L F H SR TS M  PSL Y L F H SR TS M 
0 3.50 - - -0.12 - - - -0.21 0 6.34 - - 0.11 - - - -0.09 
2 2.51 -0.07 0.09 -0.16 -0.06 0.01 0.04 -0.66 2 -0.18 0.07 -0.06 0.10 -0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.70 
4 2.42 -0.17 0.14 -0.16 -0.14 0.00 0.07 -1.04 4 -0.39 0.11 -0.09 0.15 -0.18 0.02 -0.02 -0.60 
6 2.15 -0.19 0.06 -0.11 -0.22 -0.01 0.07 -0.93 6 -0.19 0.04 -0.05 0.09 -0.27 0.02 -0.01 -0.86 
8 2.36 -0.23 0.03 -0.13 -0.29 0.00 0.07 -0.99 8 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.08 -0.31 0.02 0.00 -1.03 
12 2.17 -0.30 0.00 -0.12 -0.31 -0.01 0.08 -1.02 12 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.13 -0.35 0.00 0.02 -0.83 
20 2.29 -0.22 -0.06 -0.09 -0.27 -0.01 0.08 -0.87 20 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.18 -0.27 0.00 0.01 -0.80 
40 2.31 -0.23 -0.03 -0.08 -0.27 -0.01 0.08 -0.90 40 0.00 -0.05 0.01 0.19 -0.30 0.00 0.01 -0.82 
 
Table A3 (ctd): Identification of financial structural shocks: Impulse response functions of selected variables to financial  
structural shocks (up to a 40-quarter horizon) 
 Panel O: Leverage shock (LV)  Panel P: Risk appetite shock (RAP) 
 LEV Y L F H SR TS M  FRA Y L F H SR TS M 
0 3.78 - - -0.10 - - - -0.03 0 0.04 - - - - - - - 
2 -0.26 -0.10 0.02 -0.19 -0.09 0.02 0.03 -0.45 2 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.06 
4 0.11 -0.24 0.06 -0.28 -0.23 0.03 0.05 -0.75 4 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.04 
6 -0.23 -0.31 0.00 -0.27 -0.32 0.00 0.09 -0.72 6 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 
8 -0.01 -0.34 -0.09 -0.29 -0.40 0.00 0.10 -0.63 8 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.03 
12 0.01 -0.31 -0.24 -0.27 -0.41 -0.01 0.11 -0.42 12 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 
20 0.05 -0.17 -0.32 -0.23 -0.25 0.00 0.08 -0.39 20 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
40 0.00 -0.19 -0.31 -0.26 -0.24 0.00 0.08 -0.49 40 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Each Panel in the Table reports cumulative impulse responses of selected variables to a given financial shock, i.e., monetary policy 
stance or excess liquidity (EL, Panel A), real short-term interest rate (TL, Panel B), term structure slope (TS, Panel C), US terms of trade 
shocks (TT, Panel D), stocks (PF, Panel E), housing (PH, Panel F) and gold  (PG, Panel G) preferences, uncertainty (RAV, Panel  H), size 
(SZ, Panel  I), value (VL, Panel  L), momentum (MM, Panel  M), stock market liquidity (SL, Panel  N) , financial leverage (LV, Panel  O) 
and risk appetite (RAP, Panel  P). The variables of interest are excess liquidity (L), real short term rate (SR) and term spread (TS), real 
housing prices (H), real stock prices (F), US$ exchange rate index (X), real activity (Y), core inflation (N), real oil prices (OP), real non-
energy commodities prices (M), real gold prices (GD),  stock market volatility (FV), Fama-French size and value factors (SMB, HML), 
Carhart momentum factor (MOM), Pastor-Stambaugh stock market liquidity factor (PSL), Adrian-Etula-Muir leverage factor (LEV), 
financial fragility index (FRA). Figures in bold denote statistical significance at the 5% level. Apart from LEV and PSL, cumulated 
impulse responses are reported in all cases. A (-) sign denotes imposed zero restrictions on contemporaneous effects. 
 
Table A4: Forecast error variance decomposition: contribution of each structural shock to real activity, employment, core inflation factors and US trade deficit to GDP ratio. 
Panel A: real activity 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 0.3 5.8 1.0 2.5 8.5 2.1 79.9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.8 17.2 2.9 58.4 4.5 3.8 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 2.6 0.2 0.4 2.2 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 
4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.8 20.7 1.4 35.4 9.3 2.4 0.7 0.9 1.8 2.4 0.1 2.3 1.4 4.5 0.8 0.3 7.4 0.1 1.0 0.5 2.0 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.0 
6 1.1 0.3 0.2 0.8 18.3 0.8 21.4 12.1 1.3 1.9 1.4 5.8 2.3 0.3 4.3 2.8 5.2 2.4 0.5 8.8 0.1 1.2 0.3 2.9 0.3 0.4 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.1 
8 1.4 0.3 0.3 1.0 16.2 0.6 14.4 13.4 0.8 2.3 1.5 9.0 2.3 0.2 5.7 3.2 5.1 3.8 0.7 8.1 0.5 1.4 0.2 3.1 0.4 0.4 1.9 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.1 
12 1.4 0.9 0.2 1.3 12.5 0.5 9.4 13.8 0.6 2.7 1.3 10.9 2.2 0.2 6.7 3.9 4.3 5.9 0.8 8.0 1.4 1.9 0.2 3.2 0.6 0.5 2.8 1.1 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 
20 1.9 2.9 0.3 1.1 8.9 0.5 6.7 13.1 0.6 2.9 0.9 14.5 1.7 0.3 6.5 4.1 3.2 8.6 0.6 6.2 2.9 2.1 0.1 2.8 0.8 0.5 3.2 1.4 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 
40 3.8 7.1 0.7 0.6 4.8 0.6 4.8 11.1 0.8 3.5 0.4 19.1 1.5 0.4 5.7 3.7 2.4 9.8 0.3 3.5 4.4 2.0 0.1 2.1 0.8 0.4 3.1 1.4 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 
Panel B: employment 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 1.8 0.2 0.7 7.2 90.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 3.9 0.2 1.7 6.6 57.1 1.5 7.4 4.7 5.4 1.9 0.2 1.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 2.3 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.2 
4 2.3 0.6 2.1 7.3 47.7 0.8 5.6 7.5 5.5 0.8 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.3 1.1 0.2 1.9 0.3 0.1 7.9 0.4 0.7 0.6 1.5 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.1 0.2 
6 1.3 1.2 2.5 6.7 41.4 0.3 3.5 9.7 4.1 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.1 2.3 1.0 2.6 0.9 0.6 11.3 0.3 1.0 0.6 2.4 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.7 0.1 0.3 
8 0.8 1.7 3.3 6.5 36.9 0.2 2.1 11.1 3.0 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.1 3.4 1.5 2.9 1.7 1.2 11.9 0.2 1.0 0.5 3.0 0.8 0.2 1.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 1.7 0.0 0.3 
12 0.7 2.0 4.2 7.1 31.1 0.1 1.0 12.0 2.1 0.1 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.1 4.5 2.2 2.8 2.7 1.9 12.4 0.1 1.3 0.3 3.5 0.9 0.3 1.6 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.3 
20 1.1 2.7 4.7 8.1 27.2 0.1 0.5 11.8 1.8 0.1 1.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 4.8 2.7 2.0 3.9 2.1 12.6 0.1 1.5 0.3 3.5 1.2 0.4 2.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.4 0.0 0.4 
40 1.7 4.3 5.5 8.6 25.9 0.1 0.3 11.1 2.0 0.1 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 4.5 2.7 1.6 4.1 1.8 12.5 0.1 1.4 0.4 3.2 1.2 0.5 2.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.5 0.1 0.4 
Panel C: core inflation 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 1.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 5.3 17.7 2.9 3.3 1.7 7.2 60.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 3.3 4.6 0.1 0.5 2.3 15.0 5.2 1.2 1.4 4.5 46.5 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 
4 3.3 2.9 0.1 0.3 1.6 15.1 5.2 0.7 1.4 7.5 42.6 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.5 1.7 0.3 2.6 5.7 1.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.1 
6 2.3 2.3 0.4 0.3 1.3 14.3 4.6 0.7 2.1 10.8 38.1 1.2 0.4 0.2 1.1 1.1 3.4 0.3 1.9 6.9 1.2 0.6 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.1 
8 1.7 2.0 0.7 0.3 1.4 14.5 4.1 0.8 2.3 12.7 33.8 1.5 0.8 0.2 1.9 1.2 5.0 0.4 1.4 7.0 0.9 0.5 0.4 1.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.1 
12 1.1 2.2 0.6 0.2 1.4 14.4 3.5 1.3 2.8 14.1 26.4 1.8 1.7 0.1 2.9 1.7 6.7 0.4 1.0 8.5 0.7 0.6 0.4 2.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.0 
20 0.7 3.5 0.4 0.1 1.1 14.0 2.8 1.7 3.7 14.5 20.7 2.3 2.6 0.1 3.8 2.1 7.4 0.4 0.8 9.0 0.9 0.9 0.6 2.7 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.0 
40 0.6 5.4 0.3 0.1 0.7 14.2 2.4 1.6 4.5 14.9 18.8 2.8 2.9 0.1 3.8 2.1 7.4 0.3 0.5 8.2 1.1 0.9 0.7 2.6 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 
Panel D: US trade deficit  to GDP ratio 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 2.7 0.1 3.3 0.9 1.5 0.4 0.3 7.7 3.2 80.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 4.2 0.5 2.8 1.8 3.3 0.1 6.5 6.6 4.2 59.5 0.2 2.9 2.1 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.0 
4 5.4 0.4 1.4 1.7 5.4 0.8 4.5 8.5 4.2 52.1 0.8 3.5 2.1 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 3.2 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 
6 4.5 0.5 1.1 1.5 5.0 1.9 3.3 10.0 4.1 49.3 1.3 2.8 1.8 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.1 2.0 0.3 4.3 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.0 
8 4.4 0.4 1.0 1.8 4.3 2.7 2.4 10.3 3.7 50.4 1.4 2.3 1.5 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 3.4 0.3 3.5 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.0 
12 5.4 0.4 0.8 2.0 2.9 3.5 1.5 8.7 3.9 51.4 1.1 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.1 1.7 4.9 0.3 2.5 0.1 0.5 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.0 
20 6.0 0.8 0.6 1.6 1.6 4.7 0.9 5.9 4.1 51.7 0.7 3.0 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.1 3.5 5.9 0.6 1.4 0.1 0.3 1.9 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.0 
40 6.1 1.2 0.6 1.1 0.9 5.5 0.5 4.5 4.5 52.0 0.4 3.2 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.1 4.3 6.3 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.2 2.5 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.0 
 
The table reports the forecast error decomposition for selected variables at various horizons (impact (0) and 2 to 40 quarters), relative to the identified structural shocks: oil reserves (OR), flow oil 
supply (positive, OSP; negative, OSN), oil production mix (OX), oil consumption (OC) and inventories (OI) preferences, labor supply (LS) and demand (LD), aggregate demand (AD), productivity 
(PR), core inflation (CI) and global saving rate (GFI, GDI, GTI), excess liquidity (EL), term structure level (TL) and slope (TS), US terms of trade (TT), stocks (PF), housing (PH) and gold (PG) portfolio 
allocation/preferences, oil futures market-pressure (OFP), residual oil futures market (OFR), other real oil price (ORP), nominal oil price volatility (ONV) and non-energy commodities price (PM), 
size (SZ), value (VL), momentum (MM), stocks' liquidity (SL), leverage (LV), uncertainty (RAV), risk appetite (RAP). The selected variables are real activity (Panel A), employment (Panel B), core 
inflation (Panel C) and the US trade deficit to GDP ratio (Panel D). A (-) sign denotes imposed zero restrictions on contemporaneous effects. 
Table A5: Forecast error variance decomposition: contribution of each structural shock to excess liquidity, real short term rate and financial leverage factors. 
Panel A: excess liquidity 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 3.4 0.7 0.1 4.8 2.3 3.9 29.5 11.9 0.1 1.3 0.4 5.7 0.8 35.0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 2.4 5.2 0.2 3.2 6.2 6.0 30.8 11.4 1.3 0.5 0.9 5.0 0.4 19.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.2 2.5 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
4 1.3 11.8 0.7 1.9 3.7 3.9 22.6 12.1 0.9 0.3 0.6 3.0 0.2 21.5 0.2 1.3 0.1 2.7 0.9 4.9 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 
6 1.5 15.4 0.8 1.3 3.1 2.6 15.9 10.6 2.2 0.3 0.6 2.5 0.2 24.0 0.1 2.0 0.3 5.7 0.6 3.4 2.2 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.0 
8 1.6 19.5 1.2 1.0 5.0 2.0 11.1 8.0 3.3 0.2 0.8 2.7 0.3 21.9 0.2 1.6 1.1 6.9 0.4 3.4 3.0 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.1 0.0 
12 1.2 23.4 3.2 1.1 10.4 1.2 6.0 3.8 3.4 0.2 1.9 1.7 0.4 16.1 0.9 0.8 2.9 5.9 0.9 4.9 3.7 0.4 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 1.3 1.1 0.1 
20 1.9 24.2 4.8 2.2 13.4 0.7 3.1 1.7 3.0 0.2 2.9 1.4 0.6 10.5 1.9 0.4 3.4 3.8 1.9 7.7 3.3 0.2 0.1 1.7 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.1 1.7 1.2 0.2 
40 3.6 27.8 5.8 2.9 13.1 0.8 1.9 0.6 3.5 0.1 2.9 2.6 0.3 7.9 1.6 0.2 2.4 2.7 1.6 7.8 3.4 0.1 0.1 1.5 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.8 1.1 0.2 
Panel B: real short term rate 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 3.9 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.9 4.2 13.9 1.9 1.4 12.0 4.4 25.7 0.4 0.8 29.4 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 2.2 2.1 1.2 0.7 3.2 4.1 12.9 2.2 4.4 7.5 3.9 19.5 0.7 2.8 28.3 0.0 1.4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
4 2.2 1.7 3.0 0.8 2.9 3.4 9.8 2.7 3.4 6.2 5.6 16.5 0.8 2.8 29.2 0.3 1.6 2.1 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.0 
6 1.9 1.5 2.7 0.7 2.4 3.1 8.0 2.4 2.9 5.5 6.3 14.1 1.0 4.1 31.0 0.3 1.4 3.1 1.8 1.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.1 
8 1.8 1.5 2.9 0.6 2.0 3.0 6.5 2.0 2.7 5.7 6.0 14.6 1.1 5.1 32.4 0.3 1.1 3.2 1.6 1.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.1 
12 1.8 1.2 3.4 0.5 1.5 2.5 4.7 1.5 2.8 5.1 4.8 16.9 2.1 5.8 35.1 0.3 0.9 3.0 1.2 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.0 
20 1.4 1.0 3.0 0.4 1.0 2.0 3.2 1.1 3.1 4.8 4.0 18.5 3.0 6.9 37.9 0.4 0.6 2.3 0.8 1.7 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.0 
40 1.4 0.9 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.7 2.0 0.6 3.6 4.4 4.2 20.9 3.2 7.9 39.1 0.3 0.4 1.7 0.4 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 
Panel C: leverage factor 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 3.7 0.1 2.2 0.4 3.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.1 5.0 2.2 3.4 3.9 0.2 0.9 0.5 2.0 0.3 12.1 2.2 0.2 0.7 0.5 53.8 - - - - - - - - - 
2 4.3 0.3 4.0 0.4 4.7 1.9 1.2 0.6 10.5 5.2 1.6 7.4 4.5 0.7 1.3 1.7 1.4 0.4 13.4 3.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 26.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.2 
4 4.0 1.9 3.8 0.4 5.5 1.8 1.3 0.6 9.7 4.6 1.7 6.9 4.3 0.8 1.3 2.1 1.3 0.6 14.2 3.3 1.3 0.9 1.4 24.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 
6 4.6 2.2 4.1 0.6 5.3 1.9 1.2 0.6 9.3 4.3 1.7 6.5 4.1 1.6 1.3 2.2 1.2 0.8 14.1 3.3 1.3 0.9 1.3 22.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.2 
8 4.8 2.3 4.1 0.7 5.1 1.9 1.3 0.6 9.1 4.2 1.7 6.5 4.1 1.6 1.3 2.1 1.2 0.9 14.1 3.6 1.4 1.0 1.3 21.3 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.2 
12 4.8 2.6 4.1 0.7 5.1 2.0 1.4 0.6 9.0 4.2 1.7 6.4 4.2 1.6 1.3 2.1 1.2 0.9 14.0 3.6 1.4 1.0 1.4 20.9 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.2 
20 4.8 2.7 4.2 0.7 5.1 2.0 1.4 0.7 8.9 4.2 1.7 6.4 4.2 1.6 1.3 2.1 1.2 0.9 14.0 3.6 1.4 1.0 1.4 20.7 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.2 
40 4.8 2.7 4.2 0.7 5.1 2.0 1.4 0.7 8.9 4.2 1.7 6.3 4.2 1.6 1.3 2.1 1.2 0.9 13.9 3.7 1.4 1.0 1.4 20.7 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.2 
 
The table reports the forecast error decomposition for selected variables at various horizons (impact (0) and 2 to 40 quarters), relative to the identified structural shocks: oil reserves (OR), flow oil 
supply (positive, OSP; negative, OSN), oil production mix (OX), oil consumption (OC) and inventories (OI) preferences, labor supply (LS) and demand (LD), aggregate demand (AD), productivity 
(PR), core inflation (CI) and global saving rate (GFI, GDI, GTI), excess liquidity (EL), term structure level (TL) and slope (TS), US terms of trade (TT), stocks (PF), housing (PH) and gold (PG) portfolio 
allocation/preferences, oil futures market-pressure (OFP), residual oil futures market (OFR), other real oil price (ORP), nominal oil price volatility (ONV) and non-energy commodities price (PM), 
size (SZ), value (VL), momentum (MM), stocks' liquidity (SL), leverage (LV), uncertainty (RAV), risk appetite (RAP). The selected variables are excess liquidity (Panel A), the real short term rate 
(Panel B) and the leverage factor (Panel C). A (-) sign denotes imposed zero restrictions on contemporaneous effects. 
 
Table A6: Forecast error variance decomposition: contribution of each structural shock to US$ exchange rate, real stock, housing and non-energy commodity price factors. 
Panel A: US$ exchange rate index 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 3.5 0.6 1.9 0.0 7.2 13.5 12.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 4.3 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.2 49.7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 3.5 0.8 1.1 1.0 8.1 11.2 8.6 1.6 0.5 0.2 4.8 0.1 9.6 2.5 0.5 0.3 1.9 35.5 0.4 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.0 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 1.3 0.0 
4 3.5 0.5 2.4 0.5 6.2 9.1 4.6 1.4 1.1 2.0 5.0 0.2 12.6 1.5 2.1 0.3 3.1 30.8 0.3 4.2 0.2 0.5 1.2 0.7 0.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.7 0.0 
6 3.4 0.4 2.8 0.4 5.5 8.3 3.0 1.3 1.0 2.7 5.3 0.2 12.4 1.5 2.6 0.3 3.6 29.4 0.4 5.0 0.2 0.6 1.8 0.8 0.2 1.1 1.5 1.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 2.1 0.0 
8 3.7 0.4 2.9 0.4 5.1 8.0 2.2 1.1 1.0 2.7 5.2 0.2 12.4 1.5 2.6 0.2 3.6 29.0 0.4 4.9 0.3 0.6 2.4 0.7 0.3 1.1 1.8 1.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 2.5 0.0 
12 4.4 0.4 3.2 0.4 4.5 7.6 1.7 0.7 0.8 2.4 4.8 0.5 12.3 1.4 2.4 0.2 3.2 29.7 0.3 5.6 0.3 0.7 2.8 0.7 0.4 1.0 1.7 1.3 0.7 0.7 0.3 2.8 0.0 
20 4.9 0.3 3.3 0.4 4.4 7.2 1.5 0.4 0.6 1.8 4.8 1.2 12.3 1.4 2.0 0.1 3.1 31.4 0.4 5.7 0.2 0.6 2.9 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.4 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.4 2.9 0.0 
40 6.0 0.4 2.7 0.6 5.3 6.0 1.4 0.3 0.3 1.2 5.1 2.1 11.8 1.4 1.8 0.1 3.0 31.1 0.5 6.8 0.1 0.6 2.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.5 3.0 0.0 
Panel B: real stock prices 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 5.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 1.3 2.2 9.1 3.9 2.6 0.5 0.1 8.4 0.7 0.1 2.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 11.2 19.1 1.9 2.3 2.1 1.7 0.5 0.1 0.4 1.4 0.1 0.5 20.9 - - 
2 3.6 0.8 0.9 0.3 6.7 2.0 6.6 5.5 6.6 0.5 0.7 6.4 0.6 0.1 3.5 0.2 0.8 0.4 5.7 21.6 2.5 2.0 1.5 2.1 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.3 15.9 0.0 0.0 
4 2.3 4.3 1.8 0.2 7.0 3.8 3.9 6.0 4.6 0.6 1.4 4.3 0.7 0.2 4.3 0.7 1.2 0.8 3.0 22.9 2.9 1.8 1.5 3.2 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.2 14.0 0.1 0.1 
6 1.8 6.5 3.8 0.2 6.7 4.3 2.7 6.2 3.7 0.6 2.0 3.2 0.7 0.3 4.8 1.0 1.3 0.9 2.1 21.8 3.9 1.4 1.2 3.6 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.2 12.8 0.1 0.1 
8 2.0 7.6 4.9 0.2 6.7 4.3 2.1 6.3 3.4 0.5 2.4 3.2 0.8 0.2 4.7 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.6 21.1 4.2 1.3 0.9 3.8 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.2 12.1 0.1 0.2 
12 3.1 9.4 5.1 0.3 6.3 4.5 1.6 5.7 3.4 0.3 2.7 4.3 0.7 0.2 4.2 1.0 0.9 0.6 1.1 20.8 4.6 1.1 0.8 3.7 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.1 11.2 0.1 0.2 
20 4.9 13.7 5.4 0.4 5.6 5.2 1.0 4.2 3.9 0.4 2.7 6.7 0.4 0.1 3.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.6 18.2 5.2 0.8 0.9 2.9 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.1 10.0 0.0 0.2 
40 6.3 18.4 5.9 0.5 5.7 5.1 0.6 2.7 4.4 0.4 2.6 8.6 0.2 0.1 2.0 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 15.3 5.9 0.4 1.0 2.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.1 8.3 0.0 0.1 
Panel C: real housing prices 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 0.6 0.2 3.0 0.2 6.8 2.1 0.2 4.6 1.2 1.0 0.2 9.0 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 68.8 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2 3.3 2.7 4.9 0.3 10.9 0.3 0.1 9.3 0.6 1.8 1.5 8.2 2.2 3.2 4.0 0.2 40.0 0.5 0.1 3.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 
4 5.5 5.5 2.6 0.1 10.3 0.1 0.1 11.2 0.8 1.9 1.9 8.7 3.2 3.9 5.2 0.3 26.2 1.1 1.4 4.7 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.4 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 
6 5.9 7.6 1.5 0.2 9.1 0.2 0.1 12.0 1.0 1.4 1.8 8.6 4.7 3.8 5.4 0.4 19.9 1.6 2.8 4.9 0.9 0.8 1.3 2.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 
8 6.0 9.6 1.2 0.2 7.7 0.3 0.1 12.3 1.2 1.0 1.6 8.2 5.5 3.9 5.2 0.5 16.0 1.9 4.0 5.0 1.4 1.1 1.5 2.3 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 
12 6.1 12.9 1.4 0.3 5.5 0.4 0.1 12.1 1.7 0.6 1.3 8.6 6.0 4.1 4.9 0.8 11.7 2.7 5.3 4.4 1.9 1.3 1.6 2.5 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 
20 6.2 18.0 2.6 0.3 3.1 0.3 0.1 10.8 2.2 0.4 0.9 9.4 5.6 4.3 4.2 0.7 8.0 4.5 5.0 2.9 3.2 1.4 1.6 2.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 
40 7.6 23.3 3.6 0.2 1.4 0.3 0.1 8.9 2.6 0.2 0.4 11.0 4.7 4.6 3.1 0.5 5.4 5.9 3.9 1.4 4.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.0 
Panel D: real non-energy commodities price index 
 OR OSN OSP OX LS LD AD GFI GDI GTI CI PR OC EL TL TS PH TT RAV SZ VL MM SL LV OFP OFR OI ORP ONV PM PF PG RAP 
0 1.2 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.5 8.4 24.9 0.9 1.2 0.0 0.5 2.8 1.7 3.1 1.4 0.0 0.4 14.5 1.1 1.7 4.8 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3 1.5 2.0 24.0 - - - 
2 0.2 2.1 0.1 0.5 3.4 12.9 21.2 2.6 0.7 0.2 0.1 2.0 4.5 2.7 0.4 0.2 2.3 12.2 0.3 4.0 3.5 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.4 1.8 2.5 14.8 0.1 1.1 0.0 
4 0.2 2.0 0.9 0.3 3.5 11.7 15.7 3.2 0.5 1.6 0.1 1.5 5.0 2.0 0.8 1.1 3.1 10.1 0.2 9.3 3.6 1.6 0.8 0.7 0.0 1.1 0.7 2.1 2.1 12.9 0.3 1.3 0.0 
6 0.1 2.1 1.1 0.2 3.3 11.0 12.5 3.9 0.4 2.6 0.1 1.0 4.8 1.8 1.3 1.6 3.6 8.7 0.2 11.0 4.0 1.9 1.1 0.9 0.1 1.1 1.1 2.6 1.9 12.2 0.3 1.4 0.0 
8 0.2 2.2 1.0 0.3 3.2 10.8 10.5 4.0 0.4 2.7 0.1 0.8 4.8 2.1 1.6 1.5 3.5 8.0 0.2 11.0 4.8 2.1 1.5 1.0 0.1 1.3 1.5 2.9 2.2 12.1 0.3 1.6 0.0 
12 0.4 2.2 1.2 0.3 2.6 10.8 8.7 3.3 0.3 2.7 0.1 1.1 4.4 2.4 1.6 1.4 3.0 7.6 0.2 11.2 5.7 2.4 1.8 0.8 0.1 1.4 1.8 3.1 2.8 12.5 0.3 1.8 0.0 
20 0.5 2.0 1.5 0.2 2.2 10.9 8.1 2.6 0.2 2.6 0.1 1.6 3.9 2.8 1.3 1.2 2.7 8.6 0.3 11.1 6.0 2.3 1.9 0.7 0.1 1.4 1.7 3.0 3.0 13.2 0.3 2.0 0.0 
40 0.7 1.5 1.3 0.2 2.5 10.6 7.4 2.3 0.2 2.6 0.1 2.2 3.8 3.1 1.2 1.0 2.8 9.3 0.3 11.8 5.6 2.3 1.9 0.7 0.0 1.4 1.7 2.9 2.8 13.2 0.3 2.2 0.0 
 
The table reports the forecast error decomposition for selected variables at various horizons (impact (0) and 2 to 40 quarters), relative to the identified structural shocks: oil reserves (OR), flow oil 
supply (positive, OSP; negative, OSN), oil production mix (OX), oil consumption (OC) and inventories (OI) preferences, labor supply (LS) and demand (LD), aggregate demand (AD), productivity 
(PR), core inflation (CI) and global saving rate (GFI, GDI, GTI), excess liquidity (EL), term structure level (TL) and slope (TS), US terms of trade (TT), stocks (PF), housing (PH) and gold (PG) portfolio 
allocation/preferences, oil futures market-pressure (OFP), residual oil futures market (OFR), other real oil price (ORP), nominal oil price volatility (ONV) and non-energy commodities price (PM), 
size (SZ), value (VL), momentum (MM), stocks' liquidity (SL), leverage (LV), uncertainty (RAV), risk appetite (RAP). The selected variables are the US$ exchange rate index (Panel A), real stock Panel 
B), housing (Panel C) and non-energy commodity (Panel D) prices. A (-) sign denotes imposed zero restrictions on contemporaneous effects. 
